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ABSTRACT†
The intersection of intellectual disability and the death penalty is
now clearly established. Both under the U.S. Supreme Court’s
constitutional decisions and under the terms of many state statutes,
individual defendants who have that disability cannot be sentenced to
death or executed. It now falls to trial, appellate, and post-conviction
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courts to determine which individual criminal defendants are entitled to
the law’s protection.
This Article attempts to assist judges in performing that task. After
a brief discussion of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Atkins v.
Virginia, Hall v. Florida, and Moore v. Texas, it analyzes the component
parts and terminology of the clinical definition of intellectual disability.
It then offers more detailed discussion of a number of the clinical issues
that arise frequently in adjudicating these cases. For each of these
issues, the Article’s text and the accompanying notes attempt to provide
judges with a thorough survey of the relevant clinical literature, and an
explanation of the terminology used by clinical professionals. Our
purpose is to help those judges to become more knowledgeable
consumers of the clinical reports and expert testimony presented to them
in individual cases, and to help them reach decisions that are consistent
with what the clinical literature reveals about the nature of intellectual
disability and best professional practices in the diagnostic process.
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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia1 requires courts
to make determinations about whether individual capital defendants have
intellectual disability (“ID”), also known as mental retardation.2 In a
number of states, there are also statutory provisions protecting capital
defendants with intellectual disability.3 Both trial courts in the first
instance, and reviewing courts in appellate and post-conviction cases,
must therefore address the task of weighing and assessing clinical
evaluations and clinical testimony about a defendant’s claim to Atkins
relief. This Article seeks to offer some assistance to those courts in
considering these cases.
There is a sense in which this subject is not unfamiliar territory for
judges. The question of whether a criminal defendant might have a
significant mental disability has long been a concern for criminal
courts.4 On subjects as diverse as criminal responsibility, 5 competence in

1. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). Background on the Atkins case can be found in THOMAS G.
WALKER, ELIGIBLE FOR EXECUTION: THE STORY OF THE DARYL ATKINS CASE (2009).
2. Clinicians and other professionals in the field of mental disability now use the term
“intellectual disability” in place of “mental retardation.” While the terminology employed by many
in the field has shifted to “intellectual disability,” in large part due to the stigma attached to “mental
retardation,” this Article uses the two terms interchangeably as necessary for clarity when
discussing historical context, and statutes and case law that use the older term. For a fuller
discussion of the change in terminology, see infra Part III.A.
3. Eighteen states and Congress had enacted such statutes prior to the Atkins decision. See
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-15. Many (but not all) of the remaining states with capital punishment
enacted statutes to implement the Supreme Court’s decision. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376
(West 2011 & Supp. 2018) (enacted in 2003); see also James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the
Death Penalty: A Guide to State Legislative Issues, 27 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY LAW
REPORTER 11, 11 (2003) [hereinafter Legislative Guide].
4. See, e.g., HENRY WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE (1954);
Barbara A. Weiner, Mental Disability and the Criminal Law, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND
THE LAW 693, 693-801 (Samuel Jan Brakel et al. eds., 3d ed. 1985).
5. See, e.g., Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006); see also MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE
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various issues,6 and sentencing,7 courts have recognized the importance
of determining whether a defendant is currently functioning with a
mental disability, or may have been impaired by such a disability at the
time of the offense with which he is charged.8 Although many of the best
known cases have involved defendants with some form of mental
illness,9 it is clear that courts and legislatures have long recognized the
relevance of a defendant’s intellectual disability in criminal cases.10
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1994); DANIEL N. ROBINSON, WILD BEASTS & IDLE
HUMOURS: THE INSANITY DEFENSE FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT (1996).
6. See, e.g., Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 167, 170, 174-78 (2008) (competence for
self-representation); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam) (same); Drope v.
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975) (same); Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996) (competence to
stand trial); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (competence to be executed). See generally
NORMAN G. POYTHRESS ET AL., ADJUDICATIVE COMPETENCE: THE MACARTHUR STUDIES (2002);
THOMAS GRISSO ET AL., EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND
INSTRUMENTS ch. 1-5 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing various criminal competencies including
incompetence to stand trial; competence to waive rights to silence and legal counsel); MICHAEL L.
PERLIN ET AL., COMPETENCE IN THE LAW: FROM LEGAL THEORY TO CLINICAL APPLICATION
(2008); Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47
U. MIAMI L. REV. 539 (1993); David Freedman, When Is a Capitally Charged Defendant
Incompetent to Stand Trial?, 32 INT’L J. LAW & PSYCHIATRY 127 (2009); RONALD ROESCH &
STEPHEN L. GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL (1980); MARK C. BARDWELL & BRUCE A.
ARRIGO, CRIMINAL COMPETENCY ON TRIAL: THE CASE OF COLIN FERGUSON (2002).
7. See, e.g., Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233 (2007); Brewer v. Quarterman, 550
U.S. 286 (2007); Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004); Penry v. Johnson (Penry II), 532 U.S.
782 (2001).
8. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS (1988) [hereinafter ABA
MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 1988, std. 7-X.Y]. The American Bar Association (ABA) draws
distinctions regarding the difficulty of assessing mental condition among an individual’s present
condition, condition at the time of the crime, and predictions regarding future mental state. See id.
std. 7-3.12 & commentary. Since intellectual disability is a disability that does not change
substantially in an individual over time, these distinctions are less significant and less difficult than
they are in cases involving mental illness. See discussion infra Parts IV.C and VII.B.
The ABA has recently adopted a revised set of Standards, ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE
MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS (2016) [hereinafter ABA MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 2016, std. 7X.Y]. Since the 2016 version of the Standards does not yet have accompanying Commentary, this
Article will refer readers to both sets of Standards. None of the Standards cited here reflect
substantive changes between the 1988 and 2016 versions. The comparable 2016 Standard on
retrospective, current, and prospective mental condition is found at ABA MENTAL HEALTH
STANDARDS 2016, std. 7-3.10(c).
9. See, e.g., CHARLES E. ROSENBERG, THE TRIAL OF THE ASSASSIN GUITEAU 134 (1996);
LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR. 45 (1984);
RICHARD MORAN, KNOWING RIGHT FROM WRONG: THE INSANITY DEFENSE OF DANIEL
MCNAUGHTAN 47 (1981).
10. See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants with Mental
Retardation to Participate in Their Own Defense, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 419, 422-24
(1990); James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 414 (1985) [hereinafter Ellis & Luckasson, Defendants]; THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM AND MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFENDANTS AND VICTIMS (Ronald W. Conley, Ruth
Luckasson & George N. Bouthilet eds., 1992); JOHN PARRY, AM. BAR ASS’N, CRIMINAL MENTAL
HEALTH AND DISABILITY LAW, EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY: A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE
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American courts have also had occasion to determine whether a
particular individual has intellectual disability in a variety of civil
settings, including special education,11 Social Security disability
claims,12 discrimination cases under the Americans with Disabilities
Act,13 and guardianship and residential placement.14 But with the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia, as well as the
enactment of state and federal statutes precluding the death penalty for
individuals who have intellectual disability (including both the statutes
enacted prior to Atkins and legislation passed subsequently), the crucial
importance of using clinical standards, particularly in death penalty
cases, is clear.15
MANUAL FOR LAWYERS, JUDGES AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROFESSIONALS 309-11 (2009)
[hereinafter PARRY, ABA REFERENCE MANUAL] (intellectual disability in incompetency cases).
11. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (2012) (specifically including “intellectual disabilities”
within the definition of “child with a disability” in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(“IDEA”)); see, e.g., Timothy W. v. Rochester, N.H., Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 954, 961, 972-73 (1st Cir.
1989) (child with multiple handicaps, including intellectual disability, meets statutory definition of
handicapped child); Parks v. Pavkovic, 753 F.2d 1397, 1406 (7th Cir. 1985) (“In light of the close
connection between mental retardation and special educational need, it comes as no surprise that
developmental disability, far from being an exempted category, is an important subcategory of the
handicaps covered by the Act.”). Indeed, much of the impetus for the enactment of the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act (now IDEA) in 1975 can be traced to judicial rejection of the
then-common practice of excluding or segregating children with intellectual disability. See LAURA
ROTHSTEIN & SCOTT F. JOHNSON, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 12 (5th ed. 2013) (citing cases such
as Penn. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971)).
12. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 524-26, 540 (1990) (discussing definition of
‘mental retardation’ for purposes of Social Security disability claims); Walker v. Massanari, 149 F.
Supp. 2d 843 (S.D. Iowa 2001) (discussing evaluation of IQ testing in the context of a
Social Security disability claim); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MENTAL RETARDATION:
DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS (Daniel J. Reschly et al. eds., 2002).
(The Social Security Administration recently revised its definition of intellectual disability, using
the term “Intellectual Disorder.” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00(B)(4) (2018).) See infra
Part III.A for a discussion of terminology changes.
13. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 & note on findings and purposes
(West 2013); John W. Parry & Amy L. Allbright, The ADA Amendments Act of 2008: Analysis &
Commentary, 32 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY LAW REPORTER 695 (2008).
14. See, e.g., Dorothy Squatrito Millar & Adelle Renzaglia, Factors Affecting Guardianship
Practices for Young Adults with Disabilities, 68 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 465 (2002). For a fuller
discussion of the role of intellectual disabilities in a variety of legal contexts, see BRUCE DENNIS
SALES ET AL., AM. BAR ASS’N, DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW: STATE LEGISLATIVE ISSUES
(1982).
15. See Caroline Everington & J. Gregory Olley, Implications of Atkins v. Virginia: Issues in
Defining and Diagnosing Mental Retardation, 8 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY PRACTICE, no. 1, 2008,
at 1, 4-5 [hereinafter Everington & Olley, Defining and Diagnosing] (“Certainly, there is no
assessment situation where the stakes are higher.”).
Viewed another way, the stakes in an Atkins case are not only high but also asymmetrical:
an incorrect or questionable determination that a defendant does not have intellectual disability can
result in his execution, but an incorrect or questionable determination that he does have the
disability is still likely to result in his lifelong imprisonment. From that perspective, the
consequence of an Atkins determination is dramatically different from that of an acquittal on
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The purpose of this Article is to assist the courts in assessing the
evaluations performed by intellectual disability professionals, and to
assist those clinicians in preparing evaluation reports that will be of
value to the courts. Toward that end, we will attempt to offer courts and
practitioners the benefit of the most current scholarship in the field of
intellectual disability,16 and to indicate the areas where there is
consensus among scholars and clinicians, as well as those issues on
which there is uncertainty or disagreement.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISIONS IN ATKINS, HALL, AND MOORE
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the
constitutionality of imposing the death penalty on individuals with
intellectual disability in the 1989 case of Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry I).17
In that case the Court, over the dissent of four Justices, held that the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment did
not preclude imposition of the death penalty on an individual who had
mental retardation.18 The Court observed that since only two states and
Congress had then passed legislation protecting defendants with mental
retardation, “at present there is insufficient evidence of a national
consensus against executing mentally retarded people convicted of
capital offenses for us to conclude that it is categorically prohibited by
the Eighth Amendment.”19
During the following thirteen years, a number of additional states
passed such legislation.20 When the Court revisited the constitutional
issue in Atkins, it concluded that these enactments provided “powerful
evidence that today our society views mentally retarded offenders as
categorically less culpable than the average criminal.”21
grounds of insanity, since the latter reduces the criminal justice system’s options to either releasing
the acquittee or seeking some form of civil commitment. See ABA MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS
1988, supra note 8, stds. 7-7.1 to -7.11, (criteria and procedures for commitment of insanity
acquittees); ABA MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 2016, supra note 8, stds. 7-7.1 to -7.12 (same);
James W. Ellis, The Consequences of the Insanity Defense: Proposals to Reform Post-Acquittal
Commitment Laws, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 961 (1986).
16. See Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1049 (2017) (“[B]eing informed by the medical
community does not demand adherence to everything stated in the latest medical guide. But neither
does our precedent license disregard of current medical standards.”).
17. 492 U.S. 302 (1989). Background on the Penry case can be found in Jordan M. Steiker,
Penry v. Lynaugh: The Hazards of Predicting the Future, in DEATH PENALTY STORIES 277 (John
H. Blume & Jordan M. Steiker eds., 2009).
18. Penry I, 492 U.S. at 340, 350.
19. Id. at 335 (emphasis added).
20. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314-16 (2002).
21. Id. The Court also observed that “[t]he evidence carries even greater force when it is
noted that the legislatures that have addressed the issue have voted overwhelmingly in favor of the
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While the existence of a national consensus against the practice of
executing defendants with mental retardation would have been sufficient
to support a prohibition under the Eighth Amendment, the Justices went
on to analyze for themselves the relevant evidence regarding the
characteristics of individuals with mental retardation.22 The Court
observed that “[o]ur independent evaluation of the issue reveals no
reason to disagree with the judgment of the legislatures that have
recently addressed the matter and concluded that death is not a suitable
punishment for a mentally retarded criminal.”23 Justice Stevens’s
majority opinion began by noting the difference between the mens rea
required for conviction and the higher level of culpability necessary for
the imposition of the death penalty:
Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference between
right and wrong and are competent to stand trial. Because of their
impairments, however, by definition they have diminished capacities
to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract
from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical
reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of
others.24

The Court then compared these common characteristics of
defendants with mental retardation to the constitutionally permissible
justifications for imposing the death penalty, namely retribution and
deterrence.25 The majority opinion noted, “[u]nless the imposition of the
death penalty on a mentally retarded person measurably contributes to
one or both of these goals, it is nothing more than the purposeless
and needless imposition of pain and suffering, and hence an
unconstitutional punishment.”26
The decision then discussed the justifications based on
retributive theories:
With respect to retribution—the interest in seeing that the offender gets
his “just deserts”—the severity of the appropriate punishment
necessarily depends on the culpability of the offender. . . . If the
culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the most
extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of the

prohibition.” Id. at 316.
22. See id. at 317-21.
23. Id. at 321 (internal quotation omitted).
24. Id. at 318.
25. Id. at 318-21; id. at 321 (“We are not persuaded that the execution of mentally retarded
criminals will measurably advance the deterrent or the retributive purpose of the death penalty.”).
26. Id. at 319 (internal quotation omitted).
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mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form
of retribution.27

Similarly, regarding deterrence, the Court found that attributes of the
disability of mental retardation made that theory of limited applicability:
The theory of deterrence in capital sentencing is predicated upon the
notion that the increased severity of the punishment will inhibit
criminal actors from carrying out murderous conduct. Yet it is the
same cognitive and behavioral impairments that make these defendants
less morally culpable—for example, the diminished ability to
understand and process information, to learn from experience, to
engage in logical reasoning, or to control impulses—that also make it
less likely that they can process the information of the possibility of
execution as a penalty and, as a result, control their conduct based
upon that information.28

After reviewing each of these considerations, the Court held that
“[c]onstruing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our
‘evolving standards of decency,’ we therefore conclude such punishment
is excessive and that the Constitution places a substantive restriction on
the State’s power to take the life of a mentally retarded offender.”29
Having established that restriction as a principle of constitutional
law, the Court declined to simultaneously dictate precise procedures for
its implementation.30 As it had done earlier regarding the issue of a
capital defendant’s competence to be executed, the Court initially left to
the states “the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the
constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.”31 In
response, courts were either guided by legislative enactments in their
states,32 or fashioned procedures on their own.33 Since the “substantive
restriction on the State’s power to take the life of a mentally retarded
offender”34 is now dictated by the Constitution, the States face more
challenges to their ability to restrict a defendant’s access to Atkins relief

27. Id.
28. Id. at 320.
29. Id. at 321 (internal quotation omitted).
30. See id. at 317.
31. Id. at 317 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405, 416-17 (1986)). For a fuller
discussion of the procedural options available to the states, see generally Legislative Guide, supra
note 3.
32. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376 (West 2011) (establishing procedures for assessing
Atkins defenses in new cases).
33. See, e.g., In re Hawthorne, 105 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2005) (establishing procedures for
assessing Atkins claims in post-conviction cases).
34. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (emphasis added) (internal quotation omitted).
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than was true when the prohibition on executing individuals with mental
retardation was a discretionary state policy.35
A. Hall v. Florida
The first such challenge to be addressed by the Supreme Court
came a dozen years after Atkins in the case of Hall v. Florida.36 In that
case, the Court found that Florida’s refusal to consider the standard error
of measurement in determining a defendant’s intellectual functioning
was unconstitutional under Atkins.37 In resolving that question, the Court
shed some useful light on its own understanding of Atkins.
In Atkins, the Court had said “we leave to the State[s] the task of
developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction
upon [their] execution of sentences.”38 However, questions about the
precise extent of the latitude granted to states by that passage led to
differing interpretations of it, and Hall was the Court’s first statement
addressing that issue. Some believed that the discretion left to the states
was limitless, and that states could fashion any procedures and any
definition of intellectual disability that they wanted.39 In rejecting
Florida’s effective narrowing of the group of defendants protected by
Atkins, the Hall opinion made clear that the Atkins decision’s deference
to the states has important substantive limits.40 Although the Court noted
that “the States play a critical role in advancing protections and
providing the Court with information that contributes to an
understanding of how intellectual disability should be measured and
assessed,”41 Hall was emphatic that the role of the states was not
unlimited. “But Atkins did not give the states unfettered discretion to
define the full scope of the constitutional protection.”42 In explaining the
35. Compare, e.g., Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798-99 (1952) (holding that it is
constitutional for a State to place the insanity defense burden, which is discretionary, at the level of
“beyond a reasonable doubt”), with Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 355-56, 366-67, 369 (1996)
(holding that it is unconstitutional for a state to impose the burden of proving incompetence to stand
trial, which is not discretionary, at the level of “clear and convincing evidence”).
36. 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014). The only earlier case that addressed an issue tangentially related
to Atkins was Bobby v. Bies, in which the Court held that a state was not precluded under the Double
Jeopardy Clause from contesting a defendant’s Atkins claim where the issue of whether he had
intellectual disability had not been fully litigated in previous proceedings. Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S.
825, 828-29, 836-37 (2009).
37. The issue of standard error of measurement (“SEM”) and the holding of Hall are
discussed in detail infra Part VI.C.
38. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405, 416-17 (1986)).
39. See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2000-01.
40. Id. at 1998-99.
41. Id. at 1998.
42. Id.; see also Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1048 (2017).
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limits on the ability of the states to interpret its decisions, the
Court observed:
If the States were to have complete autonomy to define intellectual
disability as they wished, the Court’s decision in Atkins could become
a nullity, and the Eighth Amendment’s protection of human dignity
would not become a reality. This Court thus reads Atkins to provide
substantial guidance on the definition of intellectual disability. 43

The opinion in Hall also made clear that the Court takes the Atkins
principle very seriously. Having observed that a crucial function of the
Eighth Amendment is to “reaffirm[] the duty of the government to
respect the dignity of all persons,”44 the Court concluded that “Florida’s
law contravenes our Nation’s commitment to dignity and its duty to
teach human decency as the mark of a civilized world.”45 And, in
implementing that principle, the Court emphasized that “[t]he clinical
definitions of intellectual disability . . . were a fundamental premise
of Atkins.”46
B. Moore v. Texas
Three years after the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the
standard error of measurement in Hall, it considered issues regarding
adaptive behavior in Moore v. Texas.47 As it had in Hall, the Court in
Moore emphasized the importance of adherence to scientific standards in
the adjudication of Atkins cases: “Hall indicated that being informed by
the medical community does not demand adherence to everything stated
in the latest medical guide. But neither does our precedent license
disregard of current medical standards.”48
The Moore majority first addressed the intellectual functioning
prong of the definition of intellectual disability.49 The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals (“CCA”) had held that the defendant had failed to
satisfy this component of the definition because it believed that his
scores on seven intelligence quotient (“IQ”) tests taken over his lifetime
43. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1999.
44. Id. at 1992 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005)).
45. Id. at 2001.
46. Id. at 1999 (emphasis added); see also Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1049.
47. 137 S. Ct. at 1039. The issues surrounding deficits in adaptive behavior are discussed in
greater detail infra Part VII. The Supreme Court had briefly touched on both IQ and adaptive
behavior issues in Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2276-82 (2015). The main focus of that
decision was on habeas procedural questions, but the Court did consider some adaptive behavior
issues in order to resolve the larger procedural question. Id.
48. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1049.
49. Id. at 1049-50.
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failed to demonstrate that he had the requisite intellectual impairment. 50
But the Supreme Court rejected that conclusion,51 holding that the lower
court was required to “continue the inquiry and consider other evidence
of intellectual disability where an individual’s IQ score, adjusted for the
test’s standard error, falls within the clinically established range for
intellectual-functioning deficits.”52
Turning to the definition’s requirement of deficits in adaptive
functioning, the Court clearly rejected the Texas practice of requiring
Atkins courts to evaluate clinical testimony in light of non-clinical
considerations which had no support in the clinical or scientific
literature.53 The Supreme Court noted that the CCA’s “balancing” of
deficits in the individual’s adaptive behavior against purported
“strengths,” was inconsistent with clinical standards because “the
medical community focuses the adaptive-functioning inquiry on
adaptive deficits.”54 The Court also rejected the practice of relying upon
testimony about the functioning of a defendant in prison, noting that
such evidence is likely to be distorted “in a controlled setting, as a prison
surely is.”55 In addition, the Court rejected the notion that the existence
of additional clinical diagnoses (known as comorbid conditions) was
somehow disqualifying for a diagnosis of intellectual disability.56 “The
existence of a personality disorder or mental-health issue, in short, is not
evidence that a person does not also have intellectual disability.”57
The rejection of the Texas “Briseno factors” was particularly
emphatic. The Court stated: “By design and in operation, the Briseno
factors creat[e] an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual
disability will be executed.”58 (Although the Court was divided on other
issues, its rejection of the Briseno factors was unanimous.59) Texas’s
50. Id. at 1047.
51. Id. at 1049 (“The CCA’s conclusion that Moore’s IQ scores established that he is not
intellectually disabled is irreconcilable with Hall.”).
52. Id. at 1050.
53. Id. at 1050-52.
54. Id. at 1050 (emphasis added). For a fuller discussion of strengths and weaknesses in
adaptive deficits, see infra Part VII.C.
55. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1050 (internal quotation omitted). For additional information on the
dangers of the use of a defendant’s functioning in prison as part of an evaluation for intellectual
disability, see infra notes 126-28.
56. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051. For more information on comorbidity, see infra Part V.
57. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051 (internal quotation omitted).
58. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted); see Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d
1, 6-9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). For a more in-depth discussion of the rejection of the Briseno
factors, see infra Part VII.E.
59. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1053 (“I agree with the Court today that those factors are an
unacceptable method of enforcing the guarantee of Atkins, and that the CCA therefore erred in using
them to analyze adaptive deficits.”) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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implicit reliance on stereotypes about people with intellectual disability
was severely criticized,60 with the Supreme Court describing them as
“wholly non-clinical.”61 The Court concluded that the Texas court had
“failed adequately to inform itself of the medical community’s
diagnostic framework. Because Briseno pervasively infected the CCA’s
analysis, the decision of that court cannot stand.”62
Taken together, Hall and Moore emphasize that the Eighth
Amendment requires adhering to the contemporary clinical
understanding of intellectual disability that is reflected in the clinical
literature and in the judgments by the professional associations of those
who study and work in the field of intellectual disability.63
*******
Determining which defendants fall within the scope of the law’s
protection is the solemn responsibility of state and lower federal courts,64
and the following Parts of this Article are intended to offer them
assistance with specific issues that will arise in that task.
III.

NOTES ON CHANGING TERMINOLOGY

A. The Change from “Mental Retardation” to “Intellectual Disability”
The term “mental retardation” has become the subject of
considerable discussion in recent years among professionals in the field.
Those professionals and others in the disability community now employ
the term “intellectual disability” in place of “mental retardation.”65
60. Id. at 1051-53; id. at 1052 (“[T]he medical profession has endeavored to counter lay
stereotypes of the intellectually disabled.”). For a fuller discussion of stereotypes, see infra Part
VII.E.
61. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1053.
62. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation omitted).
63. See id. at 1044 (“As we instructed in Hall, adjudications of intellectual disability should
be ‘informed by the views of medical experts.’ That instruction cannot sensibly be read to give
courts leave to diminish the force of the medical community’s consensus.” (citations omitted)).
64. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002).
65. See Robert L. Schalock et al., The Renaming of Mental Retardation: Understanding the
Change to the Term Intellectual Disability, 45 INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES
116 (2007) (explaining that the change in terminology involves no substantive change in the
definition); see also AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES, USER’S GUIDE: TO ACCOMPANY THE 11TH EDITION OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY:
DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 72 (2012) [hereinafter AAIDD, USER’S
GUIDE 2012] (“The term intellectual disability covers the same population of individuals who were
diagnosed previously with mental retardation in number, kind, level, type, and duration of the
disability and the need by people with this disability for individualized services and supports.
Furthermore, every individual who is or was eligible for a diagnosis of mental retardation is eligible
for a diagnosis of intellectual disability.”); AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON INTELLECTUAL AND
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND
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These concerns about the term “mental retardation” led the principal
organizations in the field to change their names: the organization
previously known as the Association for Retarded Citizens of the United
States is now known simply as “The Arc,” and the American
Association on Mental Retardation (“AAMR”) has renamed itself “The
American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities”
(“AAIDD”).66 The current (11th) edition of AAIDD’s classification
manual reflects the change as well.67
The concerns that have produced this shift in terminology result, in
large part, from the perception that the term “mental retardation” is
stigmatizing to individuals who bear the label of the disability.68 The
intense negative reaction to the label “mental retardation” was a central
part of the decision to change terminology within the field.69
SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS, at xvi (11th ed. 2010) [hereinafter AAIDD 2010] (same). The American
Psychiatric Association also now uses the term “intellectual disability.” AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 33 (5th ed. 2013)
[hereinafter APA, DSM-5] (“Thus, intellectual disability is the term in common use by medical,
educational, and other professions and by the lay public and advocacy groups.”).
66. See Ruth Luckasson & Alya Reeve, Naming, Defining and Classifying in Mental
Retardation, 39 MENTAL RETARDATION 47, 48 (2001) (noting that The Arc changed its name);
Editor’s Note, 45 INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES at ii (Feb. 2007) (explaining
that AAIDD had changed its name). Similarly, the principal professional journals in the field have
changed their names. “MENTAL RETARDATION” is now “INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES,” Editor’s Note, 45 INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES at ii (Feb.
2007), and the “AMERICAN JOURNAL ON MENTAL RETARDATION” is now the “AMERICAN JOURNAL
ON INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES,” Leonard Abbeduto, Editorial, 114 AM. J.
ON INELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 1, 1 (2009). Comparable changes have also
taken place within government. For example, the U.S. President’s Committee on Mental
Retardation is now named “President’s Committee for People with Intellectual Disabilities.” See
Exec. Order No. 13309, 3 C.F.R., 2003 Comp., p. 240-41 (2003).
67. AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 3. Like previous editions, the latest version of the
classification manual is the product of a team of eighteen scholars from a variety of professional
disciplines who have a wide range of professional experience with people who have intellectual
disabilities. See id. at v-vi.
In addition to its definition and classification manual, AAIDD also publishes a “User’s
Guide” to each edition. See, e.g., AAIDD, USER’S GUIDE 2012, supra note 65. Courts often find the
explanations in those Guides to be helpful in Atkins cases. See, e.g., Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1049; Hall
v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1995 (2014); Thomas v. Allen, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1289-92 (N.D.
Ala. 2009).
68. See, e.g., Gary N. Siperstein et al., Sticks, Stones, and Stigma: A Study of Students’ Use of
the Derogatory Term “Retard,” 48 INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 126 (2010);
Avery B. Albert et al., Sticks, Stones, and Stigma: Student Bystander Behavior in Response to
Hearing the Word “Retard,” 54 INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 391, 397 (2016);
AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 3; Nicole Ditchman et al., Stigma and Intellectual Disability:
Potential Application of Mental Illness Research, 58 REHABILITATION PSYCHOLOGY 206 (2013);
Sasha M. Zeedyk et al., Bullying Youth with IDD: Collateral Effects, in MALTREATMENT OF PEOPLE
WITH INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 109-35 (John R. Lutzker, Kate
Guastaferro & Megan L. Benka-Coker eds., 2016).
69. Robert L. Schalock et al., The Renaming of Mental Retardation: Understanding the
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It is well established, however, that the change in clinically
preferred terminology has made no difference in the substance of our
understanding of the disability or the characteristics of those who fall
within the definition. AAIDD has made clear that the meaning of the
term “intellectual disability” is the same as the meaning of “mental
retardation.”70 Indeed, the definition of “intellectual disability” is
identical to the previous definition of “mental retardation.”71 The
contours of the group that fell within the definition of mental retardation
are precisely the same as the group of individuals who will now be
diagnosed as having intellectual disabilities.
In its recent decision in Hall v. Florida,72 the Supreme Court took
note of the changing terminology and adopted the term “intellectual
disability” as synonymous with “mental retardation.”73
Because of the language in the original Supreme Court decision in
Atkins, and because of the terms used in the statutes of many of the
states, it is anticipated that most courts will continue to encounter the
term “mental retardation” in some documents and testimony when
adjudicating Atkins claims. This should not cause any practical
difficulties for the courts, so long as judges bear in mind that most
clinical reports will now employ the term “intellectual disability,” as will
most publications of newer clinical research in the field.
B. Terminology Regarding the Extent of Disability
In addition to the terminology discussed above—“intellectual
disability” (previously “mental retardation”)—reports and testimony in
Atkins cases may also include other clinical terms unfamiliar to courts.
This is particularly likely when reference is made to reports or other
older documents prepared at an earlier time in the defendant’s life.74
Change to the Term Intellectual Disability, 45 INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES
116 (2007). This negative reaction also led Congress to change the designation in many federal
statutes. See, e.g., Rosa’s Law, Pub. L. No. 111-256, 124 Stat. 2643, 2781 (2010).
70. AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 3 (“The term intellectual disability (ID) is used
throughout this Manual to replace the previously used term mental retardation.”) (emphasis
omitted).
71. See supra note 65.
72. 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).
73. Id. at 1990 (“This opinion uses the term ‘intellectual disability’ to describe the identical
phenomenon.”); id. at 2001-02 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269,
2274 n.1 (2015). The Court’s shift in terminology has been welcomed in the disability and clinical
communities. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, It’s ‘Intellectual Disability’ Now, NATIONAL LAW J., June 2,
2014, at 20.
74. For a brief overview of the history of earlier systems of classification and the terminology
those systems employed, see Randy W. Kamphaus et al., A History of Intelligence Test
Interpretation, in CONTEMPORARY INTELLECTUAL ASSESSMENT: THEORIES, TESTS, AND ISSUES 56,
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Some of these terms, such as “idiot,” “moral idiot,”75 “imbecile,”
“moral imbecile,”76 and “feeble-minded,” which were commonly used
by clinicians in an earlier era,77 have long since been abandoned by
scholars in the field, and are now viewed as offensive slurs.78 The term
“mental deficiency,” which was in use as recently as the 1980s as a
synonym for mental retardation, has also been abandoned.79
Courts are more likely to encounter the terms “mild,” “moderate,”
“severe,” and “profound” as modifiers of the term “mental retardation.”
As the terminology suggests, these terms were part of a taxonomy
attempting to describe the degree of an individual’s mental
impairment.80 The boundaries between these categories were originally
established solely by reference to IQ scores, with “profound” mental
retardation describing individuals with IQ scores below 20 or 25, etc.81
Categorizing individuals on the basis of IQ scores (which are distributed
along a normal bell-shaped curve), meant that roughly 80-90% of
individuals with mental retardation were identified as having “mild
mental retardation.”82 In the criminal justice system, the percentage of
individuals with “mild” mental retardation would be substantially
higher, with very few defendants in the “moderate” classification, and
practically none in the “severe” or “profound” categories.83
56-59 (Dawn P. Flanagan & Patti L. Harrison eds., 3d ed. 2012).
75. See JAMES W. TRENT, JR., INVENTING THE FEEBLE MIND: A HISTORY OF MENTAL
RETARDATION IN THE UNITED STATES 20-23 (1994).
76. Id. at 84-88; NICOLE HAHN RAFTER, CREATING BORN CRIMINALS 73-92 (1997) (Chapter
4: The Rise of the Moral Imbecile).
77. See, e.g., WILLIAM WOTHERSPOON IRELAND, THE MENTAL AFFECTIONS OF CHILDREN:
IDIOCY, IMBECILITY AND INSANITY (1898); see also Phillip M. Ferguson, The Development of
Systems of Supports: Intellectual Disability in Middle Modern Times (1800 CE to 1899 CE), in THE
STORY OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: AN EVOLUTION OF MEANING, UNDERSTANDING, AND
PUBLIC PERCEPTION 79, 94-97 (Michael L. Wehmeyer ed., 2013).
78. See, e.g., Martha E. Snell & Ruth Luckasson et al., Characteristics and Needs of People
with Intellectual Disability Who Have Higher IQs, 47 INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES 220, 221 (2009) [hereinafter Snell, Characteristics].
79. See, e.g., James W. Ellis, It’s Time to Change AAMD’s Name, 24 MENTAL RETARDATION
319, 319 (1986) (guest editorial arguing for abandonment of the archaic term “mental deficiency”).
80. Less frequently, courts may encounter the terms “educable” and “trainable” as modifiers
of “mental retardation.” “Educable” roughly coincided with “mild” mental retardation, while
“trainable” was interchangeable with “moderate” mental retardation. See, e.g., AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION glossary at
170, 200 (rev. 1983) [hereinafter AAMD 1983]. These terms are now abandoned as archaic.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 43 (4th ed. text rev. 2000) [hereinafter APA, DSM-IV-TR] (“This outdated term
[‘trainable’] should not be used because it wrongly implies that people with Moderate Mental
Retardation cannot benefit from educational programs.”).
81. AAMD 1983, supra note 80, at 13.
82. See, e.g., Snell, Characteristics, supra note 77, at 220.
83. See Gilbert S. Macvaugh, III & Mark D. Cunningham, Atkins v. Virginia: Implications
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The American Association on Mental Retardation (now AAIDD)
abandoned the mild/moderate/severe/profound classification more than
two decades ago, because it found the focus on classifying people with
mental retardation on the basis of their IQ scores was less helpful than
focusing on their adaptive functioning and their individual needs for
supports.84 The American Psychiatric Association lists the four terms in
its diagnostic manual, but differentiates the described sub-groups by
adaptive deficits rather than by IQ scores.85 Whatever the clinical merits
might be, these labels are unlikely to be particularly helpful to Atkins
courts in their task of resolving the diagnostic issue before them.86
Essentially all the individuals in the criminal justice system—and
therefore all the defendants in Atkins cases—fall within the same subcategory, “mild.”87 As a result, the label “mild” generally lacks
and Recommendations for Forensic Practice, 37 J. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 131, 142 (2009)
[hereinafter Macvaugh & Cunningham, Forensic Practice] (“[V]irtually all [capital offenders with
mental retardation] are within the mild category of mental retardation.”); Daniel J. Reschly,
Documenting the Developmental Origins of Mild Mental Retardation, 16 APPLIED
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 124, 125 (2009) [hereinafter Reschly, Documenting Origins] (“Death penalty
appeals involving claims of MR [mental retardation] . . . virtually always involve MMR [mild
mental retardation].”).
84. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION:
DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 34 (9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter AAMR
1992]; see also Gary N. Siperstein & Melissa A. Collins, Intellectual Disability, in THE DEATH
PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 21, 25 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015) (describing the
debate in the clinical community about the subcategories).
One group of distinguished clinicians has recently observed:
Once an individual’s IQ is known (which was essential for the diagnosis) nothing further
is gained by classification of that IQ score into an IQ band or range. . . . To attempt to
create different diagnostic criteria for the already small group of individuals with
intellectual disability, and to separate and identify them into diagnostic groups (mild
intellectual disability and moderate intellectual disability, for example) is not supported
and may introduce additional error. This notion of separate diagnoses would take us
backwards to the incorrect stereotype that individuals with intellectual disability with
higher IQs have “mild” needs, and those with lower IQs have “profound” needs, neither
of which provides any specificity for designing individualized supports.
Snell, Characteristics, supra note 77, at 228.
85. APA, DSM-5, supra note 65, at 33 (“The various levels of severity are defined on the
basis of adaptive functioning, and not IQ scores, because it is adaptive functioning that determines
the level of supports required. Moreover, IQ measures are less valid in the lower end of the IQ
range.”). By contrast, the earlier version of the APA’s manual had classified four levels of severity
based on IQ scores. APA, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 80, at 42-44.
86. See Ellis & Luckasson, Defendants, supra note 10, at 423 (“Mildly retarded people have
IQ scores in the range between 50 to 55 and approximately 70, and thus have a substantial
disability. Judges and other criminal justice personnel unfamiliar with this classification scheme
may find the labels of ‘mild’ and ‘moderate’ to be euphemistic descriptions of individuals at those
levels of disability.”).
87. Marc J. Tassé, Adaptive Behavior Assessment and the Diagnosis of Mental Retardation in
Capital Cases, 16 APPLIED NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 114, 117 (2009) [hereinafter Tassé, Adaptive
Behavior and Diagnosis] (reporting that because the “vast majority” of people with mental
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descriptive or analytical usefulness in distinguishing those who are
within the protection of Atkins.
Courts may also encounter a reference, particularly in older
documents and records, to an individual’s supposed “mental age,” a term
that was once used in the field of intellectual disability to describe the
relative severity of an individual’s intellectual limitation.88 An
individual’s “mental age” can simultaneously underestimate and
overestimate the intellectual functioning of the adult to whom it is
applied. An adult with intellectual disability will have the physical
development and some of the interests and experiences of his nondisabled age peers; a “mental age” equivalence to children represents a
substantial underestimation in that sense.89 Mental age substantially
overestimates important problem-solving abilities because it markedly
overstates the ability of adults with intellectual disability to use logic and
foresight in addressing and solving problems.90
Another frequently encountered term, “developmental disabilities,”
has multiple meanings, and care must be taken to make certain what an
author (or individual clinician) means by the term in a particular context.
Sometimes the term is used loosely as a synonym for “mental
retardation” or “intellectual disability.” More formally (and frequently),
it is an umbrella term which encompasses intellectual disability, but also
some other disabilities that originate in childhood.91 Much of the clinical
retardation fall within the so-called “mild mental retardation” category, “[t]he vast majority of
‘Atkins claims,’ if not all, will likely involve individuals who have intellectual and adaptive
functioning levels that are near the diagnostic cut-off range.”); see Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039,
1051 (2017) (“Mild levels of intellectual disability, although they may fall outside Texas citizens’
consensus, nevertheless remain intellectual disabilities, and States may not execute anyone in the
entire category of [intellectually disabled] offenders.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation omitted)).
88. See, e.g., AAMD 1983, supra note 80, glossary at 183 (defining “mental age”). An
individual’s “mental age” was calculated as the chronological age of children without intellectual
disability whose average IQ test performance was equivalent to that of the individual who did have
intellectual disability. See, e.g., DAVID WECHSLER, THE MEASUREMENT OF ADULT INTELLIGENCE
20-36 (1st ed. 1939). The equivalence between children who do not have intellectual disability and
adults who do have ID was always, of course, imprecise, and the terminology has not been used in
references like AAIDD’s classification manuals for more than thirty years. See, e.g., AAMR 1992,
supra note 84.
89. See Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry I), 492 U.S. 302, 339-40 (1989).
90. See id. at 339; Herman H. Spitz, Intellectual Extremes, Mental Age, and the Nature of
Human Intelligence, 28 MERRILL-PALMER QUARTERLY 167, 171 (1982) (“Although the retarded
and gifted had equal MAs [mental ages] they arrived at these MAs by different means.
Consequently, it makes no sense to talk about the two groups being at the same developmental
level, or being able to perform at the same cognitive level.”). Somewhat less problematic are
references which courts may encounter that compare the adult defendant with younger persons
regarding a specific academic ability (e.g. “reads at a third-grade level”).
91. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 15002(8)(A) (2012) (defining developmental disabilities in
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literature on developmental disabilities focuses primarily on individuals
with intellectual disability.92
Another term courts may encounter is “borderline,” which is,
unfortunately, a term of considerable ambiguity. The word is sometimes
used to describe individuals who fall just outside the definition of
intellectual disability. This could include a person whose measured
intelligence does not meet the definition’s requirement, or someone who
lacks sufficient impairment in adaptive behavior. This is the sense in
which the term is most frequently encountered in the published clinical
literature.93 But the term is also sometimes used more informally to
Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights legislation); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 4512(a) (West 2016) (“‘Developmental Disability’ means a disability that originates before an
individual attains 18 years of age; continues, or can be expected to continue, indefinitely; and
constitutes a substantial disability for that individual. . . . [T]his term shall include intellectual
disability, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, and autism. This term shall also include disabling conditions
found to be closely related to intellectual disability or to require treatment similar to that required
for individuals with an intellectual disability, but shall not include other handicapping conditions
that are solely physical in nature.”); see also APA, DSM-5, supra note 65, at 31 (including
Intellectual Disabilities within the category of “Neurodevelopmental Disorders”).
92. See Samuel L. Odom et al., The Construct of Developmental Disabilities, in HANDBOOK
OF DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 3-14 (Samuel L. Odom et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter ODOM,
HANDBOOK OF DD].
Another term that courts may occasionally encounter, particularly in pediatric or school
records is “developmental delay.” See Bruce K. Shapiro & Mark L. Batshaw, Developmental Delay
and Intellectual Disability, in CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES 291 (Mark L. Batshaw, Nancy J.
Roizen & Gaetano R. Lotrecchiano eds., 7th ed. 2013) (“The term global developmental delay is
most commonly used as a temporary diagnosis in young children at risk for developmental
disabilities, especially intellectual disabilities. In this context, it indicates a failure to achieve ageappropriate neurodevelopmental milestones in the areas of language, motor, and social-adaptive
development.”) (emphasis omitted); Edward A. Polloway et al., Mild Intellectual Disabilities:
Legacies and Trends in Concepts and Educational Practices, 45 EDUC. & TRAINING IN AUTISM &
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 54, 58 (2010) (“It is reasonable to consider that some of the
children identified as developmentally delayed will meet the identification criteria for intellectual
disability once the age of nine is reached and the term developmental delay is no longer acceptable
for usage under IDEA.”).
93. See AAMD 1983, supra note 80, at 6; APA, DSM-5, supra note 65, at 727 (“Borderline
Intellectual Functioning”); APA, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 80, at 740; Snell, Characteristics, supra
note 77, at 229. The term appears to be used somewhat more frequently in other countries than in
the U.S. See, e.g., Minna Peltopuro et al., Borderline Intellectual Functioning: A Systematic
Literature Review, 52 INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 419, 423 (2014); see also
id. at 420 (“Since 1973, BIF [borderline intellectual functioning] has not been included in any
diagnostic category.”).
Another potential source of confusion arises from the fact that the word “borderline” is
also used for an entirely unrelated mental illness, “borderline personality disorder,” sometimes
shorthanded by mental health professionals as just “borderline.” See APA, DSM-5, supra note 65, at
663 (“The essential feature of borderline personality disorder is a pervasive pattern of instability of
interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affects, and marked impulsivity that begins by early
childhood and is present in a variety of contexts.”); APA, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 80, at 706
(stating same); see also JOHN G. GUNDERSON & PAUL S. LINKS, BORDERLINE PERSONALITY
DISORDER: A CLINICAL GUIDE 1 (2d ed. 2008) (“[The Borderline Personality Disorder] (BPD)
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describe an individual who may have intellectual disability or may not;
which is to say, someone whom initial observation estimates to be in the
“border” area of intellectual disability, indicating the need for more
careful and thorough evaluation. Courts need to be cautious because it is
not always clear, particularly from older documents, which of the
meanings is intended.
IV.

THE DEFINITION OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: AN OVERVIEW

The phenomenon of intellectual disability has been recognized for
centuries. Although various descriptions have been formulated over the
ages,94 the current clinical understanding of intellectual disability
focuses on a commonly accepted consensus that has endured for more
than half a century.
All the definitions of intellectual disability adopted by legislatures
and courts follow the same basic model. The definition has three
elements: (1) significant impairments in intellectual functioning; (2)
deficits in real-world skills and abilities; and (3) onset of the disability
before the individual became an adult. There are minor variations in the

diagnosis entered the American Psychiatric Association’s DSM-III in 1980 . . . . The growth in the
recognition and use of this diagnosis during the period from 1975 to 1990 has been remarkable. It is
easily the most widely and commonly used diagnosis for personality disorders in modern clinical
practice.”) (internal citations omitted); John G. Gunderson, Mary C. Zanarini & Cassandra L. Kisiel,
Borderline Personality Disorder, in THE DSM-IV PERSONALITY DISORDERS 141-57 (W. John
Livesley ed., 1995); JEROME KROLL, THE CHALLENGE OF THE BORDERLINE PATIENT: COMPETENCY
IN DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT (1988); BIOLOGICAL AND NEUROBEHAVIORAL STUDIES OF
BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER (Kenneth R. Silk ed., 1994).
Compounding the potential confusion, the psychiatric diagnosis of “borderline personality
disorder” has been diagnosed in some people with intellectual disability. See Lawrence Dana,
Personality Disorder in Persons with Mental Retardation: Assessment and Diagnosis, in MENTAL
HEALTH ASPECTS OF MENTAL RETARDATION 130, 137 (Robert J. Fletcher & Anton Dosen eds.,
1993). As a result, courts and evaluators may be well-advised to avoid the use of the term as a
descriptor of intellectual impairment. See ALAN S. KAUFMAN & ELIZABETH O. LICHTENBERGER,
ASSESSING ADOLESCENT AND ADULT INTELLIGENCE 414 (3d ed. 2006) [hereinafter KAUFMAN &
LICHTENBERGER, ASSESSING INTELLIGENCE] (“The term Borderline is indecisive, and may be
confused with the DSM-IV psychiatric label of the same name. Examiners . . . may wish
to . . . substitut[e] Well Below Average for Borderline.”).
94. See STEPHEN B. RICHARDS, MICHAEL P. BRADY & RONALD L. TAYLOR, COGNITIVE AND
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, CURRENT PRACTICES, AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS 3-16 (2d ed. 2015); R.C. SCHEERENBERGER, 1 A HISTORY OF MENTAL RETARDATION
3-87 (1983); Pallab K. Maulik, Catherine K. Harbour & Jane McCarthy, Epidemiology, in
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND
POLICY, at 9, 10 (Elias Tsakanikos & Jane McCarthy eds., 2014) [hereinafter P SYCHOPATHOLOGY
IN ID] (“Ancient Greeks and Romans believed that children with intellectual disabilities were born
as a result of having angered the Gods, and children with severe ID would be allowed to die of
exposure as infants rather than permitted to grow up.”).
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terms that are used to describe these elements.95 However, they are all
essentially describing the same phenomenon,96 and identifying the same
95. There are three definitional variants that courts might be likely to encounter in
adjudicating Atkins cases:
A number of states, particularly those that adopted statutes in the 1980s and 1990s,
adopted the basic form of the American Association on Mental Deficiency’s (now AAIDD’s)
classification manual published in 1983. “Mental retardation refers to significantly subaverage
general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and
manifested during the developmental period.” AAMD 1983, supra note 80, at 1. This was the
definition used by the U.S. Supreme Court in Penry I. 492 U.S. 302, 308 n.1 (1989).
Other states adopted the definition published by the American Association on Mental
Retardation in 1992:
Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present functioning. It is
characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently
with related limitations in two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas:
communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction,
health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work. Mental retardation manifests
before age 18.
AAMR 1992, supra note 84, at 1 (emphasis omitted). This was the definition used by the Supreme
Court in Atkins. 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002).
The third form of the definition first appeared in AAIDD’s classification manual
published in 2002. “Mental retardation is a disability characterized by significant limitations both in
intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical
adaptive skills. This disability originates before age 18.” AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL
RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS
1 (10th ed. 2002) [hereinafter AAMR 2002]. This definition was retained as the definition for
intellectual disability. AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 1 (“Intellectual disability is characterized by
significant limitations both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed in
conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills. This disability originates before age 18.”).
The minor variations among these definitions are primarily focused on the terminology
characterizing deficits in adaptive behavior, and will be discussed infra Part IV.B.
96. As indicated in the previous note, the definitional models for legislation, as well as the
forms of the definition that will be encountered most frequently by courts, are the formulations
adopted by the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD).
This reflects the fact that AAIDD’s expertise in the field, as well as the direct clinical experience of
its members, has made it the most widely accepted definition. See, e.g., Jeffrey Ditterline & Thomas
Oakland, Relationships Between Adaptive Behavior and Impairment, in ASSESSING IMPAIRMENT:
FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 31, 34 (Sam Goldstein & Jack A. Naglieri eds., 2009) (“The AAIDD
and its predecessor, the AAMR, have been the most authoritative voice in reference to issues
pertaining to persons with mental retardation.”).
However, courts may also encounter reports and testimony referring to a definition
propounded by the American Psychiatric Association. The most recent edition of its classification
manual is AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013) (DSM-5). While the DSM-5 is focused primarily on categorizing mental
illness, it also includes a definition of “Intellectual Disability (Intellectual Developmental
Disorder),” which is almost identical to AAIDD’s definition:
Intellectual disability (intellectual developmental disorder) is a disorder with onset
during the developmental period that includes both intellectual and adaptive functioning
deficits in conceptual, social, and practical domains. The following three criteria must be
met:
A. Deficits in intellectual functions, such as reasoning, problem solving, planning,
abstract thinking, judgment, academic learning, and learning from experience,
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group of individuals as having intellectual disability.97
It is worth noting that the formulation and the relatively minor
re-formulations of these definitions by scientists and clinicians over the
years have had as their major purpose increasing diagnostic accuracy.98
This focus on precision in the diagnostic process has also been intended
to enhance the ability of clinicians to improve the educational and other
services that we provide to individuals who have intellectual disability.

confirmed by both clinical assessment and individualized, standardized intelligence
testing.
B. Deficits in adaptive functioning that result in failure to meet developmental and
socio-cultural standards for personal independence and social responsibility.
Without ongoing support, the adaptive deficits limit functioning in one or more
activities of daily life, such as communication, social participation, and
independent living, across multiple environments, such as home, school, work, and
community.
C. Onset of intellectual and adaptive deficits during the developmental period.
APA, DSM-5, supra note 65, at 33.
Courts may occasionally be confronted with evaluations of a defendant in which the
clinician had used the previous edition of the APA manual’s definition, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. text rev. 2000)
(APA, DSM-IV-TR):
The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is accompanied by significant limitations in
adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication, selfcare, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction,
functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety (Criterion B). The onset must
occur before age 18 years (Criterion C).
APA, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 80, at 41. This definition is nearly identical to the AAMR’s
definition in its 1992 manual. See AAMR 1992, supra note 84, at 1.
97. It is widely accepted that the causes of intellectual disability are varied, and for a
considerable number of individuals who have the disability, the cause is unknown. AAIDD 2010,
supra note 65, at 59 (“[E]ven the most extensive and up-to-date genetic and biomedical testing will
identify an etiology in less than half of all cases.”); Suzanne McDermott et al., Epidemiology and
Etiology of Mental Retardation, in HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES 3, 9 (John W. Jacobson, James A. Mulick & Johannes Rojahn eds., 2007) (“In
approximately half of the cases of MR the cause is unknown.”).
For a more general discussion of the etiology of intellectual disability, see AAMR 2002,
supra note 95, at 123-41 (rejecting the previous bright-line distinction between biological and
psychosocial causes in favor of a multifactorial approach); APA, DSM-5, supra note 65, at 38
(“Intellectual disability is a heterogeneous condition with multiple causes.”); APA, DSM-IV-TR,
supra note 80, at 41 (“Mental retardation has many etiologies and may be seen as a final common
pathway of various pathological processes that affect the functioning of the central nervous
system.”); Ludwik S. Szymanski & Maija Wilska, Childhood Disorders: Mental Retardation, in 1
PSYCHIATRY 687, 690-700 (Allan Tasman, Jerald Kay & Jeffrey A. Lieberman eds., 2d ed. 2003)
[hereinafter Szymanski & Wilska, Mental Retardation]; see also Jennifer McLaren & Susan E.
Bryson, Review of Recent Epidemiological Studies of Mental Retardation: Prevalence, Associated
Disorders, and Etiology, 92 AM. J. MENTAL RETARDATION 243, 247-51 (1987); Kim Van Naarden
Braun et al., The Epidemiology of Intellectual Disabilities, in FETAL AND NEONATAL NEUROLOGY
AND NEUROSURGERY 876 (Malcolm I. Levene & Frank A. Chervenak eds., 4th ed. 2009).
98. See, e.g., AAIDD-2010, supra note 67, preface at xiii-xvi.
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While the definition has remained largely unchanged over the last three
or four decades, during that same period, several aspects of our public
policies have changed substantially.99 Facilitating and accommodating
these changes has been a focus of the professional organizations as they
continue to address classification issues.100 The precise application of
these issues to legal questions involving the implementation of public
policies may come before the courts in cases involving such issues as
special education101 or community services.102 Those broader policy
questions have more limited relevance, of course, to courts adjudicating
Atkins cases in the criminal justice system, where the focus is directed to
the accuracy of individual clinical diagnoses.
The remainder of this Part of the Article will briefly discuss the
three components of the definition of intellectual disability. Later
Subparts will address, in more detail, specific clinical issues likely to
arise in the adjudication of Atkins cases.103
A. Intellectual Functioning
The essence of the definition of intellectual disability is that it
consists, at its core, of a substantial, measurable impairment in
intellectual functioning, and that this impairment is accompanied by a
99. One prominent example has been the movement away from institutional confinement of
people with mental retardation and the creation of community alternatives. See DISABILITY AT THE
DAWN OF THE 21ST CENTURY AND THE STATE OF THE STATES (David Braddock et al. eds., 2002);
JAMES W. TRENT, JR., INVENTING THE FEEBLE MIND: A HISTORY OF MENTAL RETARDATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 250-65 (1994). Another example has been prohibiting the categorical exclusion of
children with intellectual disabilities from public schools. See RUTH COLKER & PAUL D.
GROSSMAN, THE LAW OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION 413-20 (8th ed. 2013); LAURA ROTHSTEIN
& SCOTT F. JOHNSON, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 12-23 (5th ed. 2014). In 1975, the Education for
All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.) was enacted. See generally
Endrew F. v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017); Fry v. Napoleon Community Sch.,
137 S. Ct. 743, 748 (2017) (“The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA or
Act), 84 Stat. 175, as amended, 20 U. S. C. § 1400 et seq., ensures that children with disabilities
receive needed special education services.”).
100. See, e.g., AAMR 2002, supra note 95, at 168 (“The supports paradigm has revolutionized
how we provide education and habilitation services to people with mental retardation and closely
related disabilities.”); see also Todd R. Risley & Dennis H. Reid, Management and Organizational
Issues in the Delivery of Psychological Services for People with Mental Retardation, in MANUAL OF
DIAGNOSIS AND PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE IN MENTAL RETARDATION 383, 383 (John W. Jacobson
& James A. Mulick eds., American Psychological Association, 1996) (“[D]eveloping effective
psychological treatment requires a comprehensive understanding of human development, including
developmental, social, and psychoeducational aspects.”).
101. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (2012) (noting that children with intellectual disabilities are
included within the definition of “child with a disability”).
102. See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
103. See infra Parts V, VI.D, VII.B.
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real-world disability which significantly limits functioning in the
individual’s life.104 The starting point in the diagnostic process (and,
thus, the first prong of the definition) is therefore assessing the
impairment in intellectual functioning.105
The development of psychometric instruments to measure
intellectual functioning began in the early years of the twentieth
century.106 Our scientific understanding of those instruments evolved
over the century, but has become substantially more refined over the last
couple of decades.107 Psychologists and other clinicians now have a
substantially clearer view of the strengths and weaknesses of IQ tests, as
well as their proper administration and interpretation. But while IQ tests
have become considerably more sophisticated, the interpretation
of their results still requires experienced and knowledgeable
professional judgment.
To satisfy the intellectual impairment prong of the definition of
intellectual disability, an individual’s measured intelligence must be
“significantly subaverage.” “Significantly subaverage” is a term of art
indicating that the individual’s measured intelligence falls approximately
two standard deviations below the mean score.108 As a practical matter, it
104. See Everington & Olley, Defining and Diagnosing, supra note 15, at 13. (“[M]ental
retardation is a problem in learning; people with intellectual disabilities learn more slowly and with
a lesser degree of complexity.”).
105. In actual practice of course, it is quite likely that inquiry into the possibility that an
individual has intellectual disability originated with someone’s—a parent, a teacher, or someone
else—observation that the individual appeared to have difficulty learning or trouble in performing
ordinary life functions. APA, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 80, at 42 (“Impairments in adaptive
functioning, rather than a low IQ, are usually the presenting symptoms in individuals with Mental
Retardation.”).
106. For an overview of the development of the testing of intelligence, see KAUFMAN &
LICHTENBERGER, ASSESSING INTELLIGENCE, supra note 93, at 3-7 (“A Short History of IQ Tests”);
ALAN S. KAUFMAN ET AL., INTELLIGENT TESTING WITH THE WISC–V, at 7-11 (2016); John D.
Wasserman & David S. Tulsky, A History of Intelligence Assessment, in CONTEMPORARY
INTELLECTUAL ASSESSMENT: THEORIES, TESTS, AND ISSUES 3, 3-22 (Dawn P. Flanagan & Patti L.
Harrison eds., 2d ed. 2005); ANNE ANASTASI & SUSANA URBINA, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 32-38
(7th ed. 1997) [hereinafter ANASTASI & URBINA, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING]; LEWIS R. AIKEN,
ASSESSMENT OF INTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONING 1-21 (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter AIKEN, ASSESSMENT
OF INTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONING]. For discussion of the development of IQ testing in America, see
LEILA ZENDERLAND, MEASURING MINDS: HENRY HERBERT GODDARD AND THE ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE TESTING (1998); see also ALFRED BINET & TH. SIMON, THE
INTELLIGENCE OF THE FEEBLE-MINDED (Elizabeth S. Kite trans., 1916); JOSEPH PETERSON, EARLY
CONCEPTIONS AND TESTS OF INTELLIGENCE (1926); DAVID WECHSLER, THE MEASUREMENT OF
ADULT INTELLIGENCE (1st ed. 1939). For a more general overview of the field, see R. MICHAEL
FURR & VERNE R. BACHARACH, PSYCHOMETRICS: AN INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 2014).
107. See infra Part VI for a discussion of IQ tests and their administration.
108. AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 31 (“The ‘significant limitations in intellectual
functioning’ criterion for a diagnosis of intellectual disability is an IQ score that is approximately
two standard deviations below the mean, considering the standard error of measurement for the
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has generally been understood that this indicates that fewer than
roughly three percent of the population could be classified as having
intellectual disability.109
The requirement of “two standard deviations” can then be
expressed as IQ scores in order to ascertain whether an individual meets
the first prong of the definition. The clinical organizations that formulate
the definition have identified the upper boundary for mental retardation
at IQ scores of “approximately 70 to 75, taking into account
measurement error.”110
specific instruments used and the instruments’ strengths and limitations.” (emphasis added));
AAMR 2002, supra note 95, at 58 (“The ‘intellectual functioning’ criterion for diagnosis of mental
retardation is [an IQ score that is] approximately two standard deviations below the mean,
considering the SEM [standard error of measurement] for the specific assessment instruments used
and the instruments’ strengths and limitations.” (emphasis added)). Application of the Standard
Error of Measurement will be discussed infra Part VI.C.
109. See, e.g., Marc J. Tassé Robert L. Schalock, Giulia Balboni, Hank Bersani, Jr., Sharon A.
Borthwick-Duffy, Scott Spreat, David Thissen, Keith F. Widman & Dalun Zhang, The Construct of
Adaptive Behavior: Its Conceptualization, Measurement, and Use in the Field of Intellectual
Disability, 117 AM. J. ON INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 291, 298 (2012)
[hereinafter Tassé et al., Construct of Adaptive Behavior] (“On the basis of known properties of the
normal distribution, approximately 2.28% of the population falls below an IQ score that is two
standard deviations below the population mean. In a sense, the operational definition of a significant
deficit in intelligence is a score that is approximately in the bottom 2% of the general population.”);
MARTHA A. FIELD & VALERIE A. SANCHEZ, EQUAL TREATMENT FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL
RETARDATION: HAVING AND RAISING CHILDREN 23 (1999) (“[B]etween .67 and 3 percent of the
total U.S. population has mental retardation.”); APA, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 80, at 46 (“The
prevalence rate of Mental Retardation has been estimated at approximately 1%. However, different
studies have reported different rates depending on definitions used, methods of ascertainment, and
population studied.”); MARC J. TASSÉ & JOHN H. BLUME, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY AND THE
DEATH PENALTY 4-5 (2018) (“[T]he actual estimated prevalence (i.e., the number of people who
have ID) is closer to 1.04%”). Determining the precise incidence of mental retardation in the overall
population is a surprisingly complex endeavor for clinicians and epidemiologists. See, e.g., Sheryl
A. Larson, K. Charlie Lakin, et al., Prevalence of Mental Retardation and Developmental
Disabilities: Estimates from the 1994/1995 National Health Interview Survey Disability
Supplements, 106 AM. J. MENTAL RETARDATION 231 (2001). Fortunately, achieving such precision
is not required for the adjudication of Atkins cases.
110. AAMR 2002, supra note 95, at 58; see also Snell, Characteristics, supra note 77, at 229.
The American Psychiatric Association has reached the same conclusion. APA, DSM-5, supra note
65, at 37 (“[A] person with an IQ score above 70 may have such severe adaptive behavior problems
in social judgment, social understanding, and other areas of adaptive functioning that the person’s
actual functioning is comparable to that of individuals with a lower IQ score.”); APA, DSM-IV-TR,
supra note 80, at 48 (“Thus, it is possible to diagnose Mental Retardation in individuals with IQ
scores between 71 and 75 if they have significant deficits in adaptive behavior that meet the criteria
for Mental Retardation.”). This formulation is of long standing in the field of intellectual disability.
See, e.g., AAMR 1992, supra note 84, at 14 (“If the IQ score is valid, this will generally result in a
score of approximately 70 to 75 or below. The upper boundary of IQs for use in classification of
mental retardation is flexible to reflect the statistical variance inherent in all intelligence tests and
the need for clinical judgment by a qualified psychological examiner.”); AAMD 1983, supra note
80, at 23 (“[T]he recommended ceiling may be extended up through IQ 75.”); see Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 309 n.5 (2002) (“It is estimated that between 1 and 3 percent of the
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B. Deficits in Adaptive Behavior
The second prong of the definition inquires about the impact that
the impaired intellectual functioning has in the individual’s everyday
life.111 Clinicians and scholars in the field have long recognized that low
scores on IQ testing should not be enough to label an individual as
having intellectual disability.112 (The importance of adaptive deficits was
also emphasized in the recent decisions by the Supreme Court in Hall v.
Florida and Moore v. Texas.113) The description of the requisite deficit
has changed somewhat over time, but the purpose has remained the
same: to exclude from the definition any individuals whose impaired
performance on IQ testing was not accompanied by substantially
disabling impairment in functioning in life.114 In other words, the goal of
population has an IQ between 70 and 75 or lower, which is typically considered the cutoff IQ score
for the intellectual function prong of the mental retardation definition.” (emphasis added));
MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE IN MENTAL RETARDATION 15 (John W.
Jacobson & James A. Mulick eds., American Psychological Association, 1996) (identifying “70-75”
as the upper boundary of mental retardation); see also Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1049
(2017); Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1994-95 (2014).
111. As the leading diagnostic manual in the field has observed: “Subaverage intellectual
functioning . . . is a necessary but insufficient criterion to establish a diagnosis of mental
retardation.” AAMR 2002, supra note 95, at 66 (emphasis omitted); see also AAIDD 2010, supra
note 65, at 44; ANASTASI & URBINA, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING, supra note 106, at 248 (“The
current definition reaffirms the notion that intellectual limitation is a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for mental retardation.”); Reschly, Documenting Origins, supra note 83, at 132 (“No
single information element or source is ever sufficient to diagnose MMR [mild mental retardation]
developmentally or during the adult years. Even a very low score on a single measure of general
intellectual functioning is never sufficient. All valid MMR diagnoses require consideration of a
broad variety of information. Four types of information should be considered: (a) tests given
directly to the individual, (b) observations of the individual in relevant settings, (c) records from all
available sources, and (d) interviews with relevant persons.”).
112. See Henry Leland, Adaptive Behavior, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 19,
19 (Robert J. Sternberg ed., 1994) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLIGENCE] (“[T]he first
recorded measurement of adaptive behavior was probably Felix Voisin [in 1843].”). See generally
Robert H. Bruininks, Martha Thurlow & Cheri J. Gilman, Adaptive Behavior and Mental
Retardation, 21 J. SPECIAL EDUCATION 69 (1987).
113. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1991 (“[A]n individual’s ability or lack of ability to adapt or adjust to
the requirements of daily life, and success or lack of success in doing so, is central to the framework
followed by psychiatrists and other professionals in diagnosing intellectual disability.”); id. at 2001
(“Intellectual disability is a condition, not a number.”); id. (“Freddie Lee Hall may or may not be
intellectually disabled, but the law requires that he have the opportunity to present evidence of his
intellectual disability, including deficits in adaptive functioning over his lifetime.”); Moore, 137
S. Ct. at 1050 (“[W]e do not end the intellectual-disability inquiry, one way or the other, based on
Moore’s IQ score. Rather, in line with Hall, we require that courts continue the inquiry and consider
other evidence of intellectual disability where an individual’s IQ score, adjusted for the test’s
standard error, falls within the clinically established range for intellectual-functioning deficits.”).
114. For a discussion of the evolution of the adaptive behavior component, see Kazuo Nihira,
Adaptive Behavior: A Historical Overview, in ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR AND ITS MEASUREMENT:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FIELD OF MENTAL RETARDATION 7 (Robert L. Schalock ed., 1999)
[hereinafter Schalock, ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR]; Tassé et al., Construct of Adaptive Behavior, supra
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this prong of the definition is to limit the diagnosis of intellectual
disability to people who have an actual, significant, disability.115
It should be noted that over the fifty years that adaptive behavior
deficits have been part of the clinical definition of intellectual disability,
it has never required that clinicians demonstrate or conclude that the
deficits were caused by the intellectual impairment.116 The lack of a
requirement that diagnosticians prove that one manifestation was caused
by the other derives from the fact that clinicians lack the tools or
scientific standards to establish such a proof.117
note 109, at 292-93; Thomas Oakland & Patti L. Harrison, Adaptive Behaviors and Skills: An
Introduction, in ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR ASSESSMENT SYSTEM–II: CLINICAL USE AND
INTERPRETATION 3, 7-13 (Thomas Oakland & Patti L. Harrison eds., 2008).
115. Tassé et al., Construct of Adaptive Behavior, supra note 109, at 291 (Adaptive behavior
addresses “skills that have been learned and are performed by people in their everyday lives.”
(citing AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 43)).
Conversely, individuals who have significant deficits in adaptive behavior but who do not
have the requisite deficits in intellectual functioning do not fall within the clinical definition of ID.
Some of these individuals may be diagnosed under the category of “Autism Spectrum Disorder.”
See APA, DSM-5, supra note 65, at 50-59. However, it is important to note that some people with
Autism Spectrum Disorder will also have intellectual impairment that places them within the
definition of intellectual disability. Id. at 40. For a fuller analysis of the phenomenon of
comorbidity, see infra Part V (“Defendants with Multiple Disabilities”).
116. Marc J. Tassé et al., The Relation Between Intellectual Functioning and Adaptive
Behavior in the Diagnosis of Intellectual Disability, 54 INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES 381 (2016); see, e.g., AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, A MANUAL
ON TERMINOLOGY AND CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 3 (2d ed. 1961) (Impairment in
intellectual functioning “is associated with impairment in adaptive behavior.” (emphasis added));
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, MANUAL ON TERMINOLOGY AND
CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 5 (rev. ed. 1973) (“existing concurrently with deficits
in adaptive behavior”); AAMD 1983, supra note 80, at 1 (“existing concurrently with deficits in
adaptive behavior” (emphasis added)); AAMR 1992, supra note 84, at 5 (“existing concurrently
with related limitations in … adaptive skill areas”); AAMR 2002, supra note 95, at 1 (“significant
limitations both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior”); AAIDD 2010, supra note 65,
at 1 (“significant limitations both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior”); J. Gregory
Olley & Ann W. Cox, Assessment of Adaptive Behavior in Adult Forensic Cases: The Use of the
Adaptive Behavior Assessment System-II, in ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR ASSESSMENT SYSTEM-II:
CLINICAL USE AND INTERPRETATION 381, 385 (Thomas Oakland & Patti L. Harrison eds., 2008)
[hereinafter Olley & Cox, Assessment of Adult Behavior] (“If the deficit exists with impairment in
intelligence that originated in childhood and adolescence, the diagnosis of mental retardation is
made regardless of the presumed cause of the impairments.”).
117. Marc J. Tassé et al., The Relation Between Intellectual Functioning and Adaptive
Behavior in the Diagnosis of Intellectual Disability, 54 INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES 381, 387 (2016) (“Demonstrating a causative relationship between these two criteria
for a diagnosis of ID is clinically impossible and irrelevant, and attempting to do so would
mistakenly add a fourth criterion to the diagnostic process.”). As AAMR explained in 1992, the
requirement that the limitations be “related” was to establish that “[t]he limitations in adaptive skills
are more closely related to the intellectual limitation than to some other circumstance such as
cultural or linguistic diversity or sensory limitation.” AAMR 1992, supra note 84, at 6. Thus, if an
individual had deficits in the area of communication (which was then one of the definition’s listed
skill areas) because he was deaf, that fact, without more, would not demonstrate that he had mental
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The adaptive behavior prong consists of “significant
limitations . . . in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social,
and practical adaptive skills.”118 As AAIDD has explained, adaptive
behavior is the collection of skills “that have been learned and are
performed by people in their everyday lives.”119 Unlike the testing of
retardation. See DSM-5, supra note 65, at 38. For a discussion of the etiology of intellectual
disability, see supra note 97.
The fact that the definition does not include a requirement of demonstrating causation also
means that evaluators should not be permitted to speculate that “defendant has ID, but I believe that
his behavior was caused by [a comorbid condition].” See infra Part V for a discussion of
comorbidity.
118. AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 1. The 2002 AAMR definition used almost identical
terms. See AAMR 2002, supra note 95, at 1 (“Mental retardation is a disability characterized by
significant limitations in both intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed in
conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills.” (emphasis added)).
The 1992 version of AAMR’s definition defined adaptive skill deficits by identifying
categories in which the limitations must be experienced. AAMR 1992, supra note 84, at 5 (“It is
characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related
limitations in two or more of the following applicable skill areas: communication, self-care, home
living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure,
and work.” (emphasis added)). The American Psychiatric Association followed this same model.
APA, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 80, at 41 (“accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive
functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living,
social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills,
work, leisure, health, and safety”).
The 1983 AAMD definition (and earlier versions) had described adaptive deficits in less
detailed terms. See AAMD 1983, supra note 80, at 1 (“Adaptive behavior is defined as the
effectiveness or degree with which individuals meet the standards of personal independence and
social responsibility expected for age and cultural group.”).
Each of these formulations has found its way into the statutory definitions in one or more
of the states. Courts in those states will obviously focus on the language adopted by their
legislatures. Clinicians and the relevant professional organizations have tinkered with the language
about adaptive behavior deficits in order to allow diagnoses and diagnostic reports that will assist in
such tasks as the development of individual educational plans in the schools and the tailoring of
social and habilitative services to meet an adult’s individual needs. See, e.g., AAMR 2002, supra
note 95, at 81 (explaining that despite the shift from ten skill areas to three more general domains,
“[t]he 10 skill areas have been reported to be particularly useful for developing profiles of strengths
and weaknesses and for programming supports for people with mental retardation. Measures of the
10 skill areas . . . may also be valuable tools for planning supports or educational programming.”). It
has never been the intention of the formulators of the definition to alter the contours of the group of
individuals who meet the definition of intellectual disability.
Courts that are adjudicating Atkins cases are, of course, less concerned with the precision
of the match between an individual’s deficits in adaptive skills and the services he might optimally
receive outside the context of the criminal justice system. These courts will focus instead on
whether there is sufficient evidence that the defendant had a substantial, real-world disability at the
time of the offense with which he is charged.
119. AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 43. It should also be noted that while the three “domains”
of adaptive behavior—conceptual, social, and practical—are listed with the conjunctive “and,” the
actual measurement of deficits in any one of the three domains will generally be sufficient to satisfy
the adaptive behavior prong of the definition. See APA, DSM-5, supra note 65, at 38 (“Criterion B
[deficits in adaptive functioning] is met when at least one domain of adaptive functioning—
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intellectual functioning, the clinical assessment of deficits in adaptive
behavior is not measured by a single kind of instrument administered to
the subject himself or herself. Rather, determining whether an individual
has significant limitations in adaptive skills involves a wider-ranging
inquiry.120 As a part of that inquiry, the clinician will frequently employ
a standardized instrument of assessment called an “adaptive behavior
scale” (or “AB scale”), which explores the impact of the individual’s
intellectual impairment on the person’s functioning in life.121 As part of
the process, the clinical evaluator will inquire about the subject’s
adaptive functioning by interviewing individuals who have observed him
or her in childhood or in adult life.122
Details about particular issues involving adaptive behavior that may
prove to be of interest to the courts will be discussed more fully infra in
Part VII of this Article. However, three general principles about adaptive
behavior may be helpful at this at this point.
First, the measurement of adaptive behavior deficits inquires
whether there are sufficient limitations in the individual’s functioning
under ordinary circumstances. As AAIDD has explained: “The
assessment of adaptive behavior focuses on the individual’s typical
performance and not their best or assumed ability or maximum
performance. Thus, what the person typically does, rather than what the
conceptual, social, or practical—is sufficiently impaired that ongoing support is needed in order for
the person to perform adequately in one or more life settings at school, at work, at home, or in the
community.”). This subject is discussed more fully infra note 295.
120. See J. Gregory Olley, The Assessment of Adaptive Behavior in Adult Forensic Cases: Part
3: Sources of Adaptive Behavior Information, 33(1) PSYCHOLOGY IN MENTAL RETARDATION &
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, Summer 2007, at 3, 4-5; Caroline Everington & Denis W. Keyes,
Diagnosing Mental Retardation in Criminal Proceedings: The Critical Importance of Documenting
Adaptive Behavior, FORENSIC EXAMINER, July/Aug. 1999, at 31, 32-33.
121. See AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 43-55; Scott Spreat, Psychometric Standards for
Adaptive Behavior Assessment, in Schalock, ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR, supra note 114, at 103-17;
Tassé et al., Construct of Adaptive Behavior, supra note 109, at 293; Sharon A. Borthwick-Duffy,
Adaptive Behavior, in HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 279,
283-84 (John W. Jacobson, James A. Mulick, & Johannes Rojahn eds., 2007) (“The development in
the past 20 years of psychometrically adequate, norm-referenced measures of adaptive behavior has
led to a greater recognition of the value of the construct in diagnosis and planning supports.”). For a
fuller discussion of these instruments, and the cases in which they cannot be employed, see infra
Part VII.
122. AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 47 (“Using standardized adaptive behavior measures to
determine significant limitations in adaptive behavior usually involves obtaining information
regarding the individual’s adaptive behavior from a person or persons who know the individual
well . . . . Obtaining information from multiple respondents and other relevant sources (e.g., school
records, employment history, previous evaluations) is essential to providing corroborating
information that provides a comprehensive picture of the individual’s functioning.”).
However, particular care needs to be taken in using accounts by the examined individuals
(i.e., the defendants) themselves about what they can or cannot do. This issue is explored more fully
infra Part VII.
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individual can do or could do, is assessed when evaluating the
individual’s adaptive behavior.”123
This focus on the person’s ordinary, everyday functioning helps
explain why inquiries to informants who have known the individual
over a period of time are so important to clinical assessment of
adaptive behavior.124
This adaptive behavior focus on actual everyday functioning also
stands in sharp contrast to the methodology used in measuring
intellectual functioning (IQ testing), where the purpose is to assess the
person’s full mental ability.125 This means that the appropriate clinical
123. AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 47 (emphasis omitted); see also AAMR 2002, supra note
95, at 74; Keith F. Widaman & Kevin S. McGrew, The Structure of Adaptive Behavior, in MANUAL
OF DIAGNOSIS AND PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE IN MENTAL RETARDATION 97, 98 (John W. Jacobson
& James A. Mulick eds., American Psychological Association 1996) (“Measures of adaptive
behavior are usually measures of typical performance, assessing the level of skill a person typically
displays when responding to challenges in his or her environment.”); Marc J. Tassé et al., The
Relation Between Intellectual Functioning and Adaptive Behavior in the Diagnosis of Intellectual
Disability, 54 INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 381, 387 (2016) (“A complete
understanding of human functioning requires an understanding of the person’s typical performance,
which is the case in the assessment of adaptive behavior, not maximum performance, which is the
case in the assessment of intellectual functioning.” (emphasis added)); Olley & Cox, Assessment of
Adult Behavior, supra note 116, at 385 (“Adaptive behavior assessment describes an individual’s
actual functional performance and is not used to speculate as to a person’s potential. In other words,
a person’s adaptive behavior is what a person has done rather than what he or she may have done or
could have done if raised in more ideal conditions.”); Caroline Everington, Challenges of Conveying
Intellectual Disabilities to Judge and Jury, 23 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 467, 471 (2014)
(“An accurate diagnosis requires an in-depth understanding of the construct of adaptive behavior
and its manifestation in defendants with ID. Key to this is the context of adaptive skill assessment—
the individual’s actual performance in community settings. It is not based on a hypothesis of what
the person has the potential to do.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)); Henry Leland, Adaptive
Behavior, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLIGENCE, supra note 112, at 18, 23 (noting that assessment
of adaptive behavior is “a way of determining how a person may be expected to cope in average or
usual daily activities”); Tassé, Adaptive Behavior and Diagnosis, supra note 87, at 116 (“This view
is consistent with AAIDD’s long-standing position that adaptive behavior assessment must focus on
the individual’s typical performance and not maximal ability.”); Everington & Olley, Defining and
Diagnosing, supra note 15, at 10 (“The consensus of contemporary views on assessment of adaptive
behavior clearly indicates that adaptive behavior is the individual’s actual performance.”).
124. J. Gregory Olley, Adaptive Behavior Instruments, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 187, 193 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015) (“Among the most common
and potentially most valuable sources are interviews with family members and others who have
known the individual well in varied community settings. Multiple informants who have known the
individual at different ages before the pertinent crime can provide consensual validity regarding
adaptive functioning.”).
125. See KAUFMAN & LICHTENBERGER, ASSESSING INTELLIGENCE, supra note 93, at 336
(“Tests of cognitive functioning are intended to measure optimal maximum performance, or
potential, while adaptive behavior scales measure typical performance.”); AAIDD 2010, supra note
65, at 47 (“This is a critical distinction between the assessment of adaptive behavior and the
assessment of intellectual functioning, where best or maximal performance is assessed.”);
Everington & Olley, Defining and Diagnosing, supra note 15, at 11 (“[A]daptive behavior is the
individual’s typical performance in his/her community setting.”); Macvaugh & Cunningham,
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focus in adaptive behavior is on how an individual performed (or failed
to perform) tasks in general society,126 rather than on whether he or she
experiences functional limitations in the more regimented (and, in
significant ways, less demanding) setting of imprisonment127 (e.g., a
Forensic Practice, supra note 83, at 162 (“[T]here is [a] consensus [among clinicians] that
assessment of adaptive behavior should measure a person’s typical or actual performance, as
opposed to knowledge of a skill or estimated potential.” (citation omitted)). (The Macvaugh and
Cunningham article is an outgrowth of the ad hoc committee on Atkins evaluations within the
relevant section of the American Psychological Association, and also includes the authors’ practice
recommendations for evaluators. Id. at 133-34.)
126. Since the defendant’s culpability at the time of the offense is central to the holding of
Atkins, that time period must be the focus of the adaptive behavior assessment in determining
whether the defendant satisfies the definition of intellectual disability. See infra Part VII.B
(discussing the retrospective nature of Atkins evaluations).
While evidence of an inmate’s successful adaptation to prison conditions can be probative
evidence on the separate and distinct issue of future dangerousness, and therefore admissible in
mitigation at capital sentencing, see, e.g., Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 7 (1986), it does
not have the same relevance in an Atkins case to the issue of whether the defendant had deficits in
adaptive behavior at the time of the offense. See J. Gregory Olley, The Assessment of Adaptive
Behavior in Adult Forensic Cases: Part 1, 32(1) PSYCHOLOGY IN MENTAL RETARDATION &
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, Summer 2006, at 2, 2 (“[S]tandard approaches cannot be used,
because prison life offers no opportunity to demonstrate most areas of adaptive functioning.”);
Caroline Everington et al., Challenges in the Assessment of Adaptive Behavior of People Who Are
Incarcerated, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 201, 202 (Edward A.
Polloway ed., 2015) (“[A] satisfactory assessment of AB is not possible in a prison context because
the individual has no opportunities to demonstrate the presence or absence of adaptive skills typical
in day-to-day life. Inmates do not cook, choose clothing, or make independent choices about their
day-to-day existence. By design, correctional settings remove virtually all personal control from the
individual, and, as such, practical behaviors pertinent to the diagnosis cannot be demonstrated.”);
Macvaugh & Cunningham, Forensic Practice, supra note 83, at 161 (“Institutional adaptation
should generally not be regarded as dispositive of adaptive functioning in the open community. In
such situations, forensic examiners should clearly state the limitations of retrospective assessments
of adaptive functioning.”). The Supreme Court has taken note of this issue. See Moore v. Texas, 137
S. Ct. 1039, 1050 (2017) (“Clinicians, however, caution against reliance on adaptive strengths
developed in a controlled setting, as a prison surely is.” (internal quotation omitted)).
127. Tassé, Adaptive Behavior and Diagnosis, supra note 87, at 119 (“The prison setting is an
artificial environment that offers limited opportunities for many activities and behaviors defining
adaptive behavior.”); Everington & Olley, Defining and Diagnosing, supra note 15, at 12 (“[T]he
limited opportunities available to people in prison make it impossible to assess adaptive behavior
within the context of community environments . . . .” (internal quotation omitted)); APA, DSM-5,
supra note 65, at 38 (“Adaptive functioning may be difficult to assess in a controlled setting (e.g.,
prisons, detention centers); if possible, corroborative information reflecting functioning outside
those settings should be obtained.”); Macvaugh & Cunningham, Forensic Practice, supra note 83,
at 160 (“Most of the instruments that are available for assessing adaptive behavior are intended to
measure an individual’s current functioning in the community. This creates methodological
problems for assessments of adaptive functioning with incarcerated populations, particularly for
those who have been on death row for many years following a capital murder conviction. In cases in
which the examinee has been incarcerated for a number of years, the examiner must perform a
retrospective assessment of adaptive functioning.”); Richard J. Bonnie & Katherine Gustafson, The
Challenge of Implementing Atkins v. Virginia: How Legislatures and Courts Can Promote Accurate
Assessments and Adjudications of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 41 U. RICHMOND L.
REV. 811, 848 (2007) [hereinafter Bonnie & Gustafson, Implementing Atkins] (“A mentally
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correctional officer’s estimation of a defendant’s functioning in jail
while awaiting trial).128
The second general principle about assessing adaptive behavior is
that the inquiry necessarily focuses on deficits in defendants’ adaptive
skills, and not on their abilities or strengths.129 This principle may be, at
retarded person is also likely to show stronger adaptive behavior in the structured environment of a
correctional facility than in society, thus possibly inflating scores that would have been indicative of
mental retardation in the community environment.”).
There may also be other problems that arise from purported evidence of adaptive behavior
in a prison setting. For example, testimony is sometimes offered of prison behavior that a
correctional officer believes to be inconsistent with mental retardation. In addition to the likelihood
of stereotypes entering into such an assessment, see infra Part VII.E, there may also be other
evidentiary problems. For example, regarding documents purportedly written by a defendant:
[T]he implications of such writings are often ambiguous because independent authorship
cannot be assumed. It is not uncommon for less literate inmates to request that more
literate inmates write correspondence, grievances, legal research requests, or even legal
briefs on their behalf. In some cases, the less literate inmate may have done no more than
sign the document. At times, such ghost writing is evident from the widely varying
handwriting on these documents. In other instances, however, the less literate inmate
may painstakingly copy the document provided by the more literate inmate. Discovery of
these procedures may be complicated by the less literate inmate’s desire to avoid having
his limitations revealed to others.
Macvaugh & Cunningham, Forensic Practice, supra note 83, at 163-64.
For similar reasons, testimony from correctional officers about an inmate’s reading
material may be equally suspect. Everington, supra note 123, at 475-76 (“[S]uch officers do not
have the type of continuous contact necessary for documenting skills. For example, even when
skills, such as reading a newspaper, are demonstrated, inaccurate conclusions can be reached. That
is, just being observed with a book or a newspaper does not mean that the defendant is able to
comprehend and explain what was read. A careful evaluator will probe the defendant for
comprehension as well as conduct collateral academic testing.”).
128. Given the problem and risks of stereotyping by correctional witnesses, and the lack of
comparability between structured correctional settings and the society where the defendant lived
prior to his arrest, many clinical experts have argued for the exclusion of evidence from correctional
officers. See, e.g., Olley & Cox, Assessment of Adult Behavior, supra note 116, at 386 (“[R]eports
from corrections officers or other observations of current functioning in prison are not valid
indicators of level of adaptive behavior.”); Macvaugh & Cunningham, Forensic Practice, supra
note 83, at 161 (“[A]n assessment of a particular inmate’s adaptive behavior while in a highlystructured prison environment has very limited correspondence to the adaptive demands of the open
community, whether or not the offender’s adaptation is compared with other inmates.”); Tassé,
Adaptive Behavior and Diagnosis, supra note 87, at 119 (“Correctional officers and other prison
personnel should probably never be sought as respondents to provide information regarding the
adaptive behavior of an individual that they’ve observed in a prison setting.”). Tassé’s concerns are
well-founded. On the other hand, there may be cases in which specific information from a
correctional officer is particularly crucial, in the clinical judgment of the diagnostician, to complete
the picture of a defendant’s actual level of functioning. As a result, a rigid categorical exclusion of
such evidence may or may not be warranted. But, at a minimum, there should be a strong
presumption against reliance on such testimony.
129. AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 47 (noting that in the diagnostic process, “significant
limitations in conceptual, social, or practical adaptive skills” are not “outweighed by the potential
strengths in some adaptive skills”); see Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1050 (“[T]he medical community
focuses the adaptive-functioning inquiry on adaptive deficits.”); Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269,
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least initially, counterintuitive to many people. At first blush, it might
seem to be a sensible approach to balance an individual’s strengths
against his weaknesses, and use their combination as the adaptive prong
of the definition. Although superficially attractive, that approach is
totally inconsistent with the definition of intellectual disability and with
sound diagnostic practice. An in-depth discussion of the necessity of
using deficits, not strengths, to diagnose intellectual disability is
provided infra in Part VII.C.
The third general principle, closely related to the second, is that it is
essential to avoid the trap of falling back on stereotypes about people
with intellectual disability and what they can and cannot do.130 The
problems these stereotypes and preconceived images pose for the courts
in evaluating individuals who may have intellectual disability is
discussed infra in Part VII.E.
C. Age of Onset
The final component of the definition of intellectual disability is the
stipulation that the disability must have originated during the
developmental period of life.131 This requirement has proven to present
the fewest issues for diagnosticians in Atkins cases,132 and few cases
have turned on this prong.133 The vast majority of people with the level
2281 (2015) (“[I]ntellectually disabled persons may have ‘strengths in social or physical
capabilities, strengths in some adaptive skill areas, or strengths in one aspect of an adaptive skill in
which they otherwise show an overall limitation.’” (quoting AAMR 2002, supra note 95, at 8)).
130. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1052 (“[T]he medical profession has endeavored to counter lay
stereotypes of the intellectually disabled. Those stereotypes, much more than medical and clinical
appraisals, should spark skepticism.” (citations omitted)).
131. AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 1 (“This disability originates before age 18.”); AAMR
2002, supra note 95, at 1 (same); AAMR 1992, supra note 84, at 1 (“Mental retardation manifests
before age 18.”); AAMD 1983, supra note 80, at 1 (“Mental retardation . . . [is] manifested during
the developmental period”); APA, DSM-5, supra note 65, at 33 (“Intellectual disability . . . is a
disability with onset during the developmental period . . . .”); APA, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 80, at
41 (“The onset must occur before age 18 years”).
132. Indeed, at least two legislatures found it unnecessary to include an age of onset
component in their statutes. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01(3) (2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3120A-2.1(A) (2000) (repealed 2009). Other state statutes established a different measure for the age
of onset. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-36-9-2 (2017) (“As used in this chapter, ‘individual with an
intellectual disability’ means an individual who, before becoming twenty-two (22) years of age,
manifests . . . .”); see also Legislative Guide, supra note 3, at 13. Social Security also appears to use
the age of 22. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MENTAL RETARDATION: DETERMINING
ELIGIBILITY FOR SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS 29 (Daniel J. Reschly et al. eds., 2002) (“The
impairment must be present before the age of 22, although the diagnosis may be made at any
time.”). Some jurisdictions may have chosen the age of 22 because it marks the duration of the
eligibility of students with disabilities for special education under Federal law (IDEA). See
Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2012).
133. Bonnie & Gustafson, Implementing Atkins, supra note 127, at 855. (“In sum, the
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of intellectual impairment to satisfy the first prong of the definition—
and the deficits in adaptive behavior to satisfy the second prong—first
experienced their disability in childhood, and for some, the cause can be
traced back to their birth or their genetic make-up.134 The only
individuals who are excluded from the category by the age of onset
requirement are individuals whose disability can be traced to events
during adulthood. Examples would include individuals whose
neurocognitive impairments occurred post-adolescence as with
dementia,135 or brain injuries due to post-adolescence accidents.136 But
for diagnostic purposes, adult-onset impairments can be identified and
distinguished from intellectual disability.137
developmental onset requirement, though diagnostically essential, does very little work in the
ordinary Atkins adjudication.”); John H. Blume et al., A Tale of Two (and Possibly Three) Atkins:
Intellectual Disability and Capital Punishment Twelve Years After the Supreme Court’s Creation of
a Categorical Bar, 23 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 393, 408-09 (2014) (“Very few persons
raising claims of intellectual disability lose on Prong 3 alone; in fact, we were only able to identify
three cases appropriately classified as a loss on Prong 3 only.”).
134. For a discussion of the etiology of intellectual disabilities, see discussion supra note 97;
see also AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 57-72.
135. See, e.g., APA, DSM-5, supra note 65, at 611-14 (“Major or Mild Neurocognitive
Disorder Due to Alzheimer’s Disease”). Note, however, that Alzheimer’s can occur in individuals
who also had intellectual disability throughout their lives. See Kathleen M. Bishop et al., Guidelines
for Dementia-Related Health Advocacy for Adults with Intellectual Disability and Dementia:
National Task Group on Intellectual Disabilities and Dementia Practices, 53 INTELLECTUAL &
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 2 (2015).
136. See, e.g., APA, DSM-5, supra note 65, at 624-27 (“Major or Mild Neurocognitive
Disorder Due to Traumatic Brain Injury”). But note that impairment caused by trauma that an
individual experienced during childhood presents no impediment to diagnosing intellectual
disability. See Dennis C. Russo et al., Pediatric Brain Injury, in HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL AND
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 97 (John W. Jacobson, James A. Mulick & Johannes Rojahn eds.,
2007); AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 27 (“Sometimes, however, especially when the etiology of
the disability indicates progressive damage (such as malnutrition) or damage related to an acquired
disease or injury (such as infection or traumatic brain injury), the condition may originate later [in
the developmental period].”). Another possible reason for onset of the disability in adolescence
could be prolonged exposure to chemical agents. See, e.g., Alison J. Falck et. al., Developmental
Exposure to Environmental Toxicants, 62 PEDIATRIC CLINICS OF NORTH AMERICA 1173, 1177
(2015) (discussing the wide variety of environmental toxins extant generally and adolescent
exposure sources). The Supreme Court has taken note of the incomplete development of the brains
of adolescents. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 n.5 (2012) (“It is increasingly clear
that adolescent brains are not yet fully mature . . . .” (quoting Brief for Am. Psychological Ass’n et
al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4, Miller, 567 U.S. 460 (No. 10–9646))).
137. Note, however, that an individual’s trauma or injury as an adult does not rule out a
diagnosis of intellectual disability if there is also evidence of a developmental delay prior to age 18.
Addressing concerns about equity and proportionality rather than diagnosis, the American Bar
Association has recommended that “[d]efendants should not be executed or sentenced to death if, at
the time of the offense, they had significant limitations in both their intellectual functioning and
adaptive behavior, as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills, resulting from
mental retardation, dementia, or a traumatic brain injury.” American Bar Association,
Recommendation and Report on the Death Penalty and Persons with Mental Disabilities, 30
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REPORTER 668, 668 (2006) (emphasis added); see also id. at
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The only major point of confusion about the age of onset
requirement in Atkins cases appears to involve the definition’s
requirement that the disability must have “originated” or “manifested”
during the developmental period of life. The definition does not require
that there have been IQ tests or formal assessments of adaptive deficits
while the individual was a child.138 Whether a person had received such
testing or diagnostic services as a child is, of course, a matter of
happenstance, with no relevance to questions of culpability.139
Educational policy choices, even routine bureaucratic decisions, may
play a part in determining whether a child is tested and properly
diagnosed as having intellectual disability.140
669 (“The language in this part of the Recommendation is also meant to encompass dementia and
traumatic brain injury, disabilities very similar to mental retardation in their impact on intellectual
and adaptive functioning except that they always (in the case of dementia) or often (in the case of
head injury) are manifested after age eighteen.”). This recommendation has also been endorsed by
the American Psychiatric Association and the American Psychological Association. Id.
138. Tassé, Adaptive Behavior and Diagnosis, supra note 87, at 115 (“It should be noted that
‘originated during the developmental period’ does not preclude making a first time diagnosis of
mental retardation when an individual is an adult. The clinician must, however, adequately
document that the deficits in intellectual and adaptive functioning were present before the end of the
developmental period.”); Matthew H. Scullin, Large State-Level Fluctuations in Mental Retardation
Classifications Related to Introduction of Renormed Intelligence Test, 111 AM. J. MENTAL
RETARDATION 322, 331 (2006) (“There is no professionally recognized requirement for a
developmental period classification of mental retardation or developmental period IQs in the mental
retardation range from childhood to establish mental retardation for these [Supplemental Security
Income] benefits.”); Reschly, Documenting Origins, supra note 83, at 124 (“Persons can, of course,
be properly diagnosed as MR as adults even if no official diagnosis can be found over the ages of
birth to 18, but evidence must exist that the condition of MR existed before age 18.”); see also
ROBERT L. SCHALOCK & RUTH LUCKASSON, CLINICAL JUDGMENT 37-41 (1st ed. 2005)
(discussing case example in which the individual had not had an IQ test administered during the
developmental period, but retrospective investigation revealed functional manifestations had been
present during the individual’s childhood).
139. “Some individuals, due in part to social and cultural factors, have taken standardized
intelligence or adaptive behavior tests before the age of eighteen, while others have not.” John H.
Blume et al., Of Atkins and Men: Deviations from Clinical Definitions of Mental Retardation in
Death Penalty Cases, 18 CORNELL J. Law & PUBLIC POLICY 689, 697 (2009); Matthew H. Scullin,
Large State-Level Fluctuations in Mental Retardation Classifications Related to Introduction of
Renormed Intelligence Test, 111 AM. J. MENTAL RETARDATION 322, 332 (2006) (“[M]any adults
who currently meet the IQ and poor adaptive functioning criteria necessary for being classified with
mental retardation may have never received a formal developmental period classification.”).
140. See Sheryl A. Larson & K. Charlie Lakin, Changes in the Primary Diagnosis of Students
With Intellectual or Developmental Disabilities Ages 6 to 21 Receiving Special Education Services
1999 to 2008, 48 INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 233, 233 (2010) (discussing
“[c]hanging trends in diagnostic categories used for U.S. special education students”); Matthew H.
Scullin, Large State-Level Fluctuations in Mental Retardation Classifications Related to
Introduction of Renormed Intelligence Test, 111 AM. J. MENTAL RETARDATION 322, 324 (2006)
(“State policies regarding the classification of children as having mental retardation vary widely
from state to state . . . .”).
Clinicians have catalogued several reasons that might explain the presence or absence of
diagnostic labeling during an individual’s childhood:
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If a defendant currently meets the first two criteria, and there are
indications of impairment, delayed development, etc., from childhood,
and if there is no indication that the impairment resulted from causes that
occurred in adulthood, a diagnosis of intellectual disability is
appropriate,141 and constitutionally compelled.142

A number of reasons might explain the lack of an earlier, official diagnosis of mental
retardation, including: (a) the individual was excluded from a full school experience; (b)
the person’s age precluded his/her involvement in specialized services such as special
education programs; (c) the person was given no diagnosis or a different diagnosis for
“political purposes” such as protection from stigma or teasing, avoidance of assertions of
discrimination, or related to conclusions about the potential benefits or dangers of a
particular diagnosis; (d) the school’s concern about over-representation for data
reporting purposes of specific diagnostic groups within their student population; (e)
parental concerns about labels; (f) contextual school-based issues such as availability or
nonavailability of services and potential funding streams at that time; and (g) the lack of
entry referral into the diagnostic-referral process due to cultural and linguistic
differences or for other reasons.
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, USER’S GUIDE:
MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 10TH EDITION
18 (2007) [hereinafter AAIDD, USER’S GUIDE 2007]; see also Everington & Olley, Defining and
Diagnosing, supra note 15, at 11-12 (“Some school systems delete mention of Special Education
placement from students’ permanent records for two key reasons: (a) the Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act (FERPA) requires it; and (b) because school officials may feel that such
information is stigmatizing.”). For a fuller discussion of issues involving school records, see infra
notes 302-11 and accompanying text.
Schools may fail to correctly diagnose intellectual disability even when students are
tested, if an outdated version of the test is used. Test scores may be artificially inflated by a
phenomenon known as the Norm Obsolescence Effect. See, e.g., Tomoe Kanaya, Matthew H.
Scullin & Stephen J. Ceci, The Flynn Effect and U.S. Policies: The Impact of Rising IQ Scores on
American Society Via Mental Retardation Diagnoses, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 778, 787 (2003)
(“Also, some psychologists and districts may prefer not to use a newly normed test until all of the
older test record forms are used up, so it may take many years before an older IQ test is completely
phased out of a school system. In our experience, before an old test is completely phased out,
different children may be tested on different norms in the same year—even within the same school
district.”). For a fuller discussion of the problems posed by the Norm Obsolescence Effect in
accurately assessing intellectual impairment, see infra Part VI.D.
141. The relative importance of age of onset was summarized by Bonnie & Gustafson:
[C]ourts should not require a diagnosis before the age of eighteen or scores in the range
of mental retardation from IQ tests administered before the age of eighteen. Courts
should regard tests administered during adulthood (even after the capital offense) as
highly probative on the diagnosis of mental retardation. Finally, courts should presume
that currently diagnosed mental retardation had a developmental onset in the absence of
clear evidence of post-childhood onset of the defendant’s disability.
142. Bonnie & Gustafson, Implementing Atkins, supra note 127, at 855 (“Such a requirement
[of testing during the individual’s childhood] would be unconstitutional because it would amount to
discrimination against people whose need for special education was overlooked and who did not
have access to adequate clinical or social services as a child. The age-of-onset requirement therefore
only requires that there is evidence, not necessarily test scores, that intellectual and adaptive deficits
became manifest before the age of eighteen.”).
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DEFENDANTS WITH MULTIPLE DISABILITIES

Many individuals who have intellectual disability also have other
mental or physical disabilities,143 and the existence of these co-existing
(sometimes referred to in medical documents as “comorbid,”144 and by
others as “dual diagnosis”145) conditions may raise questions in the

143. See, e.g., DARYL PAUL EVANS, THE LIVES OF MENTALLY RETARDED PEOPLE 119 (1983)
(“Many retarded people have physical handicaps that undermine their emotional well-being.”);
id. (“Some have sensory-perceptual handicaps that make it difficult for them to adapt to social
environment appropriately.”); id. at 120 (“Many retarded people have motor problems that lead
them to move their bodies in an abnormal fashion or engage in repetitive movements.”); Shoumitro
Deb, Epilepsy in People with Mental Retardation, in HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL AND
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 81 (John W. Jacobson, James A. Mulick & Johannes Rojahn eds.,
2007); John M. Pellock & Lawrence D. Morton, Treatment of Epilepsy in the Multiply
Handicapped, 6 MENTAL RETARDATION & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES RESEARCH REVIEWS
309, 309 (2000) (“It is estimated that 20% to 40% of patients with mental retardation and cerebral
palsy have epilepsy.” (citation omitted)). The connection of intellectual disability to physical
disabilities has been long—if incompletely—recognized in the field. See, e.g., Michael L. Hardman
& Clifford J. Drew, The Physically Handicapped Retarded Individual: A Review, 15 MENTAL
RETARDATION 43 (1977).
Another condition that is encountered with some frequency, and which can have
cognitive, behavioral, and physical manifestations, is fetal alcohol syndrome. See APA, DSM-5,
supra note 65, at 798-801 (“Neurobehavioral Disorder Associated With Prenatal Alcohol
Exposure”); Reschly, Documenting Origins, supra note 83, at 132 (“In several cases the adult
defendant was the product of a teen age pregnancy in which the expectant mother used excessive
amounts of alcohol daily along with other drugs prior to and after birth. In such cases, an evaluation
is warranted of the adult with MMR by a physician skilled in the diagnosis of fetal alcohol spectrum
disorder (FASD).”); Martha J. Wunsch, Charles J. Conlon & Peter C. Scheidt, Substance Abuse: A
Preventable Threat to Development, in CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES 107, 110-17 (Mark L.
Batshaw ed., 5th ed. 2002); Andrew Levitas et al., Behavioral Phenotype of Genetic Disorders, in
DIAGNOSTIC MANUAL–INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: A TEXTBOOK OF DIAGNOSIS OF MENTAL
DISORDERS IN PERSONS WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 35, 49-52 (Robert Fletcher et al. eds.,
National Association for the Dually Diagnosed 2016) [hereinafter DM-ID2] (“Fetal Alcohol
Syndrome and the Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorders”). Note, the above cited volume of the DM-ID
was published by the National Association for the Dually Diagnosed (“NADD”) in association with
the American Psychiatric Association, and is the most detailed medical treatise on individuals who
have both mental retardation and mental illness.
144. Under the heading of “Comorbidity,” the American Psychiatric Association includes
several forms of mental illness frequently encountered in individuals who have intellectual
disability. APA, DSM-5, supra note 65, at 40 (“The most common co-occurring mental and
neurodevelopmental disorders are attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder; depressive and bipolar
disorders; anxiety disorders; autism spectrum disorder; stereotypic movement disorder (with or
without self-injurious behavior); impulse-control disorders; and major neurocognitive disorder.
Major depressive disorder may occur throughout the range of severity of intellectual disability.”
(see infra note 365 for an explanation of “stereotypies”)); see Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039,
1051 (2017) (“Coexisting conditions frequently encountered in intellectually disabled individuals
have been described in clinical literature as ‘[c]omorbidit[ies].’” (alteration in original)).
145. For more than a quarter of a century, a primary voluntary organization concerned with
these issues has been the National Association for the Dually Diagnosed, also known as “NADD:
An association for persons with developmental disabilities and mental health needs.” See About Us,
NADD, http://thenadd.org/about-nadd (last visited Aug. 23, 2018).
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evaluation process. For example, if a defendant is deaf, blind, or
mobility-impaired, the evaluator may need to adjust the process of
testing and other diagnostic techniques to account for the person’s
other disability.146
It has long been recognized by psychologists, psychiatrists, and
other clinicians,147 as well as courts,148 that a substantial number of
people who have intellectual disability also have one or more
diagnosable mental illnesses.149 These mental disorders may include
146. Other conditions often experienced by individuals with intellectual disability include
cerebral palsy, seizure disorders, and sensory impairments. See Szymanski & Wilska, Mental
Retardation, supra note 97, at 689-90; AAMR 2002, supra note 95, at 174-75 (“Seizures and
epilepsy are more common among people with mental retardation compared to the general
population. The prevalence of epilepsy is 0.6% in the general population but ranges from 8.8% to
32% among people with mental retardation. For individuals with both mental retardation and
cerebral palsy, the prevalence of epilepsy is approximately 50%.”); Robert Winterhalder & Howard
Ring, Epilepsy, in PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN ID, supra note 94, at 95-107. Autism is another condition
that is experienced by a considerable number of individuals with intellectual disability. See
Szymanski & Wilska, Mental Retardation, supra note 97, at 714 (“About 75 to 80% of children
who have autistic disorder also have mental retardation.”); Elspeth Bradley, Phoebe Caldwell &
Lisa Underwood, Autism Spectrum Disorder, in PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN ID, supra note 94, at 23764. It is not clear how frequently such other disabilities are diagnosed in individuals with
intellectual disability who come before the criminal justice system, but they certainly have been
encountered in some capital cases. See, e.g., Hall v. State, 201 So.3d 628, 629, 631 (Fla. 2016) (per
curiam) (remanded from Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) (acknowledging that Freddie Lee
Hall was diagnosed with mental illness, finding that he also has intellectual disability, and vacating
his sentence of death)).
147. See, e.g., A. F. TREDGOLD, MENTAL DEFICIENCY (AMENTIA) 310-323 (1908) (“Chapter
XVII: Insane Aments”); id. at 311 (“On the whole I think we may say that close on 10 per cent of
the feeble-minded have a definite insane predisposition.”).
148. See, e.g., Olmstead v. Zimring ex rel L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 593 (1999) (“Respondents L.C.
and E.W. are mentally retarded women; L.C. has also been diagnosed with schizophrenia, and E.W.
with a personality disorder.”).
149. See, e.g., Bonnie D. Kerker et al., Mental Health Disorders Among Individuals with
Mental Retardation: Challenges to Accurate Prevalence Estimates, 119 PUBLIC HEALTH REPORTS
409 (2004); J. Helen Yoo, Maria G. Valdovinos & Stephen R. Schroeder, The Epidemiology of
Psychopathology in People with Intellectual Disability: A Forty-Year Review, in 42
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH IN DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 31, 32-36 (Robert M.
Hodapp ed., 2012); id. at 42 (“A full range of psychopathology was reported for persons with ID.”);
Julie A. Parsons, Jack G. May, Jr. & Frank J. Menolascino, The Nature and Incidence of Mental
Illness in Mentally Retarded Individuals, in HANDBOOK OF MENTAL ILLNESS IN THE MENTALLY
RETARDED 3 (Frank J. Menolascino & Jack A. Stark eds., 1984); STEVEN REISS, HUMAN NEEDS
AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES: APPLICATIONS FOR PERSON CENTERED PLANNING, DUAL
DIAGNOSIS, AND CRISIS INTERVENTION 57-67 (2010) (Chapter 6: “Mental Illness and Intellectual
Disabilities”); Marion Glick, A Developmental Approach to Psychopathology in People with Mild
Mental Retardation, in HANDBOOK OF MENTAL RETARDATION AND DEVELOPMENT 563 (Jacob A.
Burack, Robert M. Hodapp & Edward Zigler eds., 1998) (“All available evidence suggests that
people with mental retardation show disproportionally high rates of psychiatric disturbance.”);
Andrew T. Russell, The Association Between Mental Retardation and Psychiatric Disorder:
Epidemiological Issues, in MENTAL RETARDATION AND MENTAL HEALTH: CLASSIFICATION,
DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT, SERVICES 41 (Jack A. Stark et al. eds., 1988); Szymanski & Wilska,
Mental Retardation, supra note 97, at 714 (table reporting results of studies of the incidence of
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schizophrenia,150 affective or mood disorders such as bipolar disorder
and clinical depression,151 attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder,152
psychopathology in persons with mental retardation); Johannes Rojahn & Lisa J. Meier,
Epidemiology of Mental Illness and Maladaptive Behavior in Intellectual Disabilities, in 38
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH IN MENTAL RETARDATION 239 (Robert M. Hodapp ed.,
2009); Dimitrios Paschos & Nick Bouras, Mental Health Supports in Developmental Disabilities, in
ODOM, HANDBOOK OF DD, supra note 92, at 483-500; AAMR 1992, supra note 84, at 54 (“At the
present time, the best evidence suggests that overall prevalence rates [of mental illness] tend to be
higher for persons with mental retardation, primarily because of a greater vulnerability to
environmental stressors.”); Haleigh M. Scott & Susan M. Havercamp, Mental Health for People
With Intellectual Disability: The Impact of Stress and Social Support, 119 AM. J. ON INTELLECTUAL
& DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 552 (2014); Johannes Rojahn & Marc J. Tassé, Psychopathology
in Mental Retardation, in MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE IN MENTAL
RETARDATION 147-56 (John W. Jacobson & James A. Mulick eds., American Psychological
Association, 1996); George W. Woods, David Freedman & Timothy J. Derning, Intellectual
Disability and Comorbid Disorders, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 27992 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015). Often, the mental illness experienced by an individual with
intellectual disability first manifested during childhood. See Mark Reber, Dual Diagnosis: Mental
Retardation and Psychiatric Disorders, in CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES 347-63 (Mark L. Batshaw
ed., 5th ed. 2002); Stewart L. Einfeld et al., Comorbidity of Intellectual Disability and Mental
Disorder in Children and Adolescents: A Systematic Review, 36 J. INTELLECTUAL &
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY 137 (2011).
150. Angela Hassiotis et al., Schizophrenia and Other Psychotic Disorders, in DM-ID2, supra
note 143, at 231-44; see also Szymanski & Wilska, Mental Retardation, supra note 97, at 715-16;
Andrew Reid, Schizophrenic and Paranoid Syndromes in Persons with Mental Retardation:
Assessment and Diagnosis, in MENTAL HEALTH ASPECTS OF MENTAL RETARDATION: PROGRESS
IN ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT 98 (Robert J. Fletcher & Anton Dosen eds., 1993); George W.
Woods, David Freedman & Timothy J. Derning, Intellectual Disability and Comorbid Disorders,
in THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 279, 279-82 (Edward A.
Polloway ed., 2015) (“Psychotic Disorders-Schizophrenia”); Colin Hemmings, Schizophrenia
Spectrum Disorders, in PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN ID, supra note 94, at 147-60. See generally A. S.
David et al., IQ and Risk for Schizophrenia: A Population-Based Cohort Study, 27 PSYCHOLOGICAL
MEDICINE 1311 (1997).
151. APA, DSM-5, supra note 65, at 40 (“[Among] the most common co-occurring mental and
neurodevelopmental disorders are . . . depressive and bipolar disorders . . . . Major depressive
disorder may occur throughout the range of severity of intellectual disability.”); Lauren Charlot et
al., Depressive Disorders, in DM-ID2, supra note 143, at 265-302; id. at 265 (“Depression occurs
more often in people with ID than individuals without an ID.”); Robert J. Pary et al., Bipolar and
Related Disorders, in DM-ID2, supra note 143, at 245-63; Szymanski & Wilska, Mental
Retardation, supra note 97, at 716-17; Anton Dosen & Jan J. M. Gielen, Depression in Persons with
Mental Retardation: Assessment and Diagnosis, in MENTAL HEALTH ASPECTS OF MENTAL
RETARDATION: PROGRESS IN ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT 70 (Robert J. Fletcher & Anton Dosen
eds., 1993); Sigan L. Hartley & William E. MacLean, Jr., Depression in Adults with Mild
Intellectual Disability: Role of Stress, Attributions, and Coping, 114 AM. J. ON INTELLECTUAL &
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 147 (2009); Stephen Ruedrich, Bipolar Mood Disorders in Persons
with Mental Retardation: Assessment and Diagnosis, in MENTAL HEALTH ASPECTS OF MENTAL
RETARDATION: PROGRESS IN ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT 111 (Robert J. Fletcher & Anton
Dosen eds., 1993); George W. Woods, David Freedman & Timothy J. Derning, Intellectual
Disability and Comorbid Disorders, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 279,
282-84 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015) (“Mood Disorders”); Steven Reiss & Betsey A. Benson,
Psychosocial Correlates of Depression in Mentally Retarded Adults: I. Minimal Social Support and
Stigmatization, 89 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 331 (1985); MOOD DISORDERS IN PEOPLE WITH
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and post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”).153 PTSD, which can be
caused by physical abuse and other forms of mistreatment in an
intellectually disabled person’s childhood,154 may have particular
MENTAL RETARDATION (Peter Sturmey ed., 2005); Angela Hassiotis et al., Mood and Anxiety
Disorders, in PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN ID, supra note 94, at 161-75.
152. See Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1051 (2017) (“[M]any intellectually disabled people
also have other mental or physical impairments, for example, attention-deficit/hyperactivity
disorder, depressive and bipolar disorders, and autism. DSM-5, [supra note 65,] at 40 (‘[c]ooccurring mental, neurodevelopmental, medical, and physical conditions are frequent in intellectual
disability, with rates of some conditions (e.g., mental disorders, cerebral palsy, and epilepsy) three
to four times higher than in the general population’); [see AAIDD 2010, supra note 65,] at 58-63.”).
153. Ruth Ryan, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Persons with Developmental Disabilities, 30
COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 45, 46 (1994) (“People with developmental disabilities are more
likely than nondisabled persons to be abused physically, emotionally, or sexually. Individuals
victimized sexually are more likely to be victimized by multiple perpetrators.”); Szymanski &
Wilska, Mental Retardation, supra note 97, at 718; Jane McCarthy et al., Trauma-and StressorRelated Disorders, in DM-ID2, supra note 143, at 353-99; Chrissoula Stavrakaki & Yona Lunsky,
Depression, Anxiety and Adjustment Disorders in People with Intellectual Disabilities, in
PSYCHIATRIC AND BEHAVIOURAL DISORDERS IN INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES 113, 119 (Nick Bouras & Geraldine Holt eds., 2d ed. 2007) (“One major cause of
PTSD in these individuals are high rates of physical and sexual abuse.”); Almudena Martorell &
Elias Tsakanikos, Traumatic Experiences and Life Events in People with Intellectual Disability, 21
CURRENT OPINION IN PSYCHIATRY 445 (2008) (literature review); Henry F. Crabbe, Treatment of
Anxiety Disorders in Persons with Mental Retardation, in TREATING MENTAL ILLNESS AND
BEHAVIOR DISORDERS IN CHILDREN AND ADULTS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 227, 230 (Anton
Dosen & Kenneth Day eds., 2001) (“Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in persons with mental
retardation is probably significantly underdiagnosed, and it can be presented with symptoms of
panic attack, agoraphobia, and others. This disorder should be routinely considered in differential
diagnosis.” (internal citation omitted)); Dimitrios Paschos & Nick Bouras, Mental Health Supports
in Developmental Disabilities, in ODOM, HANDBOOK OF DD, supra note 92, at 483, 488 (“People
with developmental disabilities may be particularly vulnerable to PTSD because of the increased
incidence of traumatic experiences, such as sexual abuse, in this population.”); AAMR 2002, supra
note 95, at 172 (“The incidence of anxiety and stress disorders is greater in the population with
mental retardation compared with the population of people without mental retardation who are of
similar age.”). See generally Rebecca T. Leeb, Jennifer W. Kaminski, et al., The Association
Between Childhood Disability and Child Maltreatment: A Systematic Review of the Literature, in
MALTREATMENT OF PEOPLE WITH INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 11-81 (John
R. Lutzker, Kate Guastaferro & Megan L. Benka-Coker eds., 2016). For a general discussion of
PTSD, see APA, DSM-5, supra note 65, at 271-80.
154. See AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 60 (listing among the postnatal risk factors for
intellectual disability: child abuse and neglect, domestic violence, and traumatic brain injury);
Daniel J. Tomasulo & Nancy J. Razza, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, in DIAGNOSTIC MANUALINTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: A TEXTBOOK OF DIAGNOSIS OF MENTAL DISORDERS IN PERSONS WITH
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 365, 368 (Robert Fletcher et al. eds, National Association for the Dually
Diagnosed 2007) (“In addition to lower intellectual levels, people with ID [intellectual disability]
have higher rates of many additional factors known to increase vulnerability to PTSD, such as early
separation from parents (through early institutionalization or hospital admissions), lower
educational levels, less training and preparation for negative life events (training and preparation
that might have increased the individual’s sense of personal control), and limited capacity for
garnering social support.”); George W. Woods, David Freedman & Timothy J. Derning, Intellectual
Disability and Comorbid Disorders, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 279,
285 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015) (“Trauma hits people with ID hardest in their areas of greatest
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relevance in capital cases involving defendants with intellectual
disabilities.155 The behavioral manifestations that are frequently
encountered in individuals who have both conditions are at the
confluence of the intellectual disability and the consequence of traumatic
stressors.156 Other forms of mental illness encountered with some
frequency in individuals with intellectual disability in the criminal
justice system include substance-related disorders.157
weakness: new, novel, and stressful circumstances.”); Roberta A. Hibbard et al., Maltreatment of
Children with Disabilities, 119 PEDIATRICS 1018 (2007) (discussing that children with disabilities
were found to be at greater risk of becoming victims of abuse and neglect) (This American
Academy of Pediatrics policy statement was reaffirmed in 2011. 127 PEDIATRICS e1367 (2011));
Patricia M. Sullivan & John F. Knutson, Maltreatment and Disabilities: A Population-Based
Epidemiological Study, 24 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1257 (2000); see also Charles A. Nelson &
Leslie J. Carver, The Effects of Stress and Trauma on Brain and Memory: A View from
Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 10 DEVELOPMENT & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 793 (1998).
155. The list of the “constellation of symptoms” that are “more commonly seen in association
with an interpersonal stressor (e.g., childhood sexual or physical abuse, domestic battering)”
includes “impaired affect modulation; self-destructive and impulsive behavior; . . . social
withdrawal; feeling constantly threatened; impaired relationships with others; [and] a change from
the individual’s previous personality characteristics.” APA, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 80, at 465; see
also APA, DSM-5, supra note 65, at 276 (“Following prolonged, repeated, and severe traumatic
events (e.g., childhood abuse, torture), the individual may additionally experience difficulties in
regulating emotions or maintaining stable interpersonal relationships, or dissociative symptoms.”);
Megan Norris, Nancy Cunningham, & Eric M. Butter, Sexual Trauma in Children and Adolescents
with IDD, in MALTREATMENT OF PEOPLE WITH INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES 83-108 (John R. Lutzker, Kate Guastaferro, & Megan L. Benka-Coker eds., 2016).
156. Daniel J. Tomasulo & Nancy J. Razza, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, in DIAGNOSTIC
MANUAL-INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: A TEXTBOOK OF DIAGNOSIS OF MENTAL DISORDERS IN
PERSONS WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 365, 367 (Robert Fletcher et al. eds, National
Association for the Dually Diagnosed 2007) (“[Behavioral symptoms can] be a function of, or be
exacerbated by, traumatic exposure—symptoms such as the tendency to ‘act out’ rather than ‘think
through’ when distressed; difficulty describing emotional states in words; difficulty in
understanding causality, including understanding the role of one’s own behavior in the treatment
received from others; the presence of learning disabilities; and distorted self-concept.”); Dorothy
Griffiths, Strategic Behavioral Interventions in Aggression, in TREATING MENTAL ILLNESS AND
BEHAVIOR DISORDERS IN CHILDREN AND ADULTS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 305, 310 (Anton
Dosen & Kenneth Day eds., 2001) (“It is therefore more likely that persons with a developmental
disability may experience posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which until recently has not been
diagnosed nor treated in persons with disabilities. According to DSM-5, outbursts of anger are one
of the persistent symptoms of increased arousal associated with PTSD.”); see APA, DSM-5, supra
note 65, at 275 (“Individuals with PTSD may be quick tempered and may even engage in aggressive
verbal and/or physical behavior with little or no provocation . . . .”).
157. See Edwin J. Mikkelsen et al., Substance-Related and Addictive Disorders, in DM-ID2,
supra note 143, at 561-71; Jerry Annand & Chrissoula Stavrakaki, Substance-Related Disorders, in
DIAGNOSTIC MANUAL-INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: A TEXTBOOK OF DIAGNOSIS OF MENTAL
DISORDERS IN PERSONS WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 233, 233-44 (Robert Fletcher et al. eds,
National Association for the Dually Diagnosed 2007); id. at 240 (“A self-perceived feeling of being
different from others often presents as a need to ‘fit in.’ It is caused by the different path of
development from infancy to adulthood that makes the person with ID more vulnerable to the
‘comradeship’ effect of alcohol or drug use. . . . The need for a sense of acceptance, characteristic of
many with ID, decreases the conflict between values and behaviors that alerts persons without ID to
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The existence of an individual’s intellectual disability has
sometimes prevented clinicians or diagnosticians from recognizing that
the person also has mental illness (a process known as “diagnostic
overshadowing”).158 The inverse is also true; the symptoms and behavior
that accompany an individual’s mental illness may draw attention away
from the (often less dramatic and obvious) deficits in adaptive behavior
that are the manifestation of intellectual disability.159
This phenomenon poses two problems for Atkins courts. First, the
visible and behavioral manifestations of mental illness, along with the
practical and management challenges they can pose, may distract courts
and clinical evaluators from focusing on evidence about the defendant’s
intellectual disability.160 For example, an individual may display
the onset of alcohol or drug use issues.” (citations omitted)); LeeAnn Christian & Alan Poling, Drug
Abuse in Persons with Mental Retardation: A Review, 102 AM. J. ON MENTAL RETARDATION 126,
128-29, 134 (1997); Neil B. McGillicuddy, A Review of Substance Use Research Among Those with
Mental Retardation, 12 MENTAL RETARDATION & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES RESEARCH
REVIEWS 41, 42-44 (2006) (citing as a possible factor the ID individual’s “increased tendency to
‘follow the crowd.’”); Shawna L. Carroll Chapman & Li-Tzy Wu, Substance Abuse Among
Individuals with Intellectual Disabilities, 33 RESEARCH IN DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 1147,
1151 (2012) (“Additional reasons suggested for increased substance use are inadequate coping skills
for stress, a desire to fit in or increase social inclusion and overcome loneliness, stigmatization, and
limited social skills.” (citations omitted)); Frank Wenc, The Developmentally Disabled Substance
Abuser, 5 ALCOHOL HEALTH & RESEARCH WORLD 42, 44 (1980-81) (“Intoxication is a great
intellectual equalizer.”); Joseph Westermeyer, Kenneth Kemp & Sean Nugent, Substance Disorder
Among Persons with Mild Mental Retardation: A Comparative Study, 5 AM. J. ON ADDICTIONS 23
(1996). (Similar results have been found in other countries. See, e.g., Jane A. McGillivray & Megan
R. Moore, Substance Use by Offenders with Mild Intellectual Disability, 26 J. INTELLECTUAL &
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY 297 (2001).) There is also some indication in the literature that
individuals who have both ID and mental illness have reduced access to substance abuse treatment
programs. See Elspeth M. Slayter, Disparities in Access to Substance Abuse Treatment Among
People with Intellectual Disabilities and Serious Mental Illness, 35 HEALTH & SOCIAL WORK 49
(2010).
158. Szymanski & Wilska, Mental Retardation, supra note 97, at 707 (“Another phenomenon
has been ‘diagnostic overshadowing’—when clinicians know that a person has mental retardation,
they tend to overlook the comorbid mental disorder.”); David A. Jopp & Christopher B. Keys,
Diagnostic Overshadowing Reviewed and Reconsidered, 106 AM. J. ON MENTAL RETARDATION
416 (2001); AAMR 2002, supra note 95, at 174 (“There has been a general tendency to attribute all
changes in mood and behavior to the diagnosis of mental retardation. This phenomenon has been
named diagnostic overshadowing.”); J. Helen Yoo, Maria G. Valdovinos & Stephen R. Schroeder,
The Epidemiology of Psychopathology in People with Intellectual Disability: A Forty-Year Review,
in 42 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH IN DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 31, 34 (Robert M.
Hodapp ed., 2012) (“Diagnostic overshadowing can diminish the apparent need for a proper
psychiatric assessment and may lead to the subsequent lack of proper treatment and care.”).
159. See AAMR 2002, supra note 95, at 174 (“The same diagnostic error can be made from the
other diagnostic side, leading to underrecognition of intellectual impairments among individuals
with depression, psychosis, or anxiety disorders. Clinicians and teams who support individuals with
mental retardation must remain attentive to the possibility of mistakes in both of these directions.”).
160. Thomas E. Gift, John S. Strauss & Barry A. Ritzler, The Failure to Detect Low IQ in
Psychiatric Assessment, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 345 (1978); J. Gregory Olley, The Death Penalty,
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behavioral limitations that are consistent with a diagnosis of ID, but
those adaptive deficits may be attributed to the more obvious psychiatric
disorder and, as a result, IQ testing may not be pursued, resulting in a
missed ID diagnosis. Second, the same kind of masking effect may well
have been present during an individual’s childhood. Mental illness
symptoms can appear even in young children, and courts and evaluators
must be alert to the possibility that, due to the (understandable) focus on
a child’s symptom-related behaviors, school records and childhood
psychological evaluations may have failed to document a defendant’s
intellectual disability, even though it was present during the
developmental period.161
Similarly, although it is not a mental illness, the poverty which may
be a part of a defendant’s life history, and particularly of his childhood,
may also be the functional equivalent of a “comorbid condition,” in the
sense that it has the potential to mask an individual’s intellectual
disability. As with mental illness, it is exceedingly important to avoid
letting the existence of one condition interfere with the diagnostic
process concerning the other.162
There is a clear consensus among clinicians and professional
associations that the diagnosis and existence of any form of mental
illness in an individual cannot preclude a diagnosis of intellectual
disability.163 The American Psychiatric Association, for example, has
the Courts, and Intellectual Disabilities, in THE HANDBOOK OF HIGH-RISK CHALLENGING
BEHAVIORS IN PEOPLE WITH INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 229, 232 (James
K. Luiselli ed., 2012) [hereinafter Olley, Death Penalty and Courts] (“An understanding of dual
diagnoses is important because it may be mistakenly argued in court that the defendant has a mental
illness diagnosis that rules out mental retardation.”).
161. For a discussion of the age of onset requirement of the definition, see supra Part IV.C.
162. See Olley, Death Penalty and Courts, supra note 160, at 232 (“[T]he relationship between
the conditions of poverty and mild ID are well established, especially when such conditions are
experienced in early childhood. . . . A failure to understand this relationship sometimes leads to
misguided court testimony in which it is argued that these conditions are the cause of the
defendant’s limitations, and, thus, the diagnosis of mental retardation cannot be made. In fact, these
conditions are such a familiar pattern that mild ID has historically been referred to as ‘cultural
familial mental retardation.’”) (internal citations omitted); see also Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039,
1051 (2017) (identifying “childhood abuse and suffering” as “traumatic experiences [that] count in
the medical community as ‘risk factors’ for intellectual disability.”).
163. See, e.g., APA, DSM-5, supra note 65, at 31, 39, 40; Macvaugh & Cunningham, Forensic
Practice, supra note 83, at 151-52.
Another question that occasionally arises is whether and how an individual with mental
illness can even be evaluated for intellectual disability. Experienced clinicians recognize that the
existence of one condition does not preclude accurate diagnosis regarding the other.
In the face of active and significant symptoms of psychological disorder, we recommend
that the evaluation be postponed until the evaluee is clinically stable. However, the
diagnosis of mental retardation is routinely made in clinical settings in the presence of a
comorbid psychological disorder. Accordingly, as long as the active symptoms of mental
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advised diagnosticians that “[t]he diagnostic criteria for Mental
Retardation do not include an exclusion criterion; therefore, the
diagnosis should be made whenever the diagnostic criteria are met,
regardless of, and in addition to, the presence of another disorder.”164
VI.

ISSUES IN EVALUATING INTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONING
A. Commonly Used IQ Tests

As discussed earlier in this Article, IQ testing is the starting point in
determining whether an individual has “significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning,” which is the first prong of the definition.165 For
any court evaluating an Atkins claim, therefore, evaluation of the results
of IQ tests is likely to be the first order of business.
The concept of the intelligence quotient,166 and the tests to measure
it, were developed early in the twentieth century and have been
intensively studied and improved over the following decades.167 The
tests can be thought of as measuring what the individual has learned over
time, and thus can serve as a measured reflection of his or her ability or
capacity to learn.168 IQ tests provide a measure of the individual’s
intellectual ability, but not an explanation of the reasons for it.169 For the
illness are well-controlled with treatment, the presence of such a disorder alone should
not be assumed to account for observed deficient IQ scores, particularly when there is a
history of intellectual limitations and adaptive behavior deficits. Similarly, the presence
of a personality disorder does not contraindicate a finding of mental retardation.
Id. at 152.
164. APA, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 80, at 47; see also AAMR 2002, supra note 95, at 172
(discussing the “prevalence of mental health disorders among individuals with mental retardation”);
APA, DSM-5, supra note 65, at 40 (explaining that co-occurring conditions are “frequent,” with
some, such as mental disorders, being “three to four times higher than in the general population”).
The Supreme Court has noted this professional consensus. Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2280
(2015) (citing APA, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 80, at 47; AAMR 2002, supra note 95, at 172);
Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051 (“As mental-health professionals recognize, however, many intellectually
disabled people also have other mental or physical impairments . . . .”).
165. See supra Part IV.A.
166. See ANASTASI & URBINA, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING, supra note 106, at 296
(“[I]ntelligence is not a single, unitary ability, but a composite of several functions. The term is
commonly used to cover that combination of abilities required for survival and advancement within
a particular culture.”). David Wechsler, the psychologist who developed the Wechsler scales,
described intelligence as “the aggregate or global capacity of the individual to act purposefully, to
think rationally and to deal effectively with his environment.” DAVID WECHSLER, THE
MEASUREMENT OF ADULT INTELLIGENCE 3 (1st ed. 1939) (emphasis omitted).
167. See supra note 106.
168. ANASTASI & URBINA, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING, supra note 106, at 295-96; KAUFMAN &
LICHTENBERGER, ASSESSING INTELLIGENCE, supra note 93, at 23.
169. ANASTASI & URBINA, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING, supra note 106, at 295 (“[T]ested
intelligence should be regarded as a descriptive rather than an explanatory concept. An IQ is an
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population as a whole, the spectrum of measured intelligence can be
envisioned as a bell-curve, with the mean (average) score of 100.170
Psychologists then compare the examined person’s IQ score against
that average, and measure the individual’s score in terms of its distance
from the general population’s average. As noted earlier, to satisfy the
first prong of the definition of intellectual disability, the person’s
measured intelligence must be at least two standard deviations below the
mean score of 100 (taking into account the standard error of
measurement). Fewer than three percent of the population have scores
that are at least two standard deviations below the mean.171 That is the
threshold for the first element of the definition of intellectual disability.

Psychologists have developed a wide array of IQ tests which they
use for various purposes,172 but the courts are most likely to encounter
only a few in Atkins evaluations.173 One series of instruments courts may
expression of an individual’s ability level at a given point in time, in relation to the available age
norms. No intelligence test can indicate the reasons for one’s performance.”). For a discussion of
the causation of intellectual disability, see supra note 97 and sources cited therein.
170. See infra Figure 1.
171. See Lisa Whipple Drozdick et al., The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Fourth Edition
and the Wechsler Memory Scale-Fourth Edition, in CONTEMPORARY INTELLECTUAL ASSESSMENT:
THEORIES TESTS AND ISSUES 197, 197 (Dawn P. Flanagan & Patti L. Harrison eds., 3d ed. 2012);
see also supra note 110 and sources cited therein.
172. See, e.g., Sara S. Sparrow & Stephanie M. Davis, Recent Advances in the Assessment of
Intelligence and Cognition, 41 J. CHILD PSYCHOLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 117, 124-26 Table 1 (2000).
173. Courts may also encounter other tests in a defendant’s history. A number of these tests are
described in CONTEMPORARY INTELLECTUAL ASSESSMENT: THEORIES, TESTS AND ISSUES, 197-455
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see frequently are the IQ tests developed originally by Alfred Binet at
the turn of the twentieth century and then modified and adapted over the
years by psychologists at Stanford University. These tests are known as
the “Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales,” and since the current version is
the fifth edition, the shorthand term used by psychologists is
the “SB5.”174
The other tests most frequently encountered in intellectual disability
cases are the series of tests developed originally by David Wechsler in
the middle of the twentieth century.175 There are two basic versions. The
first is designed to measure the intelligence of children, the “Wechsler
Intelligence Scale for Children,” which is now in its fifth edition and
shorthanded as “WISC-V.”176 The other principal test is the “Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Scale,”177 now in its fourth edition, known as the
“WAIS-IV.”178 (The creation and evolution of both the Stanford-Binet
and the Wechsler scales are a result of refinements in psychometric

(Dawn P. Flanagan & Patti L. Harrison eds., 3d ed. 2012). See infra notes 424-29 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the need for experts to have specific knowledge of every test
they interpret.
174. The SB5 was published in 2003. GALE H. ROID & R. ANDREW BARRAM, ESSENTIALS OF
STANFORD-BINET INTELLIGENCE SCALES (SB5) ASSESSMENT 1 (2004).
175. The first version was the Wechsler-Bellevue Intelligence Scale, which was published in
1939. ANASTASI & URBINA, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING, supra note 106, at 215. For a history of the
development of IQ testing and the role of Dr. Wechsler, see generally Corwin Boake, From the
Binet–Simon to the Wechsler–Bellevue: Tracing the History of Intelligence Testing, 24 J. CLINICAL
& EXPERIMENTAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 383 (2002).
176. ALAN S. KAUFMAN ET AL., INTELLIGENT TESTING WITH THE WISC–V, at 5 (2016).
Because the WISC is intended for testing with children, courts will be unlikely to see test results
from the WISC-V, published in 2014, for a few years in the capital context. A comprehensive
explanation of the WISC-V may be found at id., pt. I-III. The WISC-IV was published in 2003, and
is likely to be the instrument that will appear in records of prior testing for some time to come. See
DAWN P. FLANAGAN & ALAN S. KAUFMAN, ESSENTIALS OF WISC-IV ASSESSMENT (2d ed. 2009).
There is also a separate test for younger children, the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of
Intelligence—Third Edition, or “WPPSI-III,” published in 2002. ESTHER STRAUSS, ELISABETH M.
S. SHERMAN & OTFRIED SPREEN, A COMPENDIUM OF NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS:
ADMINISTRATION, NORMS, AND COMMENTARY 337 (3d ed. 2006). For a fuller explanation of the
WISC-IV and the WPPSI-III, see id. at 310-47.
177. The first WAIS was published in 1955. KAUFMAN & LICHTENBERGER, ASSESSING
INTELLIGENCE, supra note 93, at 3.
178. ELIZABETH O. LICHTENBERGER & ALAN S. KAUFMAN, ESSENTIALS OF WAIS-IV
ASSESSMENT 37-42 (2d ed. 2013). The WAIS-IV was published in 2009. Id.; WAIS-IV CLINICAL
USE AND INTERPRETATION (Lawrence G. Weiss et al. eds., 2010); WAIS-IV, WMS-IV, AND ACS:
ADVANCED CLINICAL INTERPRETATION (James A. Holdnack et al. eds., 2013).
The WAIS-III, which courts may still encounter from prior testing, is for use from ages 16
to 89. KAUFMAN & LICHTENBERGER, ASSESSING INTELLIGENCE, supra note 93, at 3. Although the
adult version is obviously the appropriate instrument for the adults in the criminal justice system,
courts may also see WISC results (from one edition or another) when reviewing any testing that that
may have been done on the defendant earlier in life, particularly when he was in school.
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understanding, incorporating the practical experience of the
psychologists who have administered the tests.179)
These frequently used psychometric instruments have a great deal
in common with one another. Each consists of a standardized list of
individual questions and tasks180 that are administered under carefully
monitored time limitations and testing conditions.181 The questions to be
asked and the equipment to be used accompany the test kit.182 When the
individual who is to be evaluated has completed the test, the examiner
reviews the results given and, based on the percentage of correct
answers, assigns the appropriate IQ score (The IQ score is derived from
a table which reflects the percentage of individuals in the general
population who gave the same number of correct and incorrect
answers).183 The standards for each test are prescribed in great detail in
179. An indication of the intensity of the professional scrutiny of the instruments is the
plethora of scholarly articles and books analyzing and criticizing various aspects of each edition of
the tests and suggesting improvements. For example, the Wechsler instruments have engendered
“several thousand publications” reflecting extensive clinical commentary. ANASTASI & URBINA,
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING, supra note 106, at 215. These comments, critiques, and testing results
are then evaluated and incorporated in later iterations of the instrument. See id. at 222. (“The
successive editions of the three Wechsler scales reflect an increasing level of sophistication and
experience in test construction, corresponding to the decades when they were developed.”).
180. Keith F. Widaman, Concepts of Measurement, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 55, 62 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015) (“Many items on intelligence
tests are scored in dichotomous fashion (0 = incorrect, 1 = correct) or ternary form (0 = incorrect,
1 = partial credit, 2 = full credit). Other items may be scored based on time taken to complete a set
of operations, so they might lead to a transformation of time, with longer times to solve receiving
lower scores.”).
181. ANASTASI & URBINA, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING, supra note 106, at 6 (“Standardization
implies uniformity of procedure in administering and scoring the test. If the scores obtained by
different persons are to be comparable, testing conditions must obviously be the same for all.”). If
the examiner varies from the test’s time requirements, or if the conditions of administration are not
consistent with the test’s standards, there is a substantial risk that the resulting score will be
incorrect. See, e.g., Malcolm Ree, Standardization, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLIGENCE, supra
note 112, at 1032; KAUFMAN & LICHTENBERGER, ASSESSING INTELLIGENCE, supra note 93, at 197202 (discussing administration and scoring errors on Wechsler IQ tests); Jeffrey G. Kuentzel et al.,
Testing Intelligently Includes Double-Checking Wechsler IQ Scores, 29 J. PSYCHOEDUCATIONAL
ASSESSMENT 39 (2011); GARY GROTH-MARNAT, HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT
137 (5th ed. 2009) (listing the most common errors in test administration that can distort individual
scores).
182. ANASTASI & URBINA, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING, supra note 106, at 208 Figure 8–1
(showing a photograph of the test materials used in administering a Stanford-Binet scale).
183. Among the issues involved in the construction of these instruments are the “validity” and
“reliability” of the particular tests. The validity of a test is an assessment of how clearly its results
focus on the attribute that its designers set out to measure. See, e.g., Pamela A. Moss, Validity, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLIGENCE, supra note 112, at 1101, 1103 (“First, is the test any good as a
measure of the characteristic it is interpreted to assess? Second, should the test be used for the
proposed purpose?” (quoting Samuel Messick, The Standard Problem: Meaning and Values in
Measurement and Evaluation, 30 AM. PSYCHOL. 955, 962 (1975))). Reliability refers more
specifically to whether the results of a test are accurate, in the sense that they would be replicated on
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the test’s published manual, details with which every clinical evaluator
needs to be familiar and experienced. What might seem to a layperson to
be a minor departure from the rules for administering and interpreting
these tests184 can have substantial consequences and distort the
test’s results.185
Each of the psychometric instruments used to measure intelligence
has been pretested and normed on the relevant populations prior to its

another occasion or when administered by another tester. See, e.g., Cecil R. Reynolds, Reliability, in
2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLIGENCE, supra note 112, at 949 (“In thinking about reliability, one must
address such questions as what the probability is of a person obtaining the same score if tested at a
different time.”); Domenic V. Cicchetti, Guidelines, Criteria, and Rules of Thumb for Evaluating
Normed and Standardized Assessment Instruments in Psychology, 6 PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT
284 (1994); John W. Jacobson & James A. Mulick, Psychometrics, in MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE IN MENTAL RETARDATION 75, 77-80 (John W. Jacobson & James A.
Mulick eds., American Psychological Association, 1996); Widaman, supra note 180, at 65-73.
184. Great care must be taken to avoid administrative and scoring errors, which create the risk
of misreporting the defendant’s intellectual functioning. For discussion of the role of computational
and other errors in the administration and scoring of Wechsler scales, see John R. Slate & Larry C.
Hunnicutt, Jr., Examiner Errors on the Wechsler Scales, 6 J. PSYCHOEDUCATIONAL ASSESSMENT
280 (1988); Gary W. Moon et al., Frequent WAIS-R Administration Errors: An Ignored Source of
Inaccurate Measurement, 22 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH & PRACTICE 256 (1991) (listing the
most common evaluator errors and the frequency with which they occur); Joseph J. Ryan, Aurelio
Prifitera & Linda Powers, Scoring Reliability on the WAIS-R, 51 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOLOGY 149 (1983); Paul A. McDermott, Marley W. Watkins & Anna M. Rhoad, Whose IQ Is
It?—Assessor Bias Variance in High-Stakes Psychological Assessment, 26 PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSESSMENT 207, 208 (2014) (“Assessor bias is manifest where, for example, a psychologist will
tend to drift from the standardized protocol for test administration (altering or ignoring stopping
rules or verbal prompts, mishandling presentation of items and materials, etc.) and erroneously
scoring test responses (failure to query ambiguous answers, giving too much or too little credit for
performance, erring on time limits, etc.).”); KAUFMAN & LICHTENBERGER, ASSESSING
INTELLIGENCE, supra note 93, at 197-202; John R. Slate et al., Practitioners’ Administration and
Scoring of the WISC-R: Evidence That We Do Err, 30 J. SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGY 77, 81 (1992) (“The
frequent mistake of ‘generosity’ in assigning points may reflect a sincere desire to help a child/client
that creates a subtle pressure to ‘read into answers.’”); Janice Whitten et al., Examiner Errors in
Administering and Scoring the WPPSI-R, 12 J. PSYCHOEDUCATIONAL ASSESSMENT 49, 51 (1994)
(“Examiners were 1.6 times more likely to assign too many points than too few points.”). See
generally William McQueen et al., Improving Graduate Student Performance in Cognitive
Assessment: The Saga Continues, 25 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH & PRACTICE 283 (1994).
Courts should be particularly alert to the possibility of errors in testing performed during the
individual’s childhood. See Larry C. Hunnicutt, Jr. et al., Examiner Errors on the Kaufman
Assessment Battery for Children: A Preliminary Investigation, 28 J. SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGY 271,
272-76 (1990).
185. Paul A. McDermott, Marley W. Watkins & Anna M. Rhoad, Whose IQ Is It?—Assessor
Bias Variance in High-Stakes Psychological Assessment, 26 PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 207,
208 (2014) (“Administration and scoring biases, most especially pervasive types, undermine the
purpose of testing. Their corrupting effects are exponentially more serious when testing purposes
are high stakes, and there is abundant evidence that such biases will operate to distort major score
interpretations, to change results of clinical trials, and to alter clinical diagnoses and special
education classifications.”).
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publication.186 The group on which the test has been normed may also be
limited by age.187 The norming process involves careful analysis of the
results of its administration to a large and diverse collection of
individuals, including individuals with intellectual disability.188
The actual administration of any of the principal IQ tests typically
takes two to three hours, and the scoring and interpretation of the results
by the clinical examiner generally occupies about two or three additional
hours.189 Such a report should include not only the results of the testing
but also any observations regarding the test conditions.190
186. For any particular instrument, it is essential that the population sample from which the
norming is derived is representative of the overall population. Keith F. Widaman, Concepts of
Measurement, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 55, 63 (Edward A.
Polloway ed., 2015) (“A norming sample is typically selected to be representative of the population
of a country with regard to region of residence, socioeconomic status, ethnicity, and other relevant
demographic variables. The norming samples of adaptive behavior and intelligence tests serve as
representative ‘snap shots’ of the complete population or country.”); Richard W. Woodcock, Norms,
in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLIGENCE, supra note 112, at 770, 774; see infra notes 248-49
(discussing the use of the version of a test with the most recent norms whenever possible).
187. Keith F. Widaman, Concepts of Measurement, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 55, 63 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015) (“If a measure, such as an
intelligence test or inventory of adaptive behavior, assesses constructs presumed to vary as a
function of chronological age, then norming samples for each age level must be obtained.”).
188. Any test that is administered to determine whether an individual has intellectual disability
must have been properly normed on a broad sample that includes the appropriate number of people
with intellectual disability. See Richard W. Woodcock, Norms, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
INTELLIGENCE, supra note 112, at 770, 772; ANASTASI & URBINA, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING, supra
note 106, at 69. Instruments that have not been rigorously normed should not be used in assessing
the IQ of anyone who may have intellectual disability.
189. See KAUFMAN & LICHTENBERGER, ASSESSING INTELLIGENCE, supra note 93, at 192-97
(discussing administration of the third edition of the WAIS).
190. Skilled and experienced clinicians administering these instruments may be in a position to
learn more than just the individual’s test results:
Over the decades, clinicians have come to regard the Stanford-Binet and similar
individual scales not only as standardized tests but also as clinical interviews. The very
features that make these scales difficult to administer also create opportunities for
interaction between examiner and examinee and provide other sources of clues for the
experienced clinician. [These tests] make it possible to observe the respondent’s work
methods, problem-solving approaches, and other qualitative aspects of performance.
ANASTASI & URBINA, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING, supra note 106, at 207-08.
The testing process can also be helpful in identifying the possibility of co-existing mental
illness. See AIKEN, ASSESSMENT OF INTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONING, supra note 106, at 160
(“[A]dministering a test should also be viewed as a chance to make observations in a controlled
situation, an opportunity that can provide a great deal of extratest information and data to confirm or
disconfirm hypotheses about the examinee’s mental status and personality functioning.”).
Nonetheless, it is crucial to avoid confusing such observations with the results of the tests
themselves:
Any qualitative observations made in the course of administering individual scales
should, of course, be clearly recognized as such and ought not to be interpreted in the
same way as objective test scores. The value of such qualitative observations depends
largely on the skill, experience, and psychological sophistication of the examiner, as well
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The Stanford-Binet. The Stanford-Binet 5 (or SB5) is the most
recent edition of the test that is the ancestor of all modern IQ
instruments.191 Like all the others, its scores distribute results so that
individuals with measured intelligence at least two standard deviations
below the mean will receive scores in the range of approximately 70-75
or below.192 A feature of the Stanford-Binet is that it provides clinicians
with three different interpretive indices (or scores): the Verbal IQ, the
Nonverbal (previously described as “Performance”) IQ, and the
Full Scale IQ (which incorporates both the Verbal and the
Nonverbal results).193
The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. The Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale, 4th edition (WAIS-IV) is the latest edition of the test
first devised by David Wechsler in 1939 as an alternative to the
Stanford-Binet.194 Like the Stanford-Binet, its scoring system organizes
results so that individuals whose measured intelligence is at least two
standard deviations below the mean will receive scores in the range of
70-75 or below. And, like the Stanford-Binet, previous editions of the
Wechsler tests have, up through the WAIS-III, provided the examiner

as on her or his awareness of the pitfalls and limitations inherent in this type of
observation.
ANASTASI & URBINA, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING, supra note 106, at 208.
191. Gale H. Roid & Mark Pomplun, The Stanford Binet Intelligence Scales, Fifth Edition, in
CONTEMPORARY INTELLECTUAL ASSESSMENT: THEORIES, TESTS AND ISSUES 249, 266 (Dawn P.
Flanagan & Patti L. Harrison eds., 3d ed. 2012).
192. For a discussion of the SB5’s sub-tests, as well as issues involved in administration and
scoring, see id. at 251-54.
193. ESTHER STRAUSS, ELISABETH M. S. SHERMAN & OTFRIED SPREEN, A COMPENDIUM OF
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS: ADMINISTRATION, NORMS, AND COMMENTARY 259-60 (3d ed.
2006). Both the Verbal and Nonverbal (Performance) scores are, themselves, based on five socalled factor indices. Id.; see also GALE H. ROID & R. ANDREW BARRAM, ESSENTIALS OF
STANFORD-BINET INTELLIGENCE SCALES (SB5) ASSESSMENT 9-10 (2004) There is a consensus
among psychologists that the Full Scale score is generally the most reliable indicator of the
individual’s level of intelligence. See infra note 195. For a detailed description of the SB5, see
STRAUSS ET AL., supra, at 258-68.
194. Lisa Whipple Drozdick et al., The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Fourth Edition and
the Wechsler Memory Scale-Fourth Edition, in CONTEMPORARY INTELLECTUAL ASSESSMENT:
THEORIES TESTS AND ISSUES 197, 197 (Dawn P. Flanagan & Patti L. Harrison eds., 3d ed. 2012)
(“The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale—Fourth Edition (WAIS-IV) is the most recent revision of
the WAIS and incorporates numerous changes from previous editions while maintaining the
integrity and tradition of the Wechsler scales. It is used to assess intellectual and cognitive
functioning in adults and adolescents ages 16 to 90 and provides information on an individual’s
general intellectual ability, as well as abilities across various cognitive domains. Since the WAIS-IV
provides an overall estimate of cognitive functioning, it is frequently used alongside other
instruments in comprehensive evaluations.”). For a discussion of the WAIS-IV’s subtests, see id. at
200-07. The Wechsler tests now appear to be “the most widely employed individual [IQ] tests.”
ANASTASI & URBINA, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING, supra note 106, at 219.
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with a Full Scale score and Verbal and Performance scores.195 The
WAIS-IV is organized somewhat differently, and no longer has the
division between Verbal and Performance IQ scores.196 The report from
the administration of the WAIS-IV will include a Full Scale IQ score
accompanied by scores in four “index” areas: verbal comprehension,
working memory, perceptual reasoning, and processing speed.197
In addition to Wechsler and Stanford-Binet, there are other
instruments that have been used in recent years.198 Courts are most likely
to encounter reports based on these instruments in the process of
reviewing a defendant’s history from earlier times in his life.
B. Short Forms and Group Tests
At times, the courts may encounter an evaluation report or
testimony from a witness who has not given the examined individual a
complete, standardized IQ test, and instead has administered a portion of
such a test or given a so-called “short form” version of an IQ test.
Short forms of the most popular IQ tests have been available for
decades,199 and, while there is considerable controversy surrounding
195. ANASTASI & URBINA, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING, supra note 106, at 217 (The earlier
versions of the Wechsler scales, which courts remain likely to encounter, have performance subtests
which “typically require the manipulation of various objects, such as puzzles and blocks, or the
visual scanning of printed materials, like pictures or symbols. They all place time limits on the test
taker, who in most cases is also given bonus points for speed. In the Verbal Scale, by contrast, only
one subtest (Arithmetic) is speeded.”). See generally ESTHER STRAUSS, ELISABETH M. S. SHERMAN
& OTFRIED SPREEN, A COMPENDIUM OF NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS: ADMINISTRATION, NORMS,
AND COMMENTARY 283-310 (3d ed. 2006) (describing the details of the WAIS-III).
196. GARY GROTH-MARNAT, HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 122 (5th ed.
2009).
197. Id. at 122-23 (“The major rationale for the elimination of the Verbal-Performance IQs is
that they are not pure measures but typically combine a number of different abilities. For example,
the Verbal IQ included measures of verbal abilities as well as working memory. Thus it was not a
unitary measure of an ability. In contrast, relying on the four index scores ensures that relatively
pure, theoretically sound measures of abilities have been made.”).
198. See Sara S. Sparrow & Stephanie M. Davis, Recent Advances in the Assessment of
Intelligence and Cognition, 41 J. CHILD PSYCHOLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 117, 129 (2000) (“In the last
two decades of the twentieth century, there have been an abundance of new and revised tests to
measure cognition.”).
One such instrument was developed by Professor Alan Kaufman, the “Kaufman
Adolescent and Adult Intelligence Test,” also known as the “KAIT,” which was designed for
administration to individuals between the ages of 11 and 85. ANASTASI & URBINA,
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING, supra note 106, at 224. The publisher of the KAIT stopped publishing it
several years ago, in part because of the expense of the process of frequently updating and
reformulating such instruments in light of phenomena such as the Obsolescent Norms (Flynn)
effect, discussed infra Part VI.D.
199. For example, a short form variant of the Stanford-Binet was published as the “Slosson
Intelligence Test.” AAMR 2002, supra note 95, at 64 (“Slosson . . . designed this instrument to
provide an estimate of intelligence that requires little specialized training for the examiner and little
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them, some psychologists have found them helpful for making quick
assessments and rough screenings of intellectual functioning.200 These
tests achieve their brevity either by reducing the number of items in each
subtest or by eliminating some of the subtests altogether. Some other
short tests focus on one particular aspect of intelligence.201 The goal of
developing a short form is to save time for the evaluator.202
Whatever usefulness these short tests may have for initial
assessments in contexts such as educational placement, there is a strong
consensus among psychologists and other clinicians that they cannot be
used as a substitute for a full assessment of intelligence in
matters of significance.203 Relying on such abbreviated testing,
time to administer.”). The Slosson test, in particular, has been severely criticized. See, e.g.,
KAUFMAN & LICHTENBERGER, ASSESSING INTELLIGENCE, supra note 93, at 630-31; id. at 660
(“The Slosson Intelligence Test, a mostly verbal test organized in the format of the old Binet, has
been commonly used for decades, but it has largely unknown psychometric properties and a poor
standardization sample.”). There are similar concerns about the “Ammons Quick Test.” Caroline
Everington, Challenges of Conveying Intellectual Disabilities to Judge and Jury, 23 WM. & MARY
BILL OF RIGHTS J. 467, 474 (2014) (“The Ammons test is designed as a quick screening tool and is
very limited in scope, primarily measuring vocabulary, which is only one component of intellectual
functioning.” (footnote omitted)). Short forms have been developed for the Wechsler and Kaufman
tests as well. ANASTASI & URBINA, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING, supra note 106, at 217 (“Since the
publication of the original Wechsler-Bellevue, a large number of abbreviated scales or short forms
have been proposed for the Wechsler scales.” (emphasis omitted)); id. at 225 (“The Kaufman Brief
Intelligence Test (K-BIT) was designed as a quick screening instrument to estimate level of
intellectual functioning. Although it is individually administered, the test is simple and can be given
by a technician.” (citation omitted)).
200. For a discussion of the history of these instruments, see A.B. Silverstein, Short Forms of
Individual Intelligence Tests, 2 PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 3 (1990); KAUFMAN &
LICHTENBERGER, ASSESSING INTELLIGENCE, supra note 93, at 629-33.
201. See KAUFMAN & LICHTENBERGER, ASSESSING INTELLIGENCE, supra note 93, at 650. An
example is the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test—Third Edition (PPVT-III). See id. In addition,
some clinicians focus on only a single portion of the standardized test, i.e., only reporting the verbal
or the performance subtests. Kevin S. McGrew, Intellectual Functioning, in THE DEATH PENALTY
AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 85, 105 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015). Great care must be taken
when using measures other than full-scale IQ. Id. (“The total full-scale IQ score is usually the best
estimate of a client’s overall intellectual functioning for diagnostic purposes. However, there are
instances in which, and individuals for whom, the total test score may not be the best representation
of overall intellectual functioning.”); APA, DSM-5, supra note 65, at 37 (“[H]ighly discrepant
individual subtest scores may make an overall IQ score invalid.”); see, e.g., People v. Superior
Court (Vidal), 155 P.3d 259, 266-67 (Cal. 2007).
202. A.B. Silverstein, Short Forms of Individual Intelligence Tests, 2 PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSESSMENT 3, 4 (1990).
203. See, e.g., id. at 9 (“There appears to be rather general agreement that the use of a short
form . . . is definitely not legitimate if an important decision is to be made on the basis of the results
(e.g., when placement in a special education program is being considered).”); see also APA,
DSM-5, supra note 65, at 37 (“Invalid scores may result from the use of brief intelligence screening
tests or group tests . . . .”); ANASTASI & URBINA, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING, supra note 106, at
217-19 (“[M]any of the important qualitative observations made possible by the administration of
an individual scale are lost when abbreviated scales are used. Thus, it is probably inadvisable to use
such abbreviated versions except as rough screening devices.”); AIKEN, ASSESSMENT OF
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particularly in opposition to an Atkins claim,204 is inconsistent with
professional standards.
Similar concerns are raised by IQ tests that are administered to
groups rather than individually.205 These group tests, such as the Revised
Beta, are often employed by correctional institutions as part of their
initial screening process for new inmates.206 These tests were originally
designed for use in the armed forces in World War I, 207 and have been
INTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONING, supra note 106, at 152 (“Whenever shortened or abbreviated
versions of the WAIS-R are administered, they should be viewed as rough screening devices that do
not provide the same opportunity as administration of the Full Scale for making qualitative
observations of the examinee’s behavior.”); Everington & Olley, Defining and Diagnosing, supra
note 15, at 7 (“These brief tests may be useful screening instruments for placement purposes but are
not valid measures for diagnosing mental retardation and should not be compared to a test of global
intelligence, such as the Wechsler scale.”); Cecil R. Reynolds & Daneen A. Milam, Challenging
Intellectual Testing Results, in COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 311,
327 (David Faust ed., 6th ed. 2012) (“Shortened versions of tests are less reliable (their scores
contain larger error components) and typically have less scientific evidence available to support
their interpretations.”); Bradley N. Axelrod, Validity of the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of
Intelligence and Other Very Short Forms of Estimating Intellectual Functioning, 9 ASSESSMENT 17,
22 (2002) (“[I]f the clinician’s goal is to obtain an accurate estimation of general intellectual
functioning, the current results suggest that the WASI should not be used in the assessment of
individual patients.”); Gilbert S. Macvaugh, III, Karen L. Salekin & J. Gregory Olley, Mental
Retardation: Death Penalty, in 4 WILEY ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 1730, 1733 (Allan
Jamieson & Andre Moenssens eds., 2009) (“[O]nly global measures of intelligence are appropriate
for diagnosing mental retardation . . . .”); James C. Kaufman & Alan S. Kaufman, Time for the
Changing of the Guard: A Farewell to Short Forms of Intelligence Tests, 19
J. PSYCHOEDUCATIONAL ASSESSMENT 245 (2001) (arguing that even for initial screening purposes,
other instruments are superior to the short forms).
204. Contemporaneous testing using short forms does not give courts adequate information on
which to decide whether a defendant is entitled to Atkins relief. However, if a court encounters
records of, for example, a Slosson test or some other short form administered earlier in the
defendant’s life, there may be some evidentiary value on such issues as the age of onset of the
defendant’s disability.
205. Group tests are generally pencil-and-paper tests. JOHN SALVIA & JAMES E. YSSELDYKE,
ASSESSMENT IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 200 (4th ed. 1988). As is the case with short tests, this means
that only some aspects of intelligence are tested, in contrast to the full-scale instruments. See supra
notes 206-11 and accompanying text. For additional issues regarding group tests, see John Fremer,
Group Tests, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLIGENCE, supra note 112, at 508-12.
206. Everington & Olley, Defining and Diagnosing, supra note 15, at 6 (“[G]roupadministered tests, such as the Revised Beta, are commonly used upon entry into correctional
facilities . . . .” (citation omitted)).
Group tests, including the Lorge-Thorndike and Otis-Lennon, were also employed by
some school districts or individual schools for administrative purposes. JOHN SALVIA & JAMES E.
YSSELDYKE, ASSESSMENT IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 200 (4th ed. 1988) (“Most often they are
routinely administered as screening devices to identify those who are different enough to warrant
further assessment.”); id. at 217 (“Many school districts have done away with the use of group
intelligence tests for several reasons . . . [including concern that] teachers may form unrealistic or
inaccurate expectancies or stereotypes based on the scores.”).
207. See AIKEN, ASSESSMENT OF INTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONING, supra note 106, at 17-19; see
also LEILA ZENDERLAND, MEASURING MINDS: HENRY HERBERT GODDARD AND THE ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE TESTING 292-93 (1998); Frederick L. McGuire, Army Alpha and Beta
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updated and modified over the years. For a variety of reasons, including
the lack of direct interaction and observation between the examiner and
the subject, group tests are viewed as having substantially reduced
accuracy and reliability.208 They are particularly unreliable when used
for diagnostic purposes in Atkins cases.
C. Standard Error of Measurement for IQ Testing
As with measurements in any area of our lives, the process of
ascertaining an individual’s IQ necessarily includes some degree of
imprecision. Rather than ignore this potential imprecision, or make
claims for a greater level of certainty than the scientific facts warrant,
psychologists and other clinicians have addressed the issue directly:
“Because all measurement in science is imperfect, psychologists have
developed mathematical theories to assist them in determining how
well tests measure psychological traits or characteristics.”209 This
acknowledgement has produced a specific tool, which is known as the
“standard error of measurement,” or “SEM.”210
The standard error of measurement is essentially a quantification of
the likelihood that the score that was achieved on a particular
administration of a test was an accurate measure.211 Since it is not
Tests of Intelligence, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLIGENCE, supra note 112, at 125-29.
208. Caroline Everington, Challenges of Conveying Intellectual Disabilities to Judge and Jury,
23 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 467, 474 (2014) (“A commonly observed error is the reliance
on screening or group-administered intelligence tests that do not provide accurate measures of
IQ. . . . Group-administered paper and pencil tests, such as the Beta III, used in correctional settings,
are also inappropriate for diagnosis as they do not yield accurate scores. In the case of groupadministered tests, there is the additional risk that the individual received additional help or copied
the responses of others.”); AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 41 (“For evaluating whether or not a
person meets the significant limitations in intellectual functioning criterion for a diagnosis of ID,
one should employ an individually administered, standardized instrument that yields a measure of
general intellectual functioning.” (emphasis added)). Group tests are often not well-standardized due
to grade level and age fluctuations, and often not standardized on representative populations. JOHN
SALVIA & JAMES E. YSSELDYKE, ASSESSMENT IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 217 (4th ed. 1988).
209. Edward J. Slawski, Error of Measurement, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLIGENCE, supra
note 112, at 395.
210. AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 36. The statistical phenomenon of measurement error is
not unique to IQ testing; it applies to a wide array of educational and psychological measurements.
See, e.g., Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2000 (2014) (“SEM is not a concept peculiar to the
psychiatric profession and IQ tests.”). For a more technical explanation of the phenomenon, see
David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 211, 243-46 (Federal Judicial Center & National Research Council of the
National Academies eds., 3d ed. 2011).
211. ROBERT M. THORNDIKE & TRACY THORNDIKE-CHRIST, MEASUREMENT AND
EVALUATION IN PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION 132 (8th ed. 2010) (“Another way to view the
standard error of measurement is as an indication of how much a person’s score might change on
retesting. Each person’s score on the first testing includes some amount of error.”).
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possible to evaluate that accuracy by repeating the testing,212 the
statistical tool of SEM quantifies the evaluator’s level of confidence in
the score.213 Viewed another way, the SEM represents the
professionally-required level of modesty about the accuracy of the
results of IQ testing.214
The principle underlying the standard error of measurement applies
fully to IQ testing to determine whether an individual has intellectual
disability.215 Indeed, taking it into account is essential to accurate
assessment of intellectual disability.216 This fact, of course, has the
potential to complicate a court’s job in evaluating an Atkins claim.217
212. See infra notes 229-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the practice effect.
213. See AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 36 (“The term standard error of measurement, which
varies by test, subgroup, and age group, is used to quantify this variability and provide a stated
statistical confidence interval within which the person’s true score falls.”); AIKEN, ASSESSMENT OF
INTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONING, supra note 106, at 42 (“Knowing the standard error of measurement
of a test permits the determination of a range of values (a confidence interval) within which we can
be fairly certain that an examinee’s true score on the test falls.”).
214. See THORNDIKE & THORNDIKE-CHRIST, supra note 211, at 121-22 (“With psychological
or educational data, we usually cannot make a whole series of measurements on each individual
because of practice and fatigue effects, as well as time constraints . . . . Often, we are fortunate if we
can get two scores for each individual. But, if we have a pair of measurements for each individual,
we can make an estimate . . . of what the scattering of scores would have been for the average
person if we had made the measurements again and again. Our index of scatter, the standard error of
measurement, reveals the inconsistency of the measurements that we would expect if we could
employ repeated measurements.”); GARY GROTH-MARNAT, HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSESSMENT 15 (5th ed. 2009) (“The logic behind the SEM is that test scores consist of both truth
and error. Thus, there is always noise or error in the system, and the SEM provides a range to
indicate how extensive that error is likely to be. The range depends on the test’s reliability so that
the higher the reliability, the narrower the range of error.”).
215. AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 36 (“The results of any psychometric assessment must be
evaluated in terms of the accuracy of the instrument used and such is the case with the assessment
of intelligence. An IQ score is subject to variability as a function of a number of potential sources of
error, including variations in test performance, examiner’s behavior, cooperation of test taker, and
other personal and environmental factors. Thus, variation in scores may or may not represent the
individual’s actual or true level of intellectual functioning.”). For individuals in (or near) the level of
intellectual disability, measurement error on a particular instrument may be somewhat greater than
is true for individuals of average intelligence. Keith F. Widaman, Concepts of Measurement, in THE
DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 55, 70 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015) (“Experts
should also pay attention to estimates of standard error of measurement that might vary across the
ability scale, because a finding that standard error of measurement is larger (yielding less accurate
scores) in the lower tail of the distribution would not be surprising.”).
216. AAIDD, USER’S GUIDE 2007, supra note 140, at 12 (“[T]he assessment of intellectual
functioning through the reliance on intelligence tests is fraught with the potential for misuse if
consideration is not given to possible errors in measurement.”); AAIDD, USER’S GUIDE 2012, supra
note 65, at 22 (discussing the same phenomenon in terms of the “confidence interval” regarding the
accuracy of testing results); Am. Psychological Ass’n, APA’s Guidelines for Test User
Qualifications: An Executive Summary, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1099, 1101 (2001) (“[T]est users
should understand the standard error of measurement, which presents a numerical estimate of the
range of scores consistent with the individual’s level of performance.”).
217. Bonnie & Gustafson, Implementing Atkins, supra note 127, at 834-37. For example, every
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Nonetheless, there is a strong consensus among clinicians that the SEM
must always be taken into account when assessing whether the results of
an individual’s testing satisfy the first prong of the definition of
mental retardation.218
Against the backdrop of that clear professional consensus, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Hall v. Florida addressed the
constitutionality of a Florida rule barring consideration of the SEM in
making Atkins adjudications.219 Florida’s statute, which was enacted one
year before Atkins, made no mention of the SEM (and, indeed, had no IQ
score mentioned in its text).220 However, the Florida Supreme Court had
interpreted the statute to impose a strict IQ score ceiling of 70.221 In

report the court receives regarding the first prong of the definition of intellectual disability should
reflect the test’s level of confidence. See, e.g., AAIDD, USER’S GUIDE 2007, supra note 140, at 12
(“[A]n IQ of 70 is most accurately understood not as a precise score, but as a range of confidence
with parameters of at least 1 standard error of measurement (i.e., scores of about 66-74; 66%
probability) or parameters of two standard errors of the mean (i.e., scores of 62-78; 95%
probability). . . . This is a critical consideration underlying the appropriate use of intelligence tests
and best practices and that must be a part of any decision concerning the diagnosis of mental
retardation.”); see also APA, DSM-5, supra note 65, at 37 (“Individuals with intellectual disability
have scores of approximately two standard deviations or more below the population mean,
including a margin for measurement error (generally +5 points). On tests with a standard deviation
of 15 and a mean of 100, this involves a score of 65-75 (70  5).”). At least one state legislature has
directly addressed this issue. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-753(K)(5) (2011) (“The court in
determining the intelligence quotient shall take into account the margin of error for the test
administered.”). The importance of SEM is not limited to Atkins cases; it applies in any forum in
which the diagnosis of intellectual disability is at issue. See, e.g., Walker v. Massanari, 149 F. Supp.
2d 843, 847 (S.D. Iowa 2001) (discussing the relevance of SEM in determining whether an
applicant has mental retardation in the context of Social Security disability benefits).
218. See, e.g., Macvaugh & Cunningham, Forensic Practice, supra note 83, at 147 (“Reports
of IQ scores obtained by a capital defendant should include a description of these scores in light of
the SEM at an identified confidence interval.”); Everington & Olley, Defining and Diagnosing,
supra note 15, at 6 (“There is no finite score that can represent one’s intellectual functioning with
100% accuracy. There is always a measurement error.”); Bonnie & Gustafson, Implementing
Atkins, supra note 127, at 836 (“The main point here is that the SEM must always be taken into
account when interpreting scores on IQ tests; failing to do so would be a clear departure from
accepted professional practice in scoring and interpreting any kind of psychological test, including
IQ tests.”); see also Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2000 (2014) (“By failing to take into account
the SEM and setting a strict cutoff at 70, Florida goes against the unanimous professional
consensus.” (internal quotation omitted)).
219. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014); see James W. Ellis, Hall v. Florida: The Supreme
Court’s Guidance in Implementing Atkins, 23 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 383 (2014).
220. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137(1) (2014) (“[T]he term ‘intellectually disabled’ or
‘intellectual disability’ means significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing
concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the period from conception to
age 18. The term ‘significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning,’ for the purpose of this
section, means performance that is two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a
standardized intelligence test specified in the rules of the Agency for Persons with Disabilities.”).
221. Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 713 (Fla. 2007) (“[T]wo standard deviations away from
the mean of 100 is an IQ score of 70.”).
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Hall, the U.S. Supreme Court held that such an arbitrary cap violates the
Eighth Amendment.222
Noting that “[a]n IQ score is an approximation, not a final and
infallible assessment of intellectual functioning,”223 the Court rejected
Florida’s attempt to ascribe to it a level of precision that is unsupported
by the scientific understanding of the phenomenon.224 After reviewing
the scientific and clinical literature on error measurement, as well as
surveying the handful of states that imposed or might impose such a ban,
the Court concluded that it “agrees with the medical experts that when a
defendant’s IQ test score falls within the test’s acknowledged and
inherent margin of error, the defendant must be able to present additional
evidence of intellectual disability, including testimony regarding
adaptive deficits.”225
After Hall, it is clear that lower courts cannot use IQ scores as a
disqualifying factor by ignoring the SEM.226 This, in turn, will have the
effect of increasing the number of cases in which courts will have
to give careful evaluation to the defendant’s claim of deficits in
adaptive behavior.227
D. Factors Affecting the Accuracy of IQ Scores: The Practice Effect
and the Norm Obsolescence (“Flynn”) Effect
There are a number of practical considerations or conditions that
can adversely affect the validity of an individual’s IQ score, and courts
need to be aware of them. These factors may produce a score that is
either artificially high or artificially low, and evaluators and courts may
need to adjust those scores to obtain a true picture of the defendant’s
intellectual functioning. However, it is important to keep in mind that
“the presence of other sources of imprecision in administering the
222. 134 S. Ct. at 2001 (“The Florida statute, as interpreted by its courts, misuses IQ score on
its own terms; and this, in turn, bars consideration of evidence that must be considered in
determining whether a defendant in a capital case has intellectual disability. Florida’s rule is invalid
under the Constitution’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.”); see also Moore v. Texas, 137
S. Ct. 1039, 1049 (2017) (“Florida, we concluded, had violated the Eighth Amendment by
‘disregard[ing] established medical practice.’” (quoting Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1995)).
223. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2000.
224. Id. at 2001 (“Intellectual disability is a condition, not a number. . . . [A] State must afford
these test scores the same studied skepticism that those who design and use the tests do, and
understand that an IQ test score represents a range rather than a fixed number.”).
225. Id.
226. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1049 (“Hall instructs that, where an IQ score is close to, but above,
70, courts must account for the test’s standard error of measurement.” (internal quotation omitted)).
227. See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2001 (“Freddie Lee Hall may or may not be intellectually disabled,
but the law requires that he have the opportunity to present evidence of his intellectual disability,
including deficits in adaptive functioning over his lifetime.”).
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test to a particular individual cannot narrow the test-specific
standard-error range.”228
The Practice Effect. If an individual is given the same IQ test for a
second time relatively soon after the first administration, the second
result is likely to be artificially elevated, producing a misleadingly high
score.229 This “practice effect,” which has long been recognized in the
clinical literature,230 can produce scores that vary significantly from the
individual’s actual IQ.231 This phenomenon obviously has significant
implications for Atkins evaluations.232 It would appear that the practice
effect, which is a result of familiarity, is experienced even when the
second test is similar, but not identical to, the first test administered.233
There are also indications that the magnitude of the practice effect may
228. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1049 (citation omitted).
229. KAUFMAN & LICHTENBERGER, ASSESSING INTELLIGENCE, supra note 93, at 163-64
(“With all tests, the effects of using the same instrument repeatedly introduce unwanted error into
the analysis, a confounding known as progressive error.”); AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 38
(“The practice effect refers to gains in IQ scores on tests of intelligence that result from a person
being retested on the same instrument.” (emphasis omitted)); Macvaugh & Cunningham, Forensic
Practice, supra note 83, at 147-48; id. at 148 (“Gain scores, also called ‘practice effects,’ can be
caused by repeated administrations of the same intelligence test in a short period of time.”).
230. See, e.g., Joseph D. Matarazzo, Timothy P. Carmody & Leo D. Jacobs, Test-Retest
Reliability and Stability of the WAIS: A Literature Review with Implications for Clinical Practice, 2
J. CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 89 (1980) (and sources cited therein); Alan S. Kaufman, Practice
Effects, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLIGENCE, supra note 112, at 828.
231. KAUFMAN & LICHTENBERGER, ASSESSING INTELLIGENCE, supra note 93, at 164. One
authority explained the practice effect in intelligence testing by comparing IQ tests to the use of a
measuring tape to determine a person’s height:
[W]hereas one could conceive of using the same instrument (e.g., a tape measure) an
infinite number of times to measure the height of an individual, using the same
instrument an infinite number of times to measure the intelligence of an individual would
not be advised. Using the same tape measure a large number of times would not be likely
to lead to any systematic bias over time when assessing height. But when assessing
intelligence, using the same measuring instrument or test on numerous occasions might
well lead to memory (or practice) effects that might, for example, enhance scores over
time or lead to a fatigue effect that would serve to lower scores over time.
Keith F. Widaman, Concepts of Measurement, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL
DISABILITY 55, 58 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015).
232. Macvaugh & Cunningham, Forensic Practice, supra note 83, at 148 (“These gains reflect
only exposure to the test, not valid improvements in intellectual ability. Accordingly, the impact of
such gains can have critical implications in Atkins evaluations.”); George S. Baroff, Establishing
Mental Retardation in Capital Cases: An Update, 41 MENTAL RETARDATION 198, 199 (2003)
(“Over a period of time, and in capital cases this can be a decade or more, the cognitively limited
defendant may have been tested several times and, often, with the same test.”).
233. Alan S. Kaufman, Practice Effects, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLIGENCE, supra note
112, at 828 (“Practice effects refer to gains in scores on cognitive tests that occur when a person is
retested on the same instrument, or tested more than once on very similar ones. These gains are due
to the experience of having taken the test previously; they occur without the examinee being given
specific or general feedback on test items, and they do not reflect growth or other improvement on
the skills being assessed.”).
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be higher on the performance or nonverbal subparts of a test than on the
verbal portions.234 The duration of the practice effect for a particular
individual is not perfectly clear, but can last at least one year.235
To avoid diagnostic judgments distorted by the confounding impact
of the practice effect, it has been recommended that clinicians should
[a]void administration of the same intellectual assessment within 12
months. Testing protocols should reflect verbatim responses from the
examinee, allowing other professionals to reasonably scrutinize the
findings and reduce the necessity of redundant assessments. Further,
mental health experts should be prepared to analyze test scores in light
of practice effects and carefully explain these considerations to legal
professionals.236

234. KAUFMAN & LICHTENBERGER, ASSESSING INTELLIGENCE, supra note 93, at 164 (“Adults
who are retested on the WAIS or WAIS-R after about a month will gain only about 2 to 3 points on
the Verbal Scale, versus 8 to 9 points on the Performance Scale.”); Macvaugh & Cunningham,
Forensic Practice, supra note 83, at 147-48 (“Practice effects tend to be larger on performance
(non-verbal) subtests, most likely because these types of tasks are only novel during their first
administration, and they become more familiar on subsequent administrations because an examinee
may recall the strategy used to solve the problems measured by the test items.”); Bonnie &
Gustafson, Implementing Atkins, supra note 127, at 839 (“Obviously, there are important individual
variations. Some subjects gain more than others, and some subtests are more amenable to learning
than others. For example, once the object assembly puzzles are solved, they are more easily solved
the next time the test is administered. Particular trouble with this subtest would result in an aboveaverage practice effect.”); Lisa J. Rapport et al., Full-Scale IQ as Mediator of Practice Effects: The
Rich Get Richer, 11 CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGIST 375, 375 (1997) (“In the absence of factors
adversely affecting cognitive or motivational status, scores increase with repeated exposure to the
battery. In general, instruments that have a speeded component, require an infrequently-practiced
response, or that have easily-conceptualized solutions are likely to result in significant practice
effects.”).
235. See David DeMatteo et al., Capital Case Considerations, in American Psychological
Association, 1 APA HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 191, 203 (Brian L. Cutler & Patricia A.
Zapf eds., 2015) (“As such, an interval of at least 1 to 2 years between tests is advisable. In states
that allow the prosecution to rebut a defense finding of mental retardation with its own evaluation, a
particular danger of practice effects exists, setting the stage for conflicting measurements between
defense and prosecution experts.”); KAUFMAN & LICHTENBERGER, ASSESSING INTELLIGENCE,
supra note 93, at 164 (“Even if the practice effect dissipates after a year or two and is smaller for
elderly adults than young and middle-aged adults, this variable still looms large in longitudinal
investigations.”). For a discussion of the practice effect on children, see Gary L. Canivez & Marley
W. Watkins, Long-Term Stability of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children—Third Edition, 10
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 285, 285 (1998) (“[P]ractice effects seemingly disappeared when the
retest interval was greater than 1 year.”).
236. Macvaugh & Cunningham, Forensic Practice, supra note 83, at 148. AAIDD agrees with
the recommendation for a twelve-month waiting period. AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 38
(“[E]stablished clinical practice is to avoid administering the same intelligence test within the same
year to the same individual because it will often lead to an overestimate of the examinee’s true
intelligence.”).
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Other clinical experts have reached similar conclusions.237 Courts need
to be vigilant to ensure that the practice effect does not distort Atkins
evaluations, either with regard to the records of previous testing from the
individual’s childhood and earlier life, or in testing performed in the
process of judicial evaluation.238
The “Norm Obsolescence” Effect.239 While the existence of the
practice effect is intuitively obvious, at least when explained by
psychologists, the norm obsolescence effect is not. Nonetheless, this
well documented phenomenon has at least a comparable potential for
skewing the assessment of an individual’s intelligence. As a result,
courts must take particular care to assure that it does not lead to
false conclusions.
IQ scores may provide an inadequate picture of an individual’s
intellectual functioning, depending on the age of the test administered.
237. AAIDD, USER’S GUIDE 2012, supra note 65, at 23 (“The established clinical best practice
is to avoid administering the same intelligence test within a year to the same individual because it
will often lead to an overestimation of the examinee’s true intelligence.”); see also AAIDD, USER’S
GUIDE 2007, supra note 140, at 21 (“Practice effect gains occur even when the examinee has not
been given any feedback on his performance regarding test items; nor do they reflect growth or
other improvement on the skills being assessed. For example, the WAIS-III manual presents data
illustrating the potential artificial increase in IQ scores when the same instrument is readministered
within short time intervals.” (citations omitted)).
238. Concerns have been raised, in particular, when the process of Atkins assessment itself
produces the administration of IQ tests with too short an interval. See Julie C. Duvall & Richard J.
Morris, Assessing Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases: Critical Issues for Psychology and
Psychological Practice, 37 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH & PRACTICE 658, 663 (2006) (“[T]he
question arises whether the legally mandated practices in many states involving a number of test
administrations by different experts within a short period are consistent with the ‘proper application’
of the procedure for measuring IQ.”). See also the American Psychological Association’s Ethical
Standard 9.02(a): “Psychologists administer, adapt, score, interpret, or use assessment techniques,
interviews, tests, or instruments in a manner and for purposes that are appropriate in light of the
research on or evidence of the usefulness and proper application of the techniques.” Am.
Psychological Ass’n, Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, 57 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1060, 1071 (2002).
239. This phenomenon is also sometimes called the “Flynn Effect,” and is identified by
differing names. The phenomenon was observed by others before Professor Flynn. See, e.g., Read
D. Tuddenham, Soldier Intelligence in World Wars I and II, 3 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 54 (1948). More
recently, other researchers have adopted other labels. See Robert L. Williams, Overview of the
Flynn Effect, 41 INTELLIGENCE 753, 753 (2013) (“Some researchers choose to refer to the secular
gain as the Lynn-Flynn effect . . . for the obvious reason that they feel Lynn has been somewhat
slighted by not including his name.”). Although the term “Flynn Effect” is still used by many,
psychologists are increasingly using the term “Norm Obsolescence” or “Aging Norms,” since the
phenomenon has now been replicated and studied by a wide variety of scholars in the field. See,
e.g., Tassé et al., Construct of Adaptive Behavior, supra note 109, at 297 (“[C]orrections must be
made . . . based on aging norms (i.e., the Flynn effect)” (emphasis added)); AAIDD, USER’S GUIDE
2012, supra note 65, at 21 Table 3.4 (“[I]n cases where a test with aging norms was used, a
correction for the age of the norms was made.” (emphasis added)); Kevin S. McGrew, Norm
Obsolescence: The Flynn Effect, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 155
(Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015).
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As each version of an IQ test ages, the average score of individuals
taking that test increases each year.240 This phenomenon, which has been
widely recognized in the scholarly literature for a quarter of a century, 241
and which has been observed and measured in the populations of twenty
different nations,242 has been replicated and explained in numerous
scientific publications.243 The publishers of the tests recognize this
phenomenon, and use new norms when a new edition comes out.244 The
240. AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 37 (“The Flynn Effect refers to the observation that every
restandardization sample for a major intelligence test . . . from 1932 through 1978 resulted in a
mean IQ that tended to increase over time.” (citation omitted)); ANASTASI & URBINA,
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING, supra note 106, at 207 (“Rising test norms from the 1930s or 1940s to
the 1970s have also been found in other tests of general intellectual level.”).
241. See, e.g., James R. Flynn, The Mean IQ of Americans: Massive Gains 1932 to 1978, 95
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN 29 (1984).
242. See, e.g., James R. Flynn, IQ Gains Over Time, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLIGENCE,
supra note 112, at 617 (“In twenty countries, every one for which data exist, each generation
outscores the previous generation on IQ tests . . . . The twenty countries are: Britain, Northern
Ireland, Canada, the United States, New Zealand, and Australia; Norway, Sweden, and Denmark;
France, Belgium, and the Netherlands; the former East and West Germanies, Austria, and
Switzerland; Israel; Brazil; and China and Japan.”); Ulric Neisser, Introduction: Rising Test Scores
and What They Mean, in THE RISING CURVE: LONG-TERM GAINS IN IQ AND RELATED MEASURES 3
(Ulric Neisser ed., 1998) (“This rapid rise is not confined to the United States; comparable gains
have occurred all over the industrialized world.”). A more detailed explanation of the phenomenon,
including review of the data from various nations, can be found at KAUFMAN & LICHTENBERGER,
ASSESSING INTELLIGENCE, supra note 93, at 37-42.
243. See, e.g., Macvaugh & Cunningham, Forensic Practice, supra note 83, at 149 (“[T]he
Flynn Effect is a well-established statistical phenomenon of intelligence tests and has gained general
acceptance in the scientific community . . . .”); Frank M. Gresham & Daniel J. Reschly, Standard of
Practice and Flynn Effect Testimony in Death Penalty Cases, 49 INTELLECTUAL &
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 131, 131 (2011) (“The Flynn Effect is a well-established
psychometric fact documenting substantial increases in measured intelligence test performance over
time.”); KAUFMAN & LICHTENBERGER, ASSESSING INTELLIGENCE, supra note 93, at 216 (“Because
of the Flynn effect, which has demonstrated that the norms in the United States become outdated at
the rate of 2½ to 3 points per decade, newer norms are generally preferable to older ones.” (citations
omitted)); Bonnie & Gustafson, Implementing Atkins, supra note 127, at 838 (“[T]he data are
highly convincing and the 0.3 point rate of increase holds true both at the mean and for low IQ
scores.” (internal quotation omitted)); Richard W. Woodcock, Norms, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
INTELLIGENCE, supra note 112, at 770, 774 (“Even if the norms were gathered in a similar way for
both versions, the derived scores from the newer tests will tend to be lower than those from the
earlier test.” (citation omitted)); George S. Baroff, Establishing Mental Retardation in Capital
Cases: An Update, 41 MENTAL RETARDATION 198, 201 (2003) (“The effect is to raise all scores
over time such that the individual’s IQ will be elevated relative to that of the population at the time
that the test was standardized. This constitutes an unwarranted increase in IQ. Interestingly, it is
estimated that the rate of increase is about one third of an IQ point per year. Thus, over the 16 years
that the WAIS-R was employed, from 1981 to 1997, an individual’s test score can be expected to
have increased, on the average, by almost 5 points.”).
244. Tomoe Kanaya, Matthew H. Scullin & Stephen J. Ceci, The Flynn Effect and U.S.
Policies: The Impact of Rising IQ Scores on American Society Via Mental Retardation Diagnoses,
58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 778, 778 (2003) (“[T]he Flynn effect causes IQ test norms to become
obsolete over time. In other words, as time passes and IQ test norms get older, people perform better
and better on the test, raising the mean IQ by several points within a matter of years. Once a test is
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problem arises when courts encounter the results of an IQ test that was
several years old at the time it was administered. Since the test was “old”
when it was given, its scores will be artificially elevated by the passage
of time, and as a result it will overstate the person’s true intelligence.245
While there is some division of opinion about whether and how the
Norm Obsolescence Effect should be used to adjust IQ scores in Atkins
cases,246 the better view would appear to be the approach that takes it
into account in assessing the actual level of an individual’s mental
impairment. As the Fourth Circuit concluded in Walker v. True, trial
courts should consider the persuasiveness of evidence that a defendant’s
IQ score on a particular test is artificially inflated by the age of the
particular version of the test that was administered.247 While it is
important to assure that the scientific significance of the Norm
Obsolescence data is not misunderstood or distorted,248 failing to adjust
renormed, which typically happens every 15-20 years, the mean is reset to 100, making the test
harder and ‘hiding’ the previous gains in IQ scores.” (citations omitted)).
245. The problem is particularly egregious in those cases where an older version of an
instrument was administered when a newer version was available. See MARK D. CUNNINGHAM,
EVALUATION FOR CAPITAL SENTENCING 171 (2010) (“Because of well-established findings that IQ
scores in the general population inflate over time (i.e., the Flynn effect), the version reflecting the
most current standardization of the respective intelligence scale should be employed.”); AMERICAN
EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION & NATIONAL
COUNCIL ON MEASUREMENT IN EDUCATION, STANDARDS FOR EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
TESTING 93 std. 4.24 comment (2014) (“If an older version of a test is used when a newer version
has been published or made available, test users are responsible for providing evidence that the
older version is as appropriate as the new version for that particular test use.”).
246. See, e.g., Gresham & Reschly, supra note 243, at 138 (“Application of the Flynn Effect
and score adjustments for obsolete norms clearly is supported by science and should be
implemented by professional psychologists.”); Mark D. Cunningham & Marc J. Tassé, Looking to
Science Rather Than Convention in Adjusting IQ Scores When Death Is at Issue, 41 PROF.
PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH & PRACTICE 413, 418 (2010) (“We find that a sufficient body of science
supports interpreting obtained IQ scores in capital mental retardation hearings in reference to best
estimates of norms that were contemporaneous to date of test administration, rather than historical
standardization means.”); Leigh D. Hagan, Eric Y. Drogin, & Thomas J. Guilmette, Science Rather
Than Advocacy When Reporting IQ Scores, 41 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH & PRACTICE 420,
423 (2010) (“We agree that mean IQ scores shift over time. However, the magnitude and direction
of that shift are not predictable.”). For additional clinical analysis of this issue, see infra notes 24849.
247. 399 F.3d 315, 322 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he relevant question is whether [the defendant]
scored two standard deviations below the mean, a question which is directly addressed by [the
defense expert’s] opinion as to the Flynn Effect.”).
248. James R. Flynn, Tethering the Elephant: Capital Cases, IQ, and the Flynn Effect, 12
PSYCHOLOGY PUBLIC POLICY & LAW 170, 186 (2006) (“No prosecutor should be allowed to argue
that because IQ scores are rising, a person tested 20 years ago (and who scored 70 against the norms
of that time) would probably do better today and score 76. No defense attorney should be allowed a
similar gambit: to argue that a person who today scores 71 (against current norms) would probably
score 65 against the norms of 20 years hence.”); see also Cecil R. Reynolds & Daneen A. Milam,
Challenging Intellectual Testing Results, in COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
TESTIMONY 311, 315-16 (David Faust ed., 6th ed. 2012).
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an individual’s obtained score to reflect it is unwarranted, and can result
in an artificial inflation of the individual’s true IQ.249
E. Motivation and Claims of Malingering
Issues surrounding a defendant’s motivations, and their possible
impact on clinical evaluation, sometimes arise in Atkins cases. Often this
is because of a prosecution suggestion or argument that the results of an
individual’s testing should be disregarded or “adjusted” because of a
suspicion that he might have intentionally underperformed in order to
fabricate a false diagnosis.
The question of whether an individual could actually, as a practical
matter, manipulate clinicians into reaching a false diagnosis of
intellectual disability is one that had not been addressed by psychologists
or other clinicians until relatively recently.250 A primary reason for this
249. See AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 37 (“[B]est practices require recognition of a potential
Flynn Effect when older editions of an intelligence test (with corresponding older norms) are used
in the assessment or interpretation of an IQ score.”); APA, DSM-5, supra note 65, at 37 (“Factors
that may affect test scores include practice effects and the ‘Flynn effect’ (i.e., overly high scores due
to out-of-date test norms).”); Macvaugh & Cunningham, Forensic Practice, supra note 83, at 151
(“Flynn-corrected IQ scores . . . should be reported in addition to observed scores. This
recommendation is consistent with providing the court with scientific perspectives that will
facilitate a more complete understanding of IQ scores.”); AAIDD, USER’S GUIDE 2007, supra note
140, at 21 (“Thus the clinician needs to use the most current version of an individually administered
test of intelligence and take into consideration the Flynn Effect as well as the standard error of
measurement when estimating an individual’s true IQ score.”); Everington & Olley, Defining and
Diagnosing, supra note 15, at 7 (“It is important to understand this ‘Flynn effect,’ because a
person’s IQ score may be artificially raised if an out-of-date test is given.”); ANASTASI & URBINA,
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING, supra note 106, at 207 (“The examiner should be aware of this possible
artifact in interpreting scores.”); Matthew H. Scullin, Large State-Level Fluctuations in Mental
Retardation Classifications Related to Introduction of Renormed Intelligence Test, 111 AM. J.
MENTAL RETARDATION 322, 332 (2006) (“Understanding the impact of the Flynn effect on IQs is
especially relevant for death penalty cases in which the burden of providing the evidence for mental
retardation falls on the defense.”); Bonnie & Gustafson, Implementing Atkins, supra note 127, at
837-38 (“Courts interpreting IQ scores must take the Flynn effect into account if they are to reach
accurate understandings of the meaning of an individual’s score.”); AAIDD, USER’S GUIDE 2012,
supra note 65, at 23 (“Both the 11th edition of the [AAIDD] manual and this User’s Guide
recommend that in cases in which a test with aging norms is used as part of a diagnosis of ID, a
corrected Full Scale IQ upward [adjustment] of 3 points per decade for age of the norms is
warranted.”).
250. There has long been attention—and debate—among clinicians regarding whether
individuals can successfully feign mental illness. See APA, DSM-5, supra note 65, at 726-27; DSMIV-TR, supra note 80, at 739-40; see also Sanford L. Drob & Robert H. Berger, The Determination
of Malingering: A Comprehensive Clinical-Forensic Approach, 15 J. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 519,
522-29 (1987) (discussing techniques for detecting the imitation of the classic signs and symptoms
of mental illness); Michael J. Vitacco, Malingering: Forensic Evaluations, in 4 WILEY
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 1657 (Allan Jamieson & Andre Moenssens eds., 2009);
Glenn G. Perry & Bill N. Kinder, The Susceptibility of the Rorschach to Malingering: A Critical
Review, 54 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 47 (1990) (reviewing studies that found coached
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appears to be the fact that the negative consequences of the label of
mental retardation are such that clinicians simply did not encounter
individuals who were seeking that designation.251 Indeed, the opposite is
true. It has long been recognized in the field that one of the most
commonly encountered characteristics of individuals who have
intellectual disability is their intense motivation to mask their
limitations. This has been reflected in the clinical literature for
decades,252 and continues to be a prominent feature in the experience of
clinicians today.253 The intense stigmatization that individuals
experimental subjects could imitate the symptoms of mental illness on the so-called “inkblots” test);
Rex Julian Beaber et al., A Brief Test for Measuring Malingering in Schizophrenic Individuals, 142
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1478 (1985) (finding that some undergraduate students who were coached to
feign symptoms of schizophrenia could be detected by a specific test); JOHN PARRY & ERIC Y.
DROGIN, CRIMINAL LAW HANDBOOK ON PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE AND
TESTIMONY 175-79 (ABA 2000) (and sources cited therein); GARY B. MELTON ET AL.,
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 56-61 (3d ed. 2007); Sanford L. Drob et al., Clinical and
Conceptual Problems in the Attribution of Malingering in Forensic Evaluations, 37 J. AM.
ACADEMY PSYCHIATRY & LAW 98, (2009) (recommending caution before attributing patient
responses to malingering).
Attempts to evaluate whether a defendant was feigning mental illness have a substantial
history. See Jeffrey L. Geller et al., Feigned Insanity in Nineteenth-Century America: Tactics,
Trials, and Truth, 8 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES & LAW 3, 22 (1990) (“If one traces the development of
thinking on feigned insanity through the twentieth century one finds little in the handling of this
condition that has advanced since the nineteenth century.” (citations omitted)).
251. Over the years, there has not been comparable clinical focus on the practical feasibility of
successfully feigning intellectual disability. Everington & Olley, Defining and Diagnosing, supra
note 15, at 15 (“It must be noted that there is a paucity of research regarding detection of malingered
mental retardation.”).
252. See, e.g., ROBERT B. EDGERTON, THE CLOAK OF COMPETENCE: STIGMA IN THE LIVES OF
THE MENTALLY RETARDED 148-49 (1st ed. 1967) (cataloguing the false stories told by previously
institutionalized individuals in an effort to mask the fact that they had been confined in a mental
retardation facility); JAMES R. DUDLEY, CONFRONTING THE STIGMA IN THEIR LIVES: HELPING
PEOPLE WITH A MENTAL RETARDATION LABEL 74-76 (1997); Snell, Characteristics, supra note 77,
at 222 (“[M]any individuals with intellectual disability with higher IQs attempt to hide their
disability or attempt to pass as normal . . . .”); Ellis & Luckasson, Defendants, supra note 10, at
430-31; Jim L. Turner, Keith T. Kernan & Susan Gelphman, Speech Etiquette in a Sheltered
Workshop, in LIVES IN PROCESS: MILDLY RETARDED ADULTS IN A LARGE CITY 43, 60-68 (Robert
B. Edgerton ed., 1984) (noting that the most stinging insults used among the employees were those
that referenced mental retardation).
253. AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 52 (“‘[M]ental retardation’ has been a particularly
stigmatizing and pejorative label that leads most individuals with this label to fight hard not to be
identified as ‘MR.’”); see also ROBERT L. SCHALOCK & RUTH LUCKASSON, CLINICAL JUDGMENT
37 (2d ed. 2014) [hereinafter CLINICAL JUDGMENT 2014] (“[I]t is more common for individuals
with ID to attempt to ‘fake good’ to hide their ID.” Their intent is to convince others that they are
“more competent than they are.”); Snell, Characteristics, supra note 77, at 226 (“Today’s
motivation for denial by individuals with intellectual disability can come from attempting to avoid
the possibility of being placed in self-contained, special education classrooms that are separated
from the other students in the school or from being associated with activities or services that are
openly linked to individuals with intellectual disability. Thus, denial of disability can emphasize
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experience when someone suggests they may be “mentally retarded” has
only increased over time.254
The depth and vehemence of this aversion to the label “mental
retardation,” when combined with the fact that generally there is not
much advantage in our society for anyone to aspire to the label, means
that any potential for malingering simply hasn’t been perceived as a realworld problem in the field. For the small subset of individuals with
intellectual disabilities who face capital prosecutions, Atkins may, at
least theoretically, have altered that equation.255 As a result, the issue of
malingering or “suboptimal effort”256 is beginning to attract some
attention from clinicians and scholars in the field.257
It is important to begin with the fact that to be diagnosed as having
intellectual disability, an individual must satisfy all three requirements of
the definition, i.e., intellectual functioning two standard deviations
below the mean, substantial impairment in adaptive functioning, and
onset of the condition at birth or during childhood.258 So while some
scholars who explore the theoretical possibility of malingering focus on
IQ scores or adaptive behavior measures, a capital defendant could not

one’s social isolation and restrict learning opportunities, but may appear to many people with
intellectual disability and their families as a way to reduce the stigma they experience.”); Nicole
Ditchman et al., Stigma and Intellectual Disability: Potential Application of Mental Illness
Research, 58 REHABILITATION PSYCHOLOGY 206, 208 (2013) (“[P]eople with ID are in fact aware
of the public stigma of their disability and cope with its social consequences in their everyday
lives.”).
254. Indeed, it is the intense negative reaction of people who have intellectual disabilities to the
term “mental retardation,” which many of them regard as a slur, which has led to its abandonment
by many professionals and organizations in the field. See supra Part III.A.
255. Nonetheless, courts would be surprised to learn how frequently, in the Authors’
experience, capital defendants continue to insist that they do not have intellectual disability, and
continue to exaggerate their mental and practical abilities. See Caroline Everington, Challenges of
Conveying Intellectual Disabilities to Judge and Jury, 23 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 467, 477
(2014) (“Defendants will frequently inflate accomplishments (faking good) to hide their
disability.”). Others have made the same observation. See, e.g., Olley, Death Penalty and Courts,
supra note 160, at 232 (“[T]hose not familiar with it [the ‘cloak of competence’ phenomenon] may
assume that people will eagerly try to fake the condition of mental retardation in order to avoid the
death penalty. In fact, this author has found that even with their lives at stake, many defendants will
try to do their best on tests and often to exaggerate their accomplishments in order to avoid the
stigma of mental retardation.”).
256. Macvaugh & Cunningham, Forensic Practice, supra note 83, at 172 (“The distinction
between the terminology of ‘suboptimum effort’ and ‘malingering’ is an important one. Defendants
who have mental retardation, as well as those who do not, may score lower on an intelligence test
than they are capable. In such an instance, the defendant is not necessarily malingering mental
retardation, but neither are the test results an accurate reflection of intellectual functioning.”).
257. See Everington & Olley, Defining and Diagnosing, supra note 15, at 15-18; Macvaugh &
Cunningham, Forensic Practice, supra note 83, at 171-76.
258. See supra Part IV.
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succeed in fabricating an Atkins claim without satisfying all
three requirements.259
Clinicians cannot automatically reject out of hand any possibility
that suboptimal effort might be a factor in the evaluation of a particular
defendant, but such a possibility becomes a real factor in clinical
assessment only if it is grounded in the actual data revealed in the
evaluation process.260

259. The third prong of the definition, the age of onset, discussed supra Part IV.C, may have
particular relevance in the practical approach to cases in which there has been a suggestion of
malingering by a defendant. Bonnie & Gustafson, Implementing Atkins, supra note 127, at 854-55
(“[R]equiring onset before age eighteen . . . reduces the danger of malingering. . . . [So, a]lthough
malingering that escapes detection by clinicians has not been found to be a significant concern in
the diagnosis of mental retardation, the age-of-onset criterion should eliminate any concern that
defendants may somehow be able to feign impaired cognitive functioning.”). If the possibility of
feigned symptoms is at issue, consideration of the manifestation of intellectual limitations earlier in
life can have particular importance. See Karen L. Salekin & Bridget M. Doane, Malingering
Intellectual Disability: The Value of Available Measures and Methods, 16 APPLIED
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 105, 111 (2009) (“[I]t is clear that historical factors should play a critical role
in the assessment process because, unlike many disorders, ID does not have a sudden onset. By
definition, ID is a condition that begins during the developmental period and persists into adulthood.
In light of the developmental progression of the disorder, most individuals will have at least traces
of the disorder existing prior to the age of 18. . . . [C]ollateral data that is gleaned from multiple
sources can assist in putting together the history of the individual that, when appropriately
integrated, will lead to a clinical opinion that is formulated on a constellation of relevant
information, rather than gut instinct or an over-emphasis on a few variables that do not capture the
full clinical presentation.”); Olley, Death Penalty and Courts, supra note 160, at 234 (“Fortunately,
the requirement that the characteristics of ID be present in childhood serves to identify people who
feign ID in adulthood but lack a history of impaired functioning.”); CLINICAL JUDGMENT 2014,
supra note 253, at 37 (“[T]o rule out faking, clinicians need to interview multiple individuals who
know the person well and who have had the opportunity to directly observe the person engaging in
his/her typical behavior across multiple contexts (i.e., home, community, school, and work).”).
260. Concern about the potential for false claims of intellectual disability may be traced, at
least in part, to a passage in Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Atkins: “One need only read the
definitions of mental retardation adopted by the American Association on Mental Retardation and
the American Psychiatric Association to realize that the symptoms of this condition can readily be
feigned.” Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 353 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Whether malingering is a serious problem is actually an empirical question, of course. The dissent
cites to no authority for the assertion that successful malingering is possible, other than the opinion
of Sir Matthew Hale published in 1736. See id. at 354 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Matthew
Hale’s PLEAS OF THE CROWN).
The dissent’s concern about malingering was presented in the context of a prediction that
the courts would now be flooded with false claims of mental retardation. Id. at 353 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“This newest invention promises to be more effective than any of the others in turning
the process of capital trial into a game.”). Experience in the years following the Atkins decision does
not bear out this fear of opening floodgates. See John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Christopher
Seeds, An Empirical Look at Atkins v. Virginia and its Application in Capital Cases, 76 TENN. L.
REV. 625, 628 (2009) (“[A]bout seven percent of all death row inmates have filed Atkins claims.”);
John H. Blume et al., A Tale of Two (and Possibly Three) Atkins: Intellectual Disability and Capital
Punishment Twelve Years After the Supreme Court’s Creation of a Categorical Bar, 23 WM. &
MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 393, 396-400 (2014) (analyzing more recent statistics).
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1. IQ Testing (Prong 1)
Notwithstanding the lack of clear evidence that there is a problem
of malingering intellectual disability on IQ tests,261 some courts have
been persuaded to experiment with a “solution” of using tests that
psychologists had designed to identify malingering in evaluations of
mental illness. There have also been some suggestions that an
individual’s level of effort in intelligence testing could be evaluated, and
potentially impeached, by employing psychometric instruments which
were designed for other psychological purposes, which include an
element for the detection of malingering (sometimes called a “validity
scale” or “lie-scale”). Current research does not support the
suggestion that these instruments can reliably detect malingering
intellectual disability.262
261. In reality, successfully feigning a lower level of intelligence on IQ tests is more difficult
than some imagine. A major reason is the structure of the tests themselves. Philip J. Resnick &
Michael R. Harris, Retrospective Assessment of Malingering in Insanity Defense Cases, in
RETROSPECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF MENTAL STATES IN LITIGATION: PREDICTING THE PAST 101, 126
(Robert I. Simon & Daniel W. Shuman eds., 2002) (“During IQ testing, malingerers will frequently
miss ‘easy’ questions but answer more difficult questions correctly. Their test results often show
wide ‘scatter’ and inconsistent responding.”).
262. See, e.g., Paul Marshall & Maggie Happe, The Performance of Individuals with Mental
Retardation on Cognitive Tests Assessing Effort and Motivation, 21 CLINICAL
NEUROPSYCHOLOGIST 826, 837 (2007) (“A diagnosis of malingering certainly cannot be made with
confidence based on these test results alone. There must also be a great deal of additional evidence
of malingering from both other neuropsychological test results and the patient’s self-report
concerning their cognitive problems.”); CLINICAL JUDGMENT 2014, supra note 253, at 37
(“[C]linicians need to use considerable caution when using tests that purportedly assess
malingering. This caution is based on two factors. First, there is no research base supporting the
accuracy of such tests for persons with ID. Second, there is a documented misuse of common
malingering tests even when the test manual explicitly precludes use with individuals with ID.”
(citations omitted)).
Use of the MMPI in this context is particularly problematic. Macvaugh & Cunningham,
Forensic Practice, supra note 83, at 176; id. at 177 (“Inspection of the descriptive characteristics of
the MMPI-2 standardization sample points to a near certainty that it included no individuals with
mental retardation.”); id. (“The MMPI-2 is not an appropriate instrument for any purpose in the
assessment of persons who may be suspected to have mental retardation.”); Denis William Keyes,
Use of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) to Identify Malingering Mental
Retardation, 42 MENTAL RETARDATION 152, 152 (2004) (“Clearly, the authors of the MMPI-2 did
not intend for this instrument to be administered to people with mental retardation.”); Karen L.
Salekin, Gilbert S. Macvaugh, III & Timothy J. Derning, Relevance of Other Assessment
Instruments, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 305, 313 (Edward A.
Polloway ed., 2015) (“[P]ersonality testing is irrelevant to an evaluation of ID.”).
Despite the absence of support in the clinical literature for the proposition that these
unrelated psychometric instruments will reliably detect malingering on the issue of intellectual
disability, some courts have required their administration. See, e.g., Foster v. State, 848 So. 2d 172,
175 (Miss. 2003) (“We further hold that the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory–II
(MMPI–II) is to be administered since its associated validity scales make the test best suited to
detect malingering.”); Chase v. State, 873 So. 2d 1013, 1028 n.19 (Miss. 2004) (“Although this
Court has identified the MMPI–II as a test that should be given, we now clarify our position by
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At present, there is insufficient support in the clinical literature for
the reliability of these instruments in detecting potential malingering of
individuals who may have intellectual disability.263 “The available
standardized instruments designed to detect various forms of response
bias that might assist in this differentiation are plagued by a number of
psychometric limitations.”264 In particular, clinicians have expressed
concern about the substantial risk of false positives (i.e., individuals who
are incorrectly identified as malingering).265 “[R]eview of the research in

stating that the expert should use the MMPI–II, and/or any other tests and procedures permitted
under the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, and deemed necessary to assist the expert and the trial
court in forming an opinion as to whether the defendant is malingering.”); see also Lynch v. State,
951 So. 2d 549, 556-57 (Miss. 2007).
Other instruments fare no better at detecting malingering of ID; studies have not produced
consistent results. Compare Michael J. Simon, Performance of Mentally Retarded Forensic Patients
on the Test of Memory Malingering, 63 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 339, 342-43 (2007) (suggesting
possible usefulness of this test, known as the TOMM), with Kolleen E. Hurley & William Paul
Deal, Assessment Instruments Measuring Malingering Used with Individuals Who Have Mental
Retardation: Potential Problems and Issues, 44 MENTAL RETARDATION 112, 116-17 (2006)
(suggesting that the TOMM and other instruments produced false positives when used to detect
malingering), Everington & Olley, Defining and Diagnosing, supra note 15, at 16 (“These results
suggest that, in some cases, low scores obtained by defendants with mental retardation could be
incorrectly classified as malingering when they are actually indications of true memory
impairments.”), and Jill S. Hayes, David B. Hale & Wm. Drew Gouvier, Do Tests Predict
Malingering in Defendants with Mental Retardation?, 131 J. PSYCHOLOGY 575, 576 (1997) (“[T]he
present battery of malingering tests seems to have nothing to contribute to the identification of
malingering among defendants with mental retardation.”).
263. What is perhaps the most thorough review of the literature to date recommends “great
caution [in concluding that an individual is malingering mental retardation] be used in effort test
interpretation as the likelihood of false-positive error is probably quite high; individuals of
borderline and MR levels of intelligence can fail on average one to four effort tests in a standard
battery even when putting forth their full effort.” Tara L. Victor & Kyle Brauer Boone,
Identification of Feigned Mental Retardation, in ASSESSMENT OF FEIGNED COGNITIVE
IMPAIRMENT: A NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 310, 337 (Kyle Brauer Boone ed., 2007).
Another source of concern is the likelihood of false-positive attributions of malingering because the
tests fail to distinguish the potential effects of co-existing mental illness that the individual may also
have. See David T. R. Berry & Lindsey J. Schipper, Assessment of Feigned Cognitive Impairment
Using Standard Neuropsychological Tests, in CLINICAL ASSESSMENT OF MALINGERING AND
DECEPTION 237, 250 (Richard Rogers ed., 3d ed. 2008) (“A weakness common to many procedures
was limited or no investigation of the effects of psychiatric disorders on the feigning index.”).
Furthermore, as discussed supra Part V, many people with mental retardation also have a significant
mental illness.
264. Macvaugh & Cunningham, Forensic Practice, supra note 83, at 172; see also AAIDD,
USER’S GUIDE 2012, supra note 65, at 24 (“Clinicians who . . . attempt to use specific ‘malingering’
tests in individuals with ID must use considerable caution because of two factors: (1) the lack of a
research base supporting the accuracy of such tests for persons with ID; and (2) the documented
misuse of common malingering tests even when the test manual explicitly precludes use with
individuals with ID. Standardized assessment instruments used to inform the clinician whether the
person is putting forth his or her best effort (i.e., malingering) have not, for the most part, been
normed for persons with ID.” (citations omitted)).
265. See, e.g., AAIDD, USER’S GUIDE 2012, supra note 65, at 24 (“[R]ecent studies have
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the assessment of malingered ID demonstrates that effort tests and
indices of cognitive malingering are not working with this population,
and that true cases can be misidentified as malingered.”266
2. Adaptive Behavior (Prong 2)
The definition of intellectual disability also requires evidence of
substantial deficits in adaptive behavior. As noted earlier, the assessment
of an individual’s adaptive deficits involves both the use of standardized
instruments and inquiries from informants about the person’s
functioning in actual real-life settings.267 Clinicians should make efforts
to assure that informants are providing reliable information. Good
clinical practice indicates the value of interviewing third parties
“independently and in detail regarding adaptive behavior, whether
to complete a standardized adaptive behavior scale or to obtain
anecdotal history.”268
3. Role of Age of Onset (Prong 3)
Although the requirement that the disability have manifested during
the developmental period does not create additional issues about the
documented unacceptable error rates (i.e., false positive for malingering) when used with persons
with IQ scores from 50 to 78.”); Macvaugh & Cunningham, Forensic Practice, supra note 83, at
172-73.
266. Karen L. Salekin & Bridget M. Doane, Malingering Intellectual Disability: The Value of
Available Measures and Methods, 16 APPLIED NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 105, 111 (2009).
267. See supra Part IV.B.
268. Macvaugh & Cunningham, Forensic Practice, supra note 83, at 176. Recent research
indicates that the adaptive behavior instruments that are most commonly employed may differ from
one another in their susceptibility to potential malingering, at least in experiments in which the
subjects were undergraduate university students. See, e.g., Bridget M. Doane & Karen L. Salekin,
Susceptibility of Current Adaptive Behavior Measures to Feigned Deficits, 33 LAW & HUMAN
BEHAVIOR 329, 337 (2009) (finding that the ABAS-II could be more vulnerable to feigned deficits
than the SIB-R). For a discussion of these instruments, see infra Part VII.A.
Another significant finding of the research was that experimental attempts to “coach”
participants on how to feign deficits proved ineffective:
[C]oaching, at least by the provision of written information regarding the condition of
mental retardation, does not have a meaningful effect on performance on standardized
adaptive functioning measures. Specifically, the lack of significant differences among
the conditions’ domain/cluster and composite standard scores on the ABAS-II and the
SIB-R strengthens the clinician’s confidence that the coaching of a collateral source
prior to an evaluation may not significantly jeopardize the outcome of the measures.
Doane & Salekin, supra, at 340; see id. at 333 (discussing how participants in the study differed in
significant demographic particulars from the individuals who are most frequently encountered in
capital prosecutions, in that the sample was more than 67% female, 75% “White/Caucasian Not
Hispanic,” and had completed an average of one year of college); J. Gregory Olley, Knowledge and
Experience Required for Experts in Atkins Cases, 16 APPLIED NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 135, 138 (2009)
[hereinafter Olley, Qualifications] (“[M]alingering requires a degree of sophistication that would be
difficult for someone with a very low IQ.”).
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possibility of malingering, evidence of significant limitations during
childhood undercuts any contention that a capital defendant is now
pretending to have intellectual disability.269 If such reliable evidence
exists in an individual case, it would be inconsistent with a claim of
malingering since, by definition, the manifestation of the condition must
have pre-dated the crime with which the defendant is charged.270 As two
experienced clinicians in the field of intellectual disability
have observed:
Inferences regarding whether a capital defendant is making a
suboptimum effort in an Atkins assessment are greatly assisted by the
presence of intellectual assessment results that predate the capital
charges. The stability of results from repeated intellectual assessments
that are separated by years, whether before or after the capital charge,
is also of inferential benefit. Though we are aware of no longitudinal
research investigating this premise, it would seem to be a task of
improbable complexity to “dial in” a performance consistent with mild
mental retardation on multiple test administrations separated by years,
particularly when different test instruments have been employed. 271

Given all of these concerns, it should be the standard practice of
clinical evaluators to “consider the possibility of suboptimum effort in
intellectual testing and falsification of third party data.”272 But the
clinical literature does not support the reliability of any external
269. See supra note 268.
270. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (excluding from the death penalty
crimes committed before the age of 18, which is generally taken as the boundary for the
developmental period in intellectual disability assessments).
271. Macvaugh & Cunningham, Forensic Practice, supra note 83, at 175; see supra notes 13342; see also CLINICAL JUDGMENT 2014, supra note 253, at 37 (“First, the elements required for a
diagnosis of ID must have been present from an early age. Thus, in a valid retrospective diagnosis,
the clinician should almost always find a documented lifetime history, usually beginning at birth or
early childhood and extending through the school years.”); Karen L. Salekin, J. Gregory Olley &
Krystal A. Hedge, Offenders with Intellectual Disability: Characteristics, Prevalence, and Issues in
Forensic Assessment, 3 J. MENTAL HEALTH RESEARCH IN INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES 97, 108
(2010) (“In short, those who challenge the idea that ID can be feigned in the criminal justice system
base their belief on the notion that people do not feign this disorder during a time in which there is
no incentive to do so.”).
It is noteworthy that much of the experimentation that has been done about malingering
has involved individuals with diagnoses such as traumatic brain injury (TBI), which include no age
of onset requirement. See David T.R. Berry & Lindsey J. Schipper, Assessment of Feigned
Cognitive Impairment Using Standard Neuropsychological Tests, in CLINICAL ASSESSMENT OF
MALINGERING AND DECEPTION 237, 250 (Richard Rogers ed., 3d ed. 2008) (“[T]he large majority
of neurological patient groups focused on TBI.”).
272. Macvaugh & Cunningham, Forensic Practice, supra note 83, at 176; see also Olley,
Death Penalty and Courts, supra note 160, at 235 (“[O]ne must rely on the defendant’s history of
functioning since childhood and trust the examiner’s judgment about how much effort the defendant
put into the testing.”).
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“measures,”273 and the danger of relying on mere hunches or suspicions
is clear. The risk and likelihood of false positives should require great
caution before any accusation of malingering is leveled or credited in an
Atkins case.274
VII.

ISSUES IN EVALUATING ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR

A. Measurement: AB Scales and Other Information
As previously noted,275 the second prong of the definition of
intellectual disability asks whether the individual has significant
limitations in adaptive behavior.276 The purpose of this element of the
definition is to make sure that the impairment indicated in psychometric
tests actually has a real-world impact on the individual’s life and thus is
a disabling condition rather than merely a testing anomaly. This
requirement arose from concerns about the potentially inappropriate
labeling of school children, some of whom might not have had
limitations in functioning in everyday life.277
The requirement that the individual have deficits in adaptive
behavior has been phrased in somewhat different terms with successive
formulations of the definition of intellectual disability. 278 As a result,
some state statutes merely require “deficits in adaptive behavior,” while
others provide a list of adaptive skill areas and require deficits in two
areas from the list.279 The most recent formulation of the definition from
273. See, e.g., Macvaugh & Cunningham, Forensic Practice, supra note 83, at 171-77.
274. See AAIDD, USER’S GUIDE 2012, supra note 65, at 24 (“Claims of faking ID in an
individual should be addressed by a clinician in ID conducting a thorough evaluation for ID using
the diagnostic and clinical strategies outlined in the 11th edition of the AAIDD manual and this
User’s Guide.”); Bonnie & Gustafson, Implementing Atkins, supra note 127, at 855 n.191
(“Because malingering is so difficult to carry out successfully, such cases should be rare.”).
275. See supra Part IV.B.
276. AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 43-44; see also AIKEN, ASSESSMENT OF INTELLECTUAL
FUNCTIONING, supra note 106, at 217 (“Adaptive behavior is determined by the degree to which a
person can function independently and has the ability to meet personal and cultural demands.”);
APA, DSM-5, supra note 65, at 33 (“Deficits in adaptive functioning that result in failure to meet
developmental and socio-cultural standards for personal independence and social responsibility.
Without ongoing support, the adaptive deficits limit functioning in one or more activities of daily
life, such as communication, social participation, and independent living, across multiple
environments, such as home, school, work, and community.”).
277. Kazuo Nihira, Adaptive Behavior: A Historical Overview, in Schalock, ADAPTIVE
BEHAVIOR, supra note 114, at 7-12.
278. See supra notes 95-96, 119 and accompanying text.
279. For an overview of the various state statutes, see the Appendix to the Petitioner’s Brief on
the merits in Hall v. Florida. Brief for Petitioner app. B at 11a -52a Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986
(2014) (No. 12-10882), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court
_preview/briefs-v2/12-10882_pet.pdf.
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AAIDD requires “significant limitations . . . in adaptive behavior as
expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills.”280 These
three categories of adaptive functioning are referred to as “domains,”
and for a diagnosis of intellectual disability, the individual must either
have a significant impairment in any one of the domains or a significant
impairment overall.281
One tool in the evaluation of any deficits in an individual’s adaptive
functioning is usually the administration and interpretation of a
standardized “adaptive behavior scale”282 by a professionally trained
280. AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 1. This formulation has also been adopted by some courts
in states whose legislatures have not enacted an Atkins statute. See, e.g., Chase v. State, 171 So.3d
463, 471 (Miss. 2015) (“We now adopt the 2010 AAIDD and 2013 APA definitions of intellectual
disability as appropriate for use to determine intellectual disability in the courts of this state in
addition to the definitions promulgated in Atkins and Chase.”). Other courts have also referred to
this definition. See, e.g., Coleman v. State, 341 S.W.3d 221, 244 (Tenn. 2011); see also Moore v.
Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1049 (2017) (“We relied on the most recent (and still current) versions of
the leading diagnostic manuals—the DSM-5 [supra note 65] and AAIDD-11 [AAIDD 2010, supra
note 68].”).
281. AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 46 (“For a person with [intellectual disability], adaptive
behavior limitations are generalized across the domains of conceptual, social, and practical skills.”).
As discussed in Part IV.B, see supra note 121, earlier versions of the definition described the
requisite adaptive deficits in terms of 10 skill areas rather than the current description of three
domains. The shift to a description of three domains occurred in the 2002 edition. AAMR 2002,
supra note 95, at 81. The change from skill areas to domains has no practical importance for Atkins
courts, since both are designed to encompass individuals with essentially the same level of
functioning. Id. at 82 (Table 5.2 illustrating the direct relationship between each of the previous
“skill areas” and the skills encompassed by the “conceptual,” “social” and “practical” domains).
Experienced clinicians have observed that for individuals functioning at the level of most
Atkins defendants, “deficits are often found in social and conceptual skill areas, rather
than . . . practical skills . . . .” Everington & Olley, Defining and Diagnosing, supra note 15, at 8;
see also Gary N. Siperstein & Melissa A. Collins, Intellectual Disability in THE DEATH PENALTY
AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY, 21, 26 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015) (“Most individuals with
ID at the upper end of the spectrum do not experience problems in the practical skills measured by
adaptive behavior scales, such as dressing oneself or using the telephone. However, they typically
display significant deficits in adaptive skills in the social and conceptual domains.”).
282. Keith F. Widaman, Concepts of Measurement, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 55, 60 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015) (“When assessing adaptive
behavior, for example, ratings on items are often collected on a scale such as 0 = cannot perform
behavior, 1 = can perform but only with substantial support, 2 = can perform with minimal support,
and 3 = can perform without support. Values on this 0-3 scale clearly reflect different levels of
facility in performing the behavior. However, it would be difficult to say whether the movement
from 0 to 1 on this rating scale is a smaller, equal, or larger change than that represented by
movement from 2 to 3. A technical feature of scoring involving AB scales can arise here. Because
subscale scores on adaptive behavior measures are moderately correlated, a generalized deficit is
assumed even if the score on only one domain meets the operational criterion of being
approximately two standard deviations below the mean. A total score of two standard deviations
below the mean from an instrument that measures conceptual, social, and practical skills will also
meet the operational definition of a significant limitation in adaptive behavior.” (emphasis added));
AAMR 2002, supra note 95, at 79 (“Significant limitations in adaptive behavior are identified by a
score of at least two standard deviations below the mean on one or more scores representing
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clinical evaluator.283 Although these scales are also standardized
instruments, they differ dramatically from IQ tests, and these differences
have particular importance for courts adjudicating Atkins cases.284
The most fundamental difference between IQ tests and adaptive
behavior scales is that IQ instruments are administered directly to the
person whose intellectual functioning is being evaluated. By contrast,
adaptive behavior scales most frequently involve obtaining information
from other individuals who know or have known the person and who
have observed his functioning in everyday life.285
There are four well-established instruments for measuring deficits
in adaptive behavior that are in widespread use,286 and another published
conceptual, social, or practical skills on a standardized measure of adaptive behavior or on the total
score, taking the standard error of measurement into account.” (emphasis added)).
283. AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 43-55 (Chapter 5: “Adaptive Behavior and Its
Assessment”). See generally Schalock, ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR, supra note 114. It should also be
noted that, perhaps even more than is the case with IQ testing, it is important to exclude
impressionistic biases on the part of the evaluator. Macvaugh & Cunningham, Forensic Practice,
supra note 83, at 157 (“Though clinical judgment has an important role in the interpretation of
intellectual assessment scores and the integration of adaptive behavior findings, examiners are
cautioned against setting aside findings from standardized instruments in favor of idiosyncratic
assertions of what is normative.”). For a list of “best practices” for clinicians assessing an
individual’s adaptive behavior deficits, see CLINICAL JUDGMENT 2014, supra note 253, at 30.
284. Although adaptive behavior instruments have significant differences from IQ tests, they
have some common characteristics which they share with other psychometric instruments. For
example, evaluating an individual’s score must take into account the standard error of measurement.
Tassé et al., Construct of Adaptive Behavior, supra note 109, at 293 (noting “the importance of
considering the instrument’s standard error of measurement when interpreting the individual’s
obtained adaptive behavior score.”); AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 48 (“The established procedure
in psychological measurement, in which standardized measures are used, is to report results using a
statistical confidence interval around the obtained score(s) . . . . [T]he standard error of
measurement, which varies by test, subgroup, and age group, is used to estimate this statistical
confidence interval.”); see discussion supra Part VI.C.
285. Macvaugh and Cunningham offer this practice recommendation:
When undertaking a reasonably contemporaneous assessment of adaptive functioning,
utilize a standardized instrument for the assessment of adaptive behavior. This involves
independently querying a number of third parties who have had close observation of the
defendant. When scores on standardized measures are not available, the presence or
absence of significant deficits may be reflected in the extent to which a defendant has
needed assistance in order to function adequately.
Macvaugh & Cunningham, Forensic Practice, supra note 83, at 160; see also J. Gregory Olley,
Adaptive Behavior Instruments, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 187, 190
(Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015) (“Although some earlier AB measures were simple checklists,
contemporary measures emphasize using an interview format to complete rating scales . . . . [I]n
Atkins evaluations, it is preferred that AB scales be administered as part of a face-to-face interview,
which allows the examiner to clarify items when needed. This clarification is useful, because even
teachers can misunderstand items or be influenced by their feelings toward the individual.”) (We
believe that courts will find this recent review and explanation of AB scales by Dr. Olley to be
particularly helpful.).
286. Tassé et al., Construct of Adaptive Behavior, supra note 109, at 293-95; id. at 293
(“Currently, four comprehensive individualized, standardized, and psychometrically sound adaptive
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more recently.287 The first of the established instruments is the Adaptive
Behavior Scale – School, Second Edition (ABS-Schools), published by
AAIDD.288 As its name indicates, it is for use with children, and thus is
behavior scales are available that have been normed on a representative U.S. sample of the general
population and have been developed specifically for the purpose of ruling in or out a diagnosis of
ID.”); id. at 295 (“Generally speaking, any of these four instruments would be an adequate choice
[for clinical evaluators] to use in assessing an individual’s adaptive behavior for the purpose of
ruling in or out a diagnosis of ID.”); Jeffrey Ditterline & Thomas Oakland, Relationships Between
Adaptive Behavior and Impairment, in ASSESSING IMPAIRMENT: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 31,
38-42 (Sam Goldstein & Jack A. Naglieri eds., 2009) (reviewing ABAS-II, SIB-R, and Vineland II);
PAUL J. FRICK, CHRISTOPHER T. BARRY & RANDY W. KAMPHAUS, CLINICAL ASSESSMENT OF
CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PERSONALITY AND BEHAVIOR 319 Table 14.1, 322-31 (3d ed. 2010)
[hereinafter FRICK ET AL., CLINICAL ASSESSMENT] (reviewing Vineland II, SIB-R, and ABAS-II);
J. Gregory Olley, Adaptive Behavior Instruments, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL
DISABILITY 187-200 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015).
In addition to their use in diagnosing intellectual disability, the adaptive behavior scales
are also sometimes used in diagnosing other disabilities, and in designing special education
curricula and supportive services for individuals with ID. See, e.g., Steve Woolf, Christine Merman
Woolf & Thomas Oakland, Adaptive Behavior Among Adults With Intellectual Disabilities and Its
Relationship to Community Independence, 48 INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES
209 (2010); Hyojeong Seo et al., The Impact of Medical/Behavioral Support Needs on the Supports
Needed by Adolescents With Intellectual Disability to Participate in Community Life, 122 AM. J. ON
INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 173 (2017); FRICK ET AL., CLINICAL
ASSESSMENT, supra, at 318 (individual education plans (IEPs) and “classroom intervention
planning”); id. at 316 (autism); Ditterline & Oakland, supra, at 44 (attention deficit/hyperactivity
disorder).
287. The most recent test is the Diagnostic Adaptive Behavior Scale (DABS), released in 2017
by AAIDD. MARC J. TASSÉ ET AL., AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON INTELLECTUAL &
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, DIAGNOSTIC ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR SCALE USER’S MANUAL
(2017). Intended for ages 4 to 21, the DABS is designed specifically for diagnostic purposes. See
Marc J. Tassé et al., Development and Standardization of the Diagnostic Adaptive Behavior Scale:
Application of Item Response Theory to the Assessment of Adaptive Behavior, 121 AM. J. ON
INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 79, 82 (2016); Giulia Balboni et al., The
Diagnostic Adaptive Behavior Scale: Evaluating Its Diagnostic Sensitivity and Specificity, 35
RESEARCH IN DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 2884 (2014).
The DABS is not to be confused with the similarly named Adaptive Behavior Diagnostic
Scale, (ABDS) which was also published recently and is also intended for measuring adaptive
behavior during the developmental period (ages 2 to 21). See Marc J. Tassé, Adaptive Behavior, in
HANDBOOK OF POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY IN INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 201,
207 (Karrie A. Shogren, Michael L. Wehmeyer, & Nirbay N. Singh eds., 2017).
288. Tassé et al., Construct of Adaptive Behavior, supra note 109, at 293-94. (There is another
version of the Adaptive Behavior Scales, the Residential and Community Edition, or ABS-RC:2.
This instrument has clinical value when used to establish intervention goals for individuals already
diagnosed as having ID, but was only normed on people with intellectual disability, and therefore
should not be used to assess adaptive behavior to diagnose the condition. Tassé, Adaptive Behavior
and Diagnosis, supra note 87, at 117; see also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MENTAL
RETARDATION: DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS 269 (Daniel J. Reschly
et al. eds., 2002) (“Because standard scores and percentile ranks do not indicate standing relative to
people without developmental disabilities, and because the norming sample is probably not
representative of the population of adults with developmental disabilities, the ABS-RC:2 may not fit
the psychometric criteria used in determining a diagnosis of mental retardation according to AAMR
requirements.”).)
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unlikely to be encountered in the contemporary evaluation of capital
defendants (although there may be records of an administration of this
scale from earlier in the defendant’s life). The second is the Adaptive
Behavior Assessment System – Third Edition (known as the ABAS-3),
which has different instruments for individuals of different age ranges,
including an “adult form” for individuals who are between sixteen and
eighty-nine years old.289 The ABAS-3 is designed to be completed by an
informant who knows the individual and/or by the individual himself or
herself, with the latter being particularly problematic in Atkins cases.290
The third instrument is the Scales of Independent Behavior – Revised
(known as the SIB-R).291 Like the ABAS-II, the SIB-R has versions for
different age groups. However, particular skepticism is warranted when
encountering the so-called “short form” of the SIB-R.292 The fourth
instrument (which is the oldest, having been first published in the 1930s)
is the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales – Third Edition (known as the
Vineland-3). This latest edition was published in 2016. The earlier
edition, the Vineland II, has been reviewed extensively in the
clinical literature.293

289. See J. Gregory Olley, Adaptive Behavior Instruments, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 187, 191 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015). Courts are likely to continue
to see earlier reports based on the previous version of the ABAS, known as the ABAS-II. Ditterline
& Oakland, supra note 286, at 40 (“The ABAS-II is considered to be theoretically sound and among
the most clinically valid measures of adaptive behavior.”); Tassé et al., Construct of Adaptive
Behavior, supra note 109, at 294. For a discussion of the ABAS-II, see FRICK ET AL., CLINICAL
ASSESSMENT, supra note 286, at 330-31 (discussing the ABAS-II and its strengths and weaknesses).
See generally ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR ASSESSMENT SYSTEM–II: CLINICAL USE AND INTERPRETATION
(Thomas Oakland & Patti L. Harrison eds., 2008).
290. Tassé et al., Construct of Adaptive Behavior, supra note 109, at 294 (“It should be noted
that the ABAS-II self-report has many advantages when using the adaptive behavior information for
the purposes of programming and intervention planning, but self-report data should be used very
cautiously, if at all, when the purpose is to rule in or out a diagnosis of ID.”). For fuller discussion
of the issues implicated by reliance on self-reporting, see infra notes 312-15 and accompanying text.
291. FRICK ET AL., CLINICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 286, at 328-30 (discussing the SIB-R
and its strengths and weaknesses); J. Gregory Olley, Adaptive Behavior Instruments, in THE DEATH
PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 187, 190-91 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015) (same). For
a more in-depth discussion of the SIB-R, see ESTHER STRAUSS, ELISABETH M. S. SHERMAN &
OTFRIED SPREEN, A COMPENDIUM OF NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS: ADMINISTRATION, NORMS,
AND COMMENTARY 1134-40 (3d ed. 2006).
292. Tassé et al., Construct of Adaptive Behavior, supra note 109, at 294 (“Although the
reliability and validity for the comprehensive form are adequate, the psychometric properties of the
Short Form and Developmental Form are questionable.”). See discussion supra Part VI.B (regarding
the problems surrounding short forms of IQ tests).
293. Tassé et al., Construct of Adaptive Behavior, supra note 109, at 295 (“The Vineland II has
extensive representative normative data. It also has strong psychometric properties.”); FRICK ET AL.,
CLINICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 286, at 322-25 (discussing the Vineland II and its strengths and
weaknesses); J. Gregory Olley, Adaptive Behavior Instruments, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 187, 192 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015) (“The Vineland II has the
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Although many more instruments to measure adaptive behavior
have been published (particularly in the last three or four decades),294
most lack the requisite norming and testing standards (such as
scientifically demonstrated statistical reliability and validity) required
for diagnosing intellectual disability,295 particularly in the context of an
Atkins case296 where the consequence of misdiagnosis can be so
momentous. Courts should be aware of the attributes of the
specific adaptive behavior instruments they encounter in an
Atkins adjudication.297
advantage of containing items that reflect more current community functioning than the previously
mentioned scales.”); id. (“The Expanded Interview Form contains more items within the same four
domains and allows an opportunity to explore adaptive functioning in greater depth.”).
294. Scott Spreat, Psychometric Standards for Adaptive Behavior Assessment, in Schalock,
ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR, supra note 114, at 103 (“The widespread popularity of the adaptive behavior
construct has spawned the development of well over 200 scales, each purporting to measure
adaptive behavior.”).
295. See AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 49. (AAIDD specifically recommends that “[t]he
selected measure should provide robust standard scores across the three domains of adaptive
behavior: conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills. The preferred adaptive behavior
instrument should have current norms developed on a representative sample of the general
population.”) see Tassé et al., Construct of Adaptive Behavior, supra note 109, at 295-97.
296. One instrument that has proven particularly problematic in Atkins cases is the “Street
Skills Survival Questionnaire” (“SSSQ”). See J. Gregory Olley, Adaptive Behavior Instruments, in
THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 187, 189 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015)
(“The [SSSQ] has an appealing name, but it is essentially a nonverbal picture test of practical skills.
It was designed as part of a larger battery of vocational assessments and is not an adequate standalone test of AB. The SSSQ reveals some knowledge of everyday practical functioning, but it does
not measure actual AB in conceptual, social or practical areas. The test is a good example of the
difference between knowledge of adaptive behavior and actual behavior and is an inappropriate test
for the diagnosis of ID.” (citation omitted)); Caroline Everington, Challenges of Conveying
Intellectual Disabilities to Judge and Jury, 23 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 467, 475 (2014)
(“The SSSQ is a multiple choice test which presents the examinee pictures of common objects or
actions. It is designed to measure the individual’s knowledge of areas of adult living with an
emphasis on practical skills. It does not yield a valid assessment of adaptive functioning because it
only measures knowledge; whereas, adaptive functioning assessment requires a rating of actual
performance in community settings.” (footnotes omitted)); Olley, Qualifications, supra note 268, at
137 (“The ability to answer questions or point to pictures correctly is not the same as community
functioning, and tests using this format, such as the Street Skills Survival Questionnaire are not
appropriate for the diagnosis of mental retardation.” (citation omitted)).
297. Similarly, evaluators should select an instrument based on its individual properties. See
Tassé et al., Construct of Adaptive Behavior, supra note 109, at 297 (“[C]linicians also should be
aware of the best practice guidelines that have emerged in the field for selecting adaptive
instruments. According to these guidelines, clinicians should (a) select an instrument that is a
comprehensive measure of conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills and is applicable to the
population in question; (b) rely only on instruments that are normed on the general population,
including individuals with and without disabilities; (c) determine, based on the publisher’s
specifications and state and professional regulations, who should administer the instrument and who
are the preferred respondents; (d) determine that the selected instrument has acceptable reliability
and validity for its intended purpose; and (e) determine whether scoring software has been ‘error
trapped’ to prevent the entering of impossible answers or to control for circumstances such as
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Adaptive behavior scales are not the only tool that should be
employed in assessing whether an individual defendant satisfies the
diagnostic requirement of significant deficits in adaptive functioning,
and, in some cases, their use may be inappropriate.298 In any event,
evaluators certainly should not rely on a single source of information.299
Among the sources that can often provide relevant information are
missing data that may yield errors.”); see also AAIDD, USER’S GUIDE 2012, supra note 65, at 1011 Table 2.2 (“Professional Responsibilities in Diagnosis: Assessment of Adaptive Behavior”).
An issue has been raised by some clinical experts regarding the adequacy of the scales’
focus on commonly encountered behavioral deficits in individuals with intellectual disability, such
as “social competence, gullibility, naïveté, and lack of wariness.” Tassé, Adaptive Behavior and
Diagnosis, supra note 87, at 116; see also Sharon A. Borthwick-Duffy, Adaptive Behavior, in
HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 279, 282 (John W. Jacobson,
James A. Mulick, & Johannes Rojahn eds., 2007) (“Current measures of adaptive behavior omit the
sometimes subtle, and possibly even immeasurable, characteristics that differentiate persons with
and without mental retardation and reflect the person-environment interaction that is understood to
be adaptive behavior. One of the most distinguishing features of mental retardation is a limitation in
the ability to understand people and social processes.”). These deficiencies should be addressed by
other information-gathering methods in the course of evaluative assessment.
298. Tassé, Adaptive Behavior and Diagnosis, supra note 87, at 120 (“There may be instances
when completing a standardized adaptive behavior scale is not possible. It might be that there is no
one alive or available to participate as a respondent. Another reason might be that the respondents
available are not able to provide a comprehensive picture of the individual’s adaptive behavior such
that they can complete all the information needed on a standardized scale. It is important for the
clinician to use his or her clinical judgment in determining when it is viable to conduct a
standardized adaptive behavior scale and when it is not. In the latter case, it is possible to conduct a
series of semi-structured interviews with multiple respondents who have reliable information about
specific periods of time (e.g., when he was in elementary school) or have knowledge of the
individual in one specific context (e.g., when he worked at the local car wash). This information,
along with case records, can be helpful in contributing to developing a report regarding the
individual’s adaptive behavior.”).
299. AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 47 (“Obtaining information from multiple respondents
and other relevant sources (e.g., school records, employment history, previous educations) is
essential to providing corroborating information that provides a comprehensive picture of the
individual’s functioning.”); Olley & Cox, Assessment of Adult Behavior, supra note 116, at 387
(“Many writers on this topic have emphasized that no single source of information or test score
should be the sole source of information to determine whether a significant impairment in adaptive
behavior exists.”); Tassé et al., Construct of Adaptive Behavior, supra note 109, at 295-97
(discussing importance of using “multiple informants and multiple contexts”); AAIDD, USER’S
GUIDE 2012, supra note 65, at 18 (“The use of multiple respondents, consistent with this standard,
will ensure greater reliability of the information obtained, and provide a broader coverage of
adaptive behavior across settings.”); Tassé, Adaptive Behavior and Diagnosis, supra note 87, at 121
(“The information obtained from standardized adaptive behavior scales should be corroborated with
information from other sources, such as interviews with other informants and a thorough review of
records and previous evaluations.”); Keith F. Widaman & Gary N. Siperstein, Assessing Adaptive
Behavior of Criminal Defendants in Capital Cases: A Reconsideration, 27 AM. J. FORENSIC
PSYCHOLOGY, no. 2, 2009, at 5, 28 (“We urge courts and experts not to rely solely on any one type
of evidence. Courts and experts might be tempted to center virtually all of their attention on
standardized
scores
obtained
from
intelligence
tests
and
adaptive
behavior
instruments. . . . However, test scores gain meaning and interpretability only in the presence of more
anecdotal evidence consistent with the scores.”).
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interviews300 of the defendant’s family and friends, school teachers,
employers, former neighbors, as well as “archival information, such as
school and other juvenile records.”301
School records sometimes prove to be pivotal, including a
determination about whether an individual satisfies the age of onset
requirement for a diagnosis of intellectual disability.302 Such records
may also be relevant in evaluating whether the results of later-in-life IQ
testing were influenced by lack of maximum effort or malingering. 303
But documentation of intellectual disability, or, more particularly the
300. Actual interviews with knowledgeable individuals, where possible, are often preferable to
acquiring information by having the informant fill out a form or answer written questions. See J.
Gregory Olley, Adaptive Behavior Instruments, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL
DISABILITY 187, 193 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015) (“[E]xaminers can complement the
administration of an adaptive behavior scale in which the informant is asked to rate the individual’s
behavior at a specific time before the crime with interviews that also focus on the relevant areas of
adaptive functioning.”); Tassé et al., Construct of Adaptive Behavior, supra note 109, at 295-96
(“Conducting an adaptive behavior assessment via an interview (as opposed to having the
respondent complete the scale directly) also provides valuable clinical information that assists one
in determining the reliability of the respondent, because the interview provides an opportunity to
observe the respondent’s cadence, response consistency, and thought given before responding to
items.”).
Since the informant who knew the defendant in a family, school, or work setting may also
have intellectual disability or at least substantial limitations himself or herself, particular care must
be taken in acquiring and interpreting information from such individuals. See Macvaugh &
Cunningham, Forensic Practice, supra note 83, at 161 (“Persons whose intellectual abilities are
deficient, whether in the mentally retarded or borderline categories, may have difficulty with
abstract concepts, including retrospective and hypothetical queries. Evaluators also should be
cognizant of the fact that people with mental retardation have a strong tendency to acquiesce and
present with a ‘cloak of competence’ in [an] attempt to hide their disability in order to appear
normal. During the clinical interview, therefore, forensic examiners should be careful not to use
leading questions.” (citation omitted)); see also Olley & Cox, Assessment of Adult Behavior, supra
note 116, at 391 (“Items [on an adaptive behavior scale] should be read as they appear, and they
may be repeated to assure understanding. If the informant does not understand the wording, it is
permissible to paraphrase the item. However, it is essential not to change the meaning of the item or
to include wording that suggests an answer. Clarification is helpful, but coaching in any form is not
permissible.”).
301. Olley & Cox, Assessment of Adult Behavior, supra note 116, at 387; see also AAIDD
2010, supra note 65, at 50 (noting other possible archival sources “may include medical evaluations,
school records, prior psychoeducational evaluations, Social Security Administration records,
employment history, and family history”); Reschly, Documenting Origins, supra note 83, at 125-26
(“Several sources of information originating by age 18 are potentially relevant to an adult diagnosis
of MR. These sources of information include records from settings such as schools, social services,
medical, and psychological. In addition, reports from significant others are useful, including parents,
teachers, siblings, classmates, relatives and, friends.”).
302. See Reschly, Documenting Origins, supra note 83, at 126 (“Schools more often diagnose
MMR [mild mental retardation] than any other community agency or service provider.”). This
requirement is discussed supra Part IV.C. For an overview of school records for individuals with
intellectual disability, see James R. Patton, Educational Records, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 293-304 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015).
303. See supra Part VI.E.
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apparent absence of such documentation in a particular case, must be
evaluated with considerable care.304 As discussed above,305 whether a
child was placed in special education classes or not was frequently
influenced by a variety of considerations—considerations unrelated to
the individual’s diagnosis—which may not be readily apparent at first
blush in a retrospective analysis.306 Educational practices and
terminology concerning such placements vary substantially from state to
state,307 from district to district within a state, and from school to school

304. One problem encountered with increasing frequency is that the relevant school records
may have been destroyed or are otherwise unavailable. Reschly, Documenting Origins, supra note
83, at 126 (“The information retained [about an individual student] may or may not reveal whether
or not the student was diagnosed with a disability, the name of the disability, and the amount and
kind of special education participation.”); see also id. (discussing the process and common practices
involving the actual destruction of individual records—typically within “three to five years after the
student has left the school”).
305. See supra Part IV.C.
306. See CLINICAL JUDGMENT 2014, supra note 253, at 37-38 (discussing the possible reasons
for absence of a diagnosis in an individual’s earlier records, including school records); Donald L.
MacMillan et al., The Labyrinth of IDEA: School Decisions on Referred Students with Subaverage
General Intelligence, 101 AM. J. ON MENTAL RETARDATION 161, 161 (1996) (documenting and
discussing “a 38% decline (a reduction of over 335,000 children) in the number of students ages 6
to 21 served in the public schools who were classified as having mental retardation”); Joan F.
Goodman, Reluctance to Refer the Mildly Retarded Child: Implications for Labelling, 29 EARLY
CHILD DEVELOPMENT & CARE 331, 331-32 (1987) (discussing reluctance of pediatricians to
diagnose possible mental retardation); Gary N. Siperstein & Melissa A. Collins, Intellectual
Disability, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 21, 29 (Edward A. Polloway
ed., 2015) (“Despite the importance of early intervention, there is often reluctance to diagnose a
child with ID, as parents do not perceive their child’s impairment to be significant enough to
warrant diagnosis.”); see also Eva Z. Abrams & Joan F. Goodman, Diagnosing Developmental
Problems in Children: Parents and Professionals Negotiate Bad News, 23 J. PEDIATRIC
PSYCHOLOGY 87 (1998); Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1052 (2017) (criticizing the lower
court’s overemphasis on defendant’s education in “normal classrooms during his school career”).
For additional resources regarding school records and placement in special education, see supra
note 140.
307. Snell, Characteristics, supra note 77, at 222 (“The trend in national figures . . . over the
past 25 years, indicates little overall variability in the percentage of the school-aged population
identified as receiving special education services under the category of ‘mental retardation’ (0.9%),
but great variability from state to state.” (emphasis added)); Edward A. Polloway et al., Mild
Intellectual Disabilities: Legacies and Trends in Concepts and Educational Practices, 45 EDUC. &
TRAINING IN AUTISM & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 54, 57 (2010) (“The most compelling
finding related to prevalence in the field of intellectual disabilities is the significant variance across
states.”); Reschly, Documenting Origins, supra note 83, at 127 (“Although all states are committed
to meeting the IDEA legal requirements and to serve the children in the 13 disabilities defined at 34
C.F.R. 300.8, significant state discretion is permitted regarding the names and classification criteria
for specific disabilities.”); Caroline Everington, Challenges of Conveying Intellectual Disabilities to
Judge and Jury, 23 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 467, 472 (2014) (“Generally, school records
will display evidence of academic difficulties and often special education placement. However,
special education placement may not have been in a setting for students with ID.”); see, e.g., Donald
MacMillan et al., The Role of Assessment in Qualifying Students as Eligible for Special Education:
What Is and What’s Supposed to Be, 30(2) FOCUS ON EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN, Oct. 1997, at 1, 6
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within a district.308 Similarly, grading practices vary widely from school
to school.309 In addition, the attitudes and sophistication of individual
teachers may have been pivotal.310 As a result, courts must inquire
carefully into such placement and grading practices before evaluating
the relevance of a defendant’s school records.311
(“It is evident that the public schools of California are not using the diagnostic category of ‘mental
retardation’ for many students with mild mental retardation.”).
308. Reschly, Documenting Origins, supra note 83, at 127-28; id. at 127 (“Changes in [state
education agency] definitions and criteria for MR necessitate determining the criteria actually in
effect at the time an adult with MMR [mild mental retardation] was evaluated in a school setting
and whether or not the criteria used are consistent with the current definition of MR established for
death penalty appeals.”); Keith F. Widaman & Gary N. Siperstein, Assessing Adaptive Behavior of
Criminal Defendants in Capital Cases: A Reconsideration, 27 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY, no.
2, 2009, at 5, 15 (“In certain instances, euphemisms such as mental delay are used instead of the
more pejorative label of mental retardation, despite the fact that these terms mean the same thing.”);
Reschly, Documenting Origins, supra note 83, at 128 (“Parents and school professionals clearly
prefer SLD [specific learning disability] to MMR and often admit to using the latter even when the
former is more appropriate due to parental acceptability.”); Donald MacMillan et al., The Role of
Assessment in Qualifying Students as Eligible for Special Education: What Is and What’s Supposed
to Be, 30(2) FOCUS ON EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN, October 1997, at 1, 10 (“LD [learning disability]
seems to be the ‘diagnosis of choice’ for a nonspecific and undifferentiated category of children that
general education teachers view as ‘difficult to teach,’ with a disregard for eligibility criteria for
State-sanctioned disability categories.”); RUTH COLKER, DISABLED EDUCATION: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 217-18, 228-33 (2013).
309. See Reschly, Documenting Origins, supra note 83, at 128-30; see also J. Gregory Olley,
The Assessment of Adaptive Behavior in Adult Forensic Cases: Part 3: Sources of Adaptive
Behavior Information, 33(1) PSYCHOLOGY IN MENTAL RETARDATION AND DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES, Summer 2007, at 3, 5 (“[S]chool records are often partially or completely missing
after several years, and the help of a person from the local school system may be needed to interpret
the meaning of certain records.”); Keith F. Widaman & Gary N. Siperstein, Assessing Adaptive
Behavior of Criminal Defendants in Capital Cases: A Reconsideration, 27 AM. J. FORENSIC
PSYCHOLOGY, no. 2, 2009, at 5, 14-15 (“[A]n examiner must know the history of judicial rulings
and/or school directives to interpret correctly many aspects of a defendant’s school records. Failure
to find evidence of special school placements cannot be used to justify a conclusion that the school
system never recognized problems related to school failure during the defendant’s developmental
period.”); Everington & Olley, Defining and Diagnosing, supra note 15, at 12 (“Even when school
records are available, the information in them may be difficult to interpret. For example, just
because a person has been placed in a classroom for children with learning disabilities does not
preclude a mental retardation diagnosis.”).
310. For an analysis of teacher attitudes, see Gary N. Siperstein, Jennifer Norins & Amanda
Mohler, Social Acceptance and Attitude Change, in HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL AND
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 133, 142-46 (John W. Jacobson, James A. Mulick, & Johannes
Rojahn eds., 2007) and the sources cited therein; see also Cindy L. Praisner, Attitudes of Elementary
School Principals Toward the Inclusion of Students With Disabilities, 69 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN
135, 140-42 (2003).
311. In addition to school records, there may also be valuable information in other records,
particularly those created during the individual’s developmental period. See Reschly, Documenting
Origins, supra note 83, at 132 (“Social services and medical records may exist that reveal useful
information about the onset of MMR [mild mental retardation] during the developmental period.
Medical conditions should be reviewed to identify conditions and diseases associated with MMR.
Many families of persons with MMR are at least periodically on public support and, for various

1384

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1305

One potential source of information about adaptive behavior that is
widely disfavored among clinicians is information provided by the
individual himself or herself. Numerous studies and clinical experience
have made clear that individuals with intellectual disabilities are
notoriously unreliable in describing or assessing their own abilities.312
Clinicians have long recognized that these self-reports and selfassessments are extremely flawed and inaccurate.313 In the context of
Atkins litigation, courts may have an understandable concern that
defendants might understate their adaptive functioning. But the
experience of clinicians indicates that the larger problem is individuals
with intellectual disabilities overstating their abilities and

reasons, have extensive child social services records.”).
Even more clearly, evidence of school failure or academic problems cannot be used as an
alternative to intellectual disability as an explanation of an individual’s limitations. See Moore, 137
S. Ct. at 1051 (“The CCA furthermore concluded that Moore’s record of academic failure, along
with the childhood abuse and suffering he endured, detracted from a determination that his
intellectual and adaptive deficits were related. Those traumatic experiences, however, count in the
medical community as ‘risk factors’ for intellectual disability. Clinicians rely on such factors as
cause to explore the prospect of intellectual disability further, not to counter the case for a disability
determination.” (quoting AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 59-60)).
312. See, e.g., Tassé et al., Construct of Adaptive Behavior, supra note 109, at 296.
313. See, e.g., AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 51 (“Self-ratings of individuals—especially
those individuals with higher tested IQ scores [within the intellectual disability range] may contain a
certain degree of bias and should be interpreted with caution when determining an individual’s level
of adaptive behavior.”); L. W. Heal & C. K. Sigelman, Response Biases in Interviews of Individuals
with Limited Mental Ability, 39 J. INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY RESEARCH 331 (1995); Tassé et al.,
Construct of Adaptive Behavior, supra note 109, at 294 (“[S]elf-report data should be used very
cautiously, if at all, when the purpose is to rule in or out a diagnosis of ID.”) Olley, Death Penalty
and Courts, supra note 160, at 237 (noting that “substantial research on interviewing people with
low intelligence should make one very cautious in interpreting” self-reports of defendants); Keith F.
Widaman & Gary N. Siperstein, Assessing Adaptive Behavior of Criminal Defendants in Capital
Cases: A Reconsideration, 27 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY, no. 2, 2009, at 5, 26-27 (“Therefore,
we recommend that self-report measures of adaptive behavior for defendants in prison not be used,
particularly when these measures are relied upon to make a diagnosis of mental retardation.”).
Another difficulty frequently encountered in seeking self-reports from individuals with
intellectual disability is the widely documented phenomenon of so-called bias responding or
“acquiescence.” See W. M. L. Finlay & E. Lyons, Acquiescence in Interviews with People Who
Have Mental Retardation, 40 MENTAL RETARDATION 14 (2002) (and the many sources cited
therein); Caroline Everington & Solomon M. Fulero, Competence to Confess: Measuring
Understanding and Suggestibility of Defendants with Mental Retardation, 37 MENTAL
RETARDATION 212 (1999); Tassé, Adaptive Behavior and Diagnosis, supra note 87, at 120. This
phenomenon has been documented and studied in the clinical literature for decades. See, e.g., Carol
K. Sigelman et al., When in Doubt, Say Yes: Acquiescence in Interviews with Mentally Retarded
Persons, 19 MENTAL RETARDATION 53, 54-57 (1981); see also W. M. L. Finlay & E. Lyons,
Methodological Issues in Interviewing and Using Self-Report Questionnaires with People with
Mental Retardation, 13 PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 319, 330 (2001) (“The difference between
expressive and receptive abilities should be recognized because professionals may often
overestimate the comprehension of people who appear to have good expressive language
abilities.”).
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accomplishments,314 either now or in the past. As a result, there is a
widespread consensus that warns against reliance on self-reports
in assessing adaptive functioning for purposes of diagnosing
intellectual disability.315
B. Challenges of an Accurate Retrospective Diagnosis
In most ordinary clinical situations, a mental disability professional
who is asked to evaluate whether an individual has intellectual disability
will focus on the individual’s mental status at the time of the evaluation.
In such instances, estimating the individual’s mental status at an earlier
time would be of very limited assistance (perhaps useful only for
establishing that the definition’s age of onset requirement had been
satisfied, and that issue is seldom contentious). Evaluations for the
purpose of school placement, social services, or even forensic
assessment of an issue like current competence to stand
trial appropriately focus on contemporaneous functioning and
prospective needs.
314. See, e.g., Tassé et al., Construct of Adaptive Behavior, supra note 109, at 296 (“This
qualification [of the reliability of self-report versus third-party respondents] is important because
individuals may have a tendency to overestimate their competence and adaptive skills in an effort to
appear more capable than they may actually be.”); Snell, Characteristics, supra note 77, at 226
(“This denial of limitations may be accompanied by the tendency to exaggerate one’s abilities.
Individuals with intellectual disability may go to great lengths to hide their limitations, consuming
significant effort to attempt to appear as their often-mistaken image of competent.”); Macvaugh &
Cunningham, Forensic Practice, supra note 83, at 161 (“Evaluators also should be cognizant of the
fact that people with mental retardation have a strong tendency to acquiesce and present with a
‘cloak of competence’ in [an] attempt to hide their disability in order to appear normal.” (citation
omitted)); CLINICAL JUDGMENT 2014, supra note 253, at 31 (“[S]elf-ratings have a high risk of
error . . . .”); AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 52 (“Based on these considerations, the authors of this
Manual caution against relying heavily only on the information obtained from the individual
himself or herself when assessing adaptive behavior for the purpose of establishing a diagnosis of
ID.”). See generally ROBERT B. EDGERTON, THE CLOAK OF COMPETENCE (rev. & updated ed.
1993).
315. Tassé et al., Construct of Adaptive Behavior, supra note 109, at 296 (“[V]irtually all
experts in the assessment of adaptive behaviors agree with this position.”).
However, interviewing the defendant serves other purposes. Olley, Qualifications, supra
note 268, at 137 (“The expert in an Atkins proceeding should, of course, meet with the defendant,
interview him, and engage him in whatever activities might help to determine his understanding of
his current situation, his ability to report on factual aspects of his history, and his ability to relate to
others. However, the defendant’s assessment of his own functioning is not a valid source of data on
which to form a diagnosis.” (emphasis added)); Olley, Death Penalty and Courts, supra note 160, at
232 (“Although an interview of the defendant is a customary part of an Atkins evaluation or any
evaluation related to the diagnosis of ID, one must be aware of many ways in which the self-report
of the defendant may be inaccurate. Interviews may be influenced by the communication limitations
of the defendant (e.g., difficulty understanding the questions, particularly those of a conceptual
nature, or difficulty responding to open-ended questions) or the tendency to try to hide one’s
limitations (i.e., the cloak of competence).”).
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By contrast, clinical evaluations in Atkins cases will focus on
whether the defendant had intellectual disability at the time of the
commission of the offense. This is because the constitutional protection
afforded by Atkins is fundamentally about the level of the individual’s
culpability for his actions.316 As a result, evaluators in these cases will
need to focus on the defendant’s mental status at an earlier point in time,
and in some of the cases (such as post-conviction proceedings), a
significantly earlier point in time. As one noted clinician has observed,
“Atkins evaluations are, by their nature, retrospective. Experts are being
asked to determine intellectual functioning in childhood, at the time of
the crime, and, in some cases, currently.”317
There is one very important sense in which this does not matter:
people who had intellectual disability earlier or later in their lives almost
certainly had it at the time of the offense. Unlike many forms of mental
illness, intellectual disability is neither a cyclical nor an episodic
occurrence. By contrast, mental illness symptoms may be present at one
point in a person’s life and not at another, or may have
substantially differing levels of severity over time.318 In addition, some
316. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (“This consensus unquestionably reflects
widespread judgment about the relative culpability of mentally retarded offenders, and the
relationship between mental retardation and the penological purposes served by the death penalty.”).
317. Olley, Death Penalty and Courts, supra note 160, at 235.
318. Some forms of mental illness are, or can be, impermanent features of the affected
individual’s life. For example, the American Psychiatric Association now includes three separate
diagnostic categories—Brief Psychotic Disorder, Schizophreniform Disorder, and Schizophrenia—
within the “schizophrenia spectrum”; these categories are distinguished from one another, in large
part, by their duration. APA, DSM-5, supra note 65, at 87, 89; id. at 94 (“The essential feature of
brief psychotic disorder is a disturbance that involves the sudden onset of . . . psychotic
symptoms . . . . An episode of the disturbance lasts at least 1 day but less than 1 month, and the
individual eventually has a full return to the premorbid level of functioning . . . .”); id. at 96; id. at
97 (“The characteristic symptoms of schizophreniform disorder are identical to those of
schizophrenia . . . . Schizophreniform disorder is distinguished by its difference in duration: the total
duration of the illness . . . is at least 1 month but less than 6 months . . . .”); id. at 99; id. at 101
(“[For a diagnosis of schizophrenia, some] signs of the disturbance must persist for a continuous
period of at least 6 months . . . .”); id. at 102 (“The onset [of schizophrenia] may be abrupt or
insidious, but the majority of individuals manifest a slow and gradual development of a variety of
clinically significant signs and symptoms. . . . The predictors of course and outcome are largely
unexplained, and course and outcome may not be reliably predicted. . . . [A] small number of
individuals are reported to recover completely.”). Similarly, there is also substantial variability
among individuals with bipolar or other affective disorders. See, e.g., id. at 123; id. at 129 (“Mood
[in Bipolar I Disorder] may shift very rapidly [from a manic episode] to anger or depression.
Depressive symptoms may occur during a manic episode and, if present, may last moments, hours,
or, more rarely, days.”); id. at 183 (“Short-duration depressive episode (4-13 days)”); id. at 168
(“[Symptoms of Persistent Depressive Disorder (Dysthymia) include:]Depressed mood for most of
the day, for more days than not, as indicated by either subjective account or observation by others,
for at least 2 years.”).
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forms of mental illness may be alleviated or masked by the effect
of treatment.319
As a result, courts confronting an issue of mental illness will
frequently need to inquire about the individual’s symptoms and
functioning at a particular point in time. For example, in civil cases,
challenges to the mental capacity of a testator will focus on the specific
point in time in which he or she executed a will.320 Similarly, actions for
damages caused by a traumatic brain injury require a determination of
the plaintiff’s mental capacity at the time of the injury.321
In criminal cases, there are also time-specific questions about a
defendant’s mental illness that call for expert testimony. For example,
competence to stand trial and other competence determinations usually
319. See, e.g., Thomas R.E. Barnes & Stephen R. Marder, Principles of Pharmacological
Treatment in Schizophrenia, in SCHIZOPHRENIA 515, 515 (Daniel R. Weinberger & Paul J. Harrison
eds., 3d ed. 2011) (“The important effect of antipsychotic medications in schizophrenia is their
ability to reduce and sometimes eliminate psychotic thought processes.”); T. Scott Stroup et al.,
Pharmacotherapies, in TEXTBOOK OF SCHIZOPHRENIA 303, 303 (Jeffrey A. Lieberman et al. eds.,
2006) (“Pharmacological treatments are an essential component of a comprehensive approach to the
treatment of schizophrenia. Rational pharmacotherapies can contribute greatly to symptom relief
and to a broader psychosocial recovery for affected individuals. However, antipsychotic drugs do
not cure schizophrenia.”); Norman Sussman, General Principles of Psychopharmacology, in 2
KAPLAN & SADOCK’S COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 2965 (9th ed. 2009) (“In a
reversal of positions, psychoanalytic theory, which once served to define the practice of psychiatry,
has been supplanted by psychopharmacology as the most widely used form of treatment for
psychiatric disorders.”).
The Supreme Court has taken note of the use of drugs for the treatment of mental illness.
See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 214 (1990) (“Antipsychotic drugs, sometimes called
‘neuroleptics’ or ‘psychotropic drugs,’ are medications commonly used in treating mental disorders
such as schizophrenia. As found by the trial court, the effect of these and similar drugs is to alter the
chemical balance in the brain, the desired result being that the medication will assist the patient in
organizing his or her thought processes and regaining a rational state of mind.” (citation omitted)).
Such treatments, particularly psychotropic medications, may also have side effects that influence the
trial process. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 142 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The
drugs can prejudice the accused in two principal ways: (1) by altering his demeanor in a manner that
will prejudice his reactions and presentation in the courtroom, and (2) by rendering him unable or
unwilling to assist counsel.”).
320. WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, SHELDON F. KURTZ & DAVID M. ENGLISH, WILLS, TRUSTS
AND ESTATES 317 (4th ed. 2010) (“[T]he appropriate inquiry is whether the decedent was lucid and
rational at the time the will was made.” (emphasis added) (quoting In re Estate of Schlueter, 994
P.2d 937, 940 (Wyo. 2000)); Robert I. Simon, Retrospective Assessment of Mental States in
Criminal and Civil Litigation: A Clinical Review, in RETROSPECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF MENTAL
STATES IN LITIGATION: PREDICTING THE PAST 21, 28-30 (Robert I. Simon & Daniel W. Shuman
eds., 2002) (“Competence to Execute a Will”); id. at 29 (“Sorting out these cases often entails
piecing together the testimony of lay and non-mental health care professionals who observed the
testator.”).
321. See David Faust, David C. Ahern & Ana J. Bridges, Neuropsychological (Brain Damage)
Assessment, in COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 363, 414 (David
Faust ed., 6th ed. 2012) (“Determining whether an injury has produced a loss or decline in
functioning requires knowledge of an individual’s baseline or prior cognitive capacities.”).
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focus on the present moment.322 But, determining whether a defendant is
entitled to a defense of insanity or whether he or she had the requisite
mens rea for a conviction focuses on mental condition at the time of the
offense.323 Evaluations by mental health professionals in criminal cases
where the issue concerns a defendant’s condition at a particular time in
the past are recognized to be more demanding than evaluations about the
individual’s current condition.324 As a consequence, it has even been
322. See, e.g., Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (“[The test for
competence to stand trial] must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” (emphasis added)); ABA MENTAL HEALTH
STANDARDS 1988, supra note 8, std. 7-4.1(b) (“The test for determining mental competence to stand
trial should be whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with defendant’s
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and otherwise to assist in the defense, and
whether the defendant has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings.” (emphasis
added)); ABA MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 2016, supra note 8, std. 7-4.1(b) (same). Of course,
appellate or post-conviction evaluation of whether a defendant had been competent at the time of an
earlier trial is, by its nature, retrospective. See, e.g., Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 387 (1966)
(“[W]e have previously emphasized the difficulty of retrospectively determining an accused’s
competence to stand trial.”).
On the issue of competence to be executed, the relevant focus is on mental condition at the
time that execution is imminent. See ABA MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 1988, supra note 8, std.75.7(a) (“Whenever a correctional official, other state official, the prosecution, or counsel for the
convict have reason to believe that a convict who has been sentenced to death may be currently
incompetent, . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. at (f) (“[I]f the court finds, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the convict is currently incompetent, it should stay the order of execution for the
duration of the convict’s incompetence.”); ABA MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 2016, supra note 8,
std. 7-9.9(a), (e); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 934 (2007) (“Prior findings of competency
do not foreclose a prisoner from proving he is incompetent to be executed because of his present
mental condition.” (emphasis added)); see also Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 407 (1986) (“[I]f,
after judgment, he becomes of nonsane memory, execution shall be stayed . . . .” (quoting 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 24 (Oxford, Clarendon Press
1769))); Daniel W. Shuman, Competence and Mental Impairment, in RETROSPECTIVE ASSESSMENT
OF MENTAL STATES IN LITIGATION: PREDICTING THE PAST, supra note 261, at 425-43.
323. 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (2012) (“It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal
statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a
result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the
wrongfulness of his acts.” (emphasis added)); ABA M ENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 1988, supra
note 8, std. 7-6.1(a) (“A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if, at the time of such
conduct, and as a result of mental disease or defect, that person was unable to appreciate the
wrongfulness of such conduct.” (emphasis added)); ABA MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 2016,
supra note 8, std. 7-6.1(a) (“A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if, at the time of such
conduct, and as a result of mental disorder, that person was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of
such conduct.” (emphasis added)); MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
1985) (“A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of
mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.” (alteration in
original) (emphasis added)).
324. See, e.g., Ronald Roesch, Jodi L. Viljoen & Irene Hui, Assessing Intent and Criminal
Responsibility, in HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY: RESOURCES FOR MENTAL HEALTH AND
LEGAL PROFESSIONALS 157 (William T. O’Donohue & Eric R. Levensky eds., 2004) (“Criminal
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recommended that the qualifications of expert witnesses with regard to
retrospective mental health status be more demanding than the
credentials required for contemporaneous evaluation of a defendant’s
mental condition.325
By contrast, intellectual disability is a condition manifested either at
birth or during childhood (most frequently early in childhood), and
which essentially remains throughout the individual’s life.326 As a result,
the mental illness concerns about substantial changes or fluctuations in
mental state over time do not have a direct analogue regarding
intellectual disability. In that sense, retrospective evaluations of
intellectual disability do not present the same challenges as mental
illness issues such as those that arise in insanity defense cases.
But the retrospective aspect of the Atkins determination of whether
a defendant had intellectual disability earlier in life does raise issues on
two narrower points. The first issue involves the third prong of the
definition, whether the disability was manifested during the
developmental period.327 As noted earlier, unless there was a brain injury
or comparable event during adulthood, it is extremely likely that an

responsibility evaluations can be extremely challenging for evaluators. One unique and
complicating feature is that they require a retrospective evaluation of a defendant’s mental state at
the time of the alleged offense.”); GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR
THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 249 (3d ed.
2007) (“[U]nlike the focus of most other forensic assessments, the focus of the MSO [mental state at
offense] evaluation is retrospective. Having to ascertain the inner workings of an individual weeks
or months prior to the evaluation limits the applicability of many traditional clinical procedures and
creates concern about the possible impact of intervening events.”); J OHN PARRY & ERIC Y.
DROGIN, CRIMINAL LAW HANDBOOK ON PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE AND
TESTIMONY 159 (ABA 2000) (“A key factor that all diminished culpability standards share is that
each determination is based on an assessment of a defendant’s mental or unconscious state at the
time of the alleged crime, rather than at trial. Thus, all of these assessments are retrospective and
usually cover an extended period of time.”).
325. ABA MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 1988, supra note 8, std. 7-3.12(c)(ii); see id.
commentary (“Paragraph (c) assumes that assessments of competency or other issues of present
mental condition may be made more easily than those requiring a reconstruction of mental condition
at the time of an alleged crime . . . .”); ABA MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 2016, supra note 8, std.
7-3.8; see also Snell, Characteristics, supra note 77, at 227 (“[T]he need for supports in individuals
with intellectual disability [is] an enduring rather than a temporary characteristic.” (citing James R.
Thompson et al., Conceptualizing Supports and the Support Needs of People with Intellectual
Disability, 47 INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 135, 136-37 (2009))).
326. See, e.g., MARC J. TASSÉ & JOHN H. BLUME, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH
PENALTY 4-5 (2018) (“Although intensive educational and therapeutic interventions received in
infancy and early childhood may alleviate some of the child’s deficits in intellectual functioning and
adaptive behavior, intellectual disability is generally considered a lifelong condition.”); J. Gregory
Olley, Time at Which Disability Must Be Shown in Atkins Cases, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 213, 214 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015) (“If the condition was
established in childhood, it was likely to have continued to the time of the crime.”).
327. See supra Part IV.C for a discussion of this prong.
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individual who meets the measured intelligence and adaptive
limitations prongs of the definition acquired the disability during the
developmental period.328
The second (and methodologically more nuanced) issue is
evaluating whether, at the time of the criminal act, the defendant had the
requisite deficits in adaptive functioning to meet the second prong of the
definition.329 This arises from the challenges inherent in retrospective
measurement of adaptive behavior.
The starting point in addressing this difficulty is acknowledging
that the problem is, indeed, inherent in the nature of the diagnostic
process and the needs of the judicial system in Atkins cases. The courts
need to know about the defendant’s functioning level at an earlier time
in his life. Unfortunately, the primary methodology that ordinarily would
be used in non-forensic settings—ascertaining his current functioning
level and extrapolating backward in time—is methodologically unsound
in this context. Because the individual is likely to be in prison (an
artificial environment which masks deficits), this approach is extremely
likely to produce an inaccurate assessment.330
Therefore, the diagnostician in Atkins evaluations is left with two
principal sources of information. The first is whatever reliable evidence
is available about the individual’s functioning earlier in life (i.e., before
being incarcerated). The second source of information is the use of
adaptive behavior scales, and other documentary and interview data. But
some caution is necessary regarding the interpretation of results from the
behavior scales in this context. Ascertaining whether an individual had
significant deficits in adaptive behavior at the time of the offense is
substantially different from evaluating his current level of functioning.
The evaluative instruments, while they remain valuable, were not
designed to perform this particular task.331 While techniques have been
328. See supra notes 135-42, 146 and accompanying text.
329. CLINICAL JUDGMENT 2014, supra note 253, at 36 (“A valid retrospective diagnosis of ID
requires the demonstration of significant limitations in adaptive behavior during the developmental
(up to age 18) period. This requirement typically involves using scores from previously
administered adaptive behavior instruments.”); id. at 36 (listing six specific standards for
retrospective adaptive behavior assessments that clinicians need to weigh); Gilbert S.
Macvaugh, III, Karen L. Salekin & J. Gregory Olley, Mental Retardation: Death Penalty, in 4
WILEY ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 1730, 1734 (Allan Jamieson & Andre Moenssens
eds., 2009) (“[C]oncerns exist regarding the validity of retrospective assessments of adaptive
behavior.”); Caroline Everington et al., Challenges in the Assessment of Adaptive Behavior of
People Who Are Incarcerated, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 201, 203
(Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015) (“Retrospective evaluations present unique challenges that can
threaten the reliability and validity (the trustworthiness) of the AB assessment results.”).
330. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
331. “No adaptive behavior rating scale was normed with such a long-term retrospective
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suggested to minimize the difficulties in obtaining reliable information
from the retrospective administration of adaptive behavior scales,332
caution is warranted against overestimating the precision these
instruments can achieve in retrospective evaluations.333
While there are problems with each source of retrospective
information334adaptive behavior scales and other historical datait is
essential that they be gathered and analyzed rigorously. The AB scales,
as previously discussed,335 were not designed for this specific task, but,
if properly administered and interpreted, they have some value.336
Information from individuals who knew the defendant prior to his
incarceration carries the fallibility attendant to any reliance on human
memory.337 School and social services records do not present this
administration. In other words, no standardization procedure used in norming any adaptive behavior
rating scale requires raters to think back and remember how the target person behaved during the
developmental period or at time years earlier.” Kay B. Stevens & J. Randall Price, Adaptive
Behavior, Mental Retardation, and the Death Penalty, 6 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY PRACTICE, no.
3, 2006, at 1, 15; see also J. Gregory Olley, The Assessment of Adaptive Behavior in Adult Forensic
Cases: Part 1, supra note 126, at 3 (“This retrospective use of adaptive behavior scales is not the
way that the tests were standardized.”); Tassé et al., Construct of Adaptive Behavior, supra note
109, at 296 (“[T]here is no research available examining the reliability or error rate of adaptive
behavior assessments obtained retrospectively.”).
332. See, e.g., Olley, The Assessment of Adaptive Behavior in Adult Forensic Cases: Part 1,
supra note 126, at 3 (“Thus, the challenge is not to find the perfect single measure but to find the
most acceptable adaptation of customary methods. By such a standard, the problems of retrospective
reports can be minimized by selecting respondents who knew the defendant well at the time they are
describing and who are generally reliable.”).
333. All authorities recognize the substantial difficulty in retrospective evaluation of adaptive
deficits. However, there is not complete agreement about precisely how that difficulty should be
addressed. See, e.g., Bonnie & Gustafson, Implementing Atkins, supra note 127, at 849 (“A final
limitation of adaptive behavior measurement is that they cannot be administered retrospectively and
thus can only measure the defendant’s current functioning.”); id. at 859 (“In particular, the construct
of adaptive behavior should be emphasized [in testimony by experts] in light of the uncertainties
surrounding its measurement.”); James R. Patton & Denis W. Keyes, Death Penalty Issues
Following Atkins, 14 EXCEPTIONALITY 237, 249 (2006) (“Sometimes it is necessary to administer a
standardized instrument retrospectively. Although this is not a preferred or recommended way of
administration, it may be the only option.”); Olley & Cox, Assessment of Adult Behavior, supra note
116, at 389 (“Although all adaptive behavior testing relies on accurate memory, reliance on memory
from the distant past is a departure from the standardized procedure. Nevertheless, information
obtained in this way can contribute to a valid conclusion.”).
334. See, e.g., Macvaugh & Cunningham, Forensic Practice, supra note 83, at 160-61; id. at
160 (“Concerns exist regarding the validity of retrospective assessments of adaptive behavior.”); see
also Everington & Olley, Defining and Diagnosing, supra note 15, at 8-10.
335. See supra Part VII.A.
336. Olley & Cox, Assessment of Adult Behavior, supra note 116, at 387 (“The question is not
whether the test or interview procedure is valid for this purpose. The question is whether the totality
of the available information is sufficient for the expert to make a well-founded and ethical clinical
judgment about the question at hand.”).
337. Id. at 386 (“When using informant information, the validity of the expert’s conclusion
relies heavily upon the memories of the individuals who provide the information.”); id. at 389
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problem, of course, but involve potential difficulties of their own,338 and
may be unavailable.339 In most cases, the best approach will be to
examine and evaluate as wide an array of valid information as
possible.340 Clinical experts who have participated in Atkins cases have
offered specific guidance in dealing with individual informants in a
retrospective interview.341 Similarly, there are recommendations for
“best practices” regarding the overall process of evaluating adaptive
behavior in a retrospective setting.342
Although the retrospective nature of most Atkins evaluations
involves considerable challenges, both for clinicians and for the courts, it
is important to remember that the lifelong nature of intellectual disability
minimizes the need for precision in determining the exact characteristics
of a defendant’s limitations at the time of the crime. Those limitations,

(“Although all adaptive behavior testing relies on accurate memory, reliance on memory from the
distant past is a departure from the standardized procedure. Nevertheless, information obtained in
this way can contribute to a valid conclusion.”); see also Everington & Olley, Defining and
Diagnosing, supra note 15, at 9 (“In other words, the informant must report on the performance of
the defendant at some time in the past and that reliance on memory is likely to compromise the
validity of the assessment to some unknown degree.”).
338. See supra notes 140, 302-11 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 140, 304.
340. Everington & Olley, Defining and Diagnosing, supra note 15, at 11 (“A valid assessment
of adaptive skills should be based on information from several sources (e.g., standardized measures
of adaptive skills, interviews, school and work records, and other archival data). . . . A thorough
assessment of adaptive skills requires some detective work . . . .”); Tassé et al., Construct of
Adaptive Behavior, supra note 109, at 296 (“For such a diagnosis, the clinician must use multiple
sources of information, including any data that can be obtained (e.g., school records, work records)
to develop as complete a picture of the person’s history of adaptive competencies to determine
manifestations of possible ID prior to age 18.”); J. Gregory Olley, Adaptive Behavior Instruments,
in THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 187, 193 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015)
(“The examiner must draw information from as many sources as possible and give each source its
appropriate weight, using clinical judgment to arrive at a diagnostic conclusion.”). A term
commonly used to describe this approach is “convergent validity.” See, e.g., Reschly, Documenting
Origins, supra note 83, at 132-33; Caroline Everington, Challenges of Conveying Intellectual
Disabilities to Judge and Jury, 23 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 467, 483 (2014) (“A process of
convergent validity is used to combine information from across a number of informants.”).
341. See, for example, Tassé, Adaptive Behavior and Diagnosis, supra note 87, at 120:
 Identify a clear time period during which you want the respondent to focus their
report of the individual’s adaptive behavior. For example, you might instruct
the respondent to recall the assessed individual before he was incarcerated.
 Build rapport with the respondent and ask them to think about where the assessed
person was living at that specific time, working, etc. These points of
reference will be important to assist the respondent to recall that time period.
 Periodically, remind the respondent that they are assessing the individual’s
adaptive behavior in that specific time period.
342. See, e.g., AAIDD, USER’S GUIDE 2012, supra note 65, at 21 & Table 3.4; Tassé et al.,
Construct of Adaptive Behavior, supra note 109, at 296-97; Macvaugh & Cunningham, Forensic
Practice, supra note 83, at 160-61; see also supra note 329.
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therefore, can be viewed and evaluated in a more comprehensive
assessment, rather than a technical and purely quantitative computation.
C. Strengths and Weaknesses
As discussed in the previous Subparts, the assessment of adaptive
behavior differs from the assessment of intellectual functioning in
several crucial ways.343 One of the principal differences is that the
diagnostic evaluation of adaptive behavior focuses on the individual’s
weaknesses, and does not “balance” them against those things that the
individual actually can do.344 This singular focus on the debit side of the
ledger may, at first blush, seem counterintuitive, but this principle is
universally recognized among clinicians in the field, and evaluators must
adhere to it in all Atkins cases.345
But the diagnostic focus of the second prong on adaptive deficits
does not deny that adaptive skills may also be present. The central
343. See supra Parts VI, VII.A-B.
344. See Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1050 (2017) (“But the medical community focuses
the adaptive-functioning inquiry on adaptive deficits.” (citing AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 47;
APA, DSM-5, supra note 65, at 33, 38; and Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2281 (2015)).
345. For decades, the professional and clinical definitions of intellectual disability have
focused solely on deficits. See, e.g., AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 1 (“[S]ignificant
limitations . . . in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive
skills.”); AAMR 2002, supra note 95, at 1 (“Mental retardation is a disability characterized by
significant limitations both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed in
conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills.”); AAMR 1992, supra note 84, at 5 (“It is
characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related
limitations in two or more of the following applicable skill areas . . . .”); AAMD 1983, supra note
80, at 11 (“Mental retardation refers to significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning
existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior . . . .”); AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON
MENTAL DEFICIENCY, MANUAL ON TERMINOLOGY AND CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL
RETARDATION 11 (rev. 1973) (“[E]xisting concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior . . . .”);
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, A MANUAL ON TERMINOLOGY AND
CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 3 (2d ed. 1961) (“Mental retardation refers to
subaverage general intellectual functioning which originates during the developmental period and is
associated with impairment in adaptive behavior.”); APA, DSM-5, supra note 65, at 33 (“Deficits in
adaptive functioning . . . .”); APA, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 80, at 41 (“[A]ccompanied by
significant limitations in adaptive functioning . . . .”); AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-III-R 32 (3d ed. rev. 1987)
(“Concurrent deficits or impairments in adaptive functioning . . . .”); MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE IN MENTAL RETARDATION 13 (John W. Jacobson & James A. Mulick
eds., American Psychological Association, 1996) (“significant limitations in adaptive functioning”)
(all emphases added).
While an individual’s strengths are relevant and important to assess in planning for
education or planning services, the same is not true in the diagnosis of intellectual disability in
Atkins cases. Olley, Death Penalty and Courts, supra note 160, at 233 (“[I]t is important to note that
a clinical evaluation emphasizes strengths in order to plan services that capitalize upon those
strengths to promote success. An evaluation for the court is focused on deficits because its purpose
is to determine a diagnosis, and an ID is, by definition, a condition characterized by deficits.”).
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reason for focusing on deficits in adaptive functioning begins with the
universally recognized fact that every individual who has intellectual
disability also has things that he or she has learned to do, and can do
whether with or without assistance. The presence of such abilities cannot
preclude the diagnosis of ID.346 The functional impairments experienced
by people with ID are not uniform across the class, and the diagnostic
process does not require such uniformity. As discussed earlier, the
purpose of requiring deficits in adaptive functioning was to assure that
the cognitive impairment that satisfies the first prong of the definition is
accompanied by actual functional limitations (and is not merely an
346. See, e.g., AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 1 (“Within an individual, limitations often coexist with strengths.”); AAMR 2002, supra note 95, at 1 (same); AAMR 1992, supra note 84, at 5
(“Specific adaptive limitations often co-exist with strengths in other adaptive skills or other personal
capabilities . . . .”); Snell, Characteristics, supra note 77, at 220 (“[A]ll individuals with intellectual
disability typically demonstrate strengths in functioning along with relative limitations.”); Olley,
Death Penalty and Courts, supra note 160, at 233 (“[P]eople with mild ID are a heterogeneous
group with individual profiles of relative strengths and weaknesses. One cannot argue that the
presence of a particular strength rules out ID, particularly if it is a strength shared with others with
ID.”); Caroline Everington, Challenges of Conveying Intellectual Disabilities to Judge and Jury, 23
WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 467, 471 (2014) (“Interpretation of these findings requires an
understanding of typical behavioral expectations of individuals who function in the mild range of
ID. For example, the presence of a defendant’s strengths in some areas . . . is to be expected and
does not preclude a diagnosis of ID.”); see also Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2281 (“[I]ntellectually
disabled persons may have ‘strengths in social or physical capabilities, strengths in some adaptive
skill areas, or strengths in one aspect of an adaptive skill in which they otherwise show an overall
limitation.’” (quoting AAMR 2002, supra note 95, at 8)). Such abilities are sometimes described as
“splinter skills” or “islands of competence.” See, e.g., Katherine T. Rhodes et al., Testing Math or
Testing Language? The Construct Validity of the KeyMath-Revised for Children with Intellectual
Disability and Language Difficulties, 120 AM. J. ON INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES 542, 543 (2015) (“[I]n addition to exhibiting a general pattern of lower than average
performance across a variety of broad abilities, children with ID may also be characterized by
heterogeneous performances (sometimes termed ‘splinter skills’) across broad abilities and a variety
of ability profiles.”).
Indeed, the presence of isolated skillssuch as reading above expected grade-levelsthat
are not within the typical range for people with ID does not preclude a diagnosis under the adaptive
behavior prong. See Karen L. Salekin, Gilbert S. Macvaugh, III & Timothy J. Derning, Relevance of
Other Assessment Instruments, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 305, 311
(Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015) (“The appropriate scientific fact is that for any IQ score there is a
symmetrical range of possible expected achievement scores which, whether reported in terms of
standard scores or GE’s [grade equivalents], can be large. Achievement scores that are above
predicted levels based on measured IQ scores will occur with some degree of regularity for
individuals with mild MR/ID.” (internal quotation omitted)).
Evaluators also need to be watchful for the possibility of hidden supports in the person’s
life. In determining the things that an individual may or may not be able to do, it is also important to
be alert to the possibility that some actions may actually have depended on the involvement of
others. See Olley, Qualifications, supra note 268, at 138 (“[Often,] the individual depends on a
parent or girlfriend or neighbor as a ‘benefactor’ or has acquaintances who try to exploit him for
money, labor, drugs, or other resources.”); see also Kelli A. Sanderson et al., Who Helps?
Characteristics and Correlates of Informal Supporters to Adults with Disabilities, 122 AM. J. ON
INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 492 (2017).
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anomaly or artifact of the IQ testing process).347 As a result, it is
essential for courts adjudicating prong 2 of the definition in Atkins
cases to follow the practice of clinicians and focus on deficits in
adaptive functioning.348
D. Relevance of the Facts of the Crime
An issue has arisen in some Atkins cases about the relevance of the
facts of the crime for which the defendant has been charged (or, in
appeals and post-conviction cases, the crime of which he has been
convicted). In these cases, it is asserted that the crime involved some
level of planning or knowledge, or that the defendant attempted to avoid
detection or capture, and that these facts (if true) are inconsistent with
the defense’s claim of intellectual disability.349 Since there is no direct
analogue to this contention outside the criminal justice system, it must
be addressed within the context of more general principles of diagnosing
intellectual disability.
Courts may be tempted to assume that the facts of the crime are part
of the evaluation of the defendant’s entitlement to Atkins relief. This
assumption might seem natural, since the details of the crime are so
pivotal in determining a defendant’s claim to a defense of insanity or
diminished capacity. In such cases, the court must inquire not just
whether the defendant had the claimed mental “disease or defect,” but
also whether it had a particular effect on his conduct at the time of the
offense.350 Similarly in those jurisdictions that recognize “diminished
347. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
348. See James R. Patton & Denis W. Keyes, Death Penalty Issues Following Atkins, 14
EXCEPTIONALITY 237, 250 (2006) (“All professional definitions of mental retardation stress that
relative strengths can coexist with deficits in adaptive behavior, as indicated by the fact that deficits
do not have to be found in all adaptive skill areas. Nevertheless, certain strengths (e.g., reading at
the sixth grade level, driving a car, or having a girlfriend) are often [erroneously] used to discredit
the claim that a person has mental retardation.”); Everington & Olley, Defining and Diagnosing,
supra note 15, at 8 (“If a defendant has a job, drives a car, fixes engines, and/or is married, he/she is
improperly declared to have no deficits in adaptive skills.”); Cecil R. Reynolds & Daneen A.
Milam, Challenging Intellectual Test Results, in COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
TESTIMONY 311, 330 (David Faust ed., 6th ed. 2012) (“Therefore, a mentally retarded individual
cannot be disqualified from a diagnosis of mental retardation based upon scattered strengths or
skills.”); see Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1050 (“In concluding that Moore did not suffer significant
adaptive deficits, the CCA overemphasized Moore’s perceived adaptive strengths. The CCA recited
the strengths it perceived, among them, Moore lived on the streets, mowed lawns, and played pool
for money.”).
349. See, e.g., Ex parte Sosa, 364 S.W.3d 889, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
350. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (AMERICAN LAW INSTUTE 1985) (providing that
the inquiry is whether, “at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law.” (alteration in original)).
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capacity”351 or “extreme emotional disturbance”352 as relevant to
criminal responsibility, the connection between the mental state and the
act is central, as it is whenever the impediment to conviction is an
individual’s lack of the requisite mens rea.353 In each of these areas, the
facts surrounding the crime are directly relevant to the legal issue of the
defendant’s criminal responsibility.
Atkins cases are entirely different. The details of the crime have no
independent relevance to the diagnostic issue of whether a defendant has
intellectual disability. As Professor Bonnie has noted:
One particularly striking feature of Atkins is that it enunciated a
constitutional rule that turns explicitly and entirely on a clinical
diagnosis. Although clinical diagnoses often serve as a threshold
requirement in legal “tests” of incompetence, non-responsibility, and
disability, they are almost never sufficient to establish that the legal
criteria are satisfied.354

The clear holding of Atkins is that no individual with intellectual
disability can be executed.355 Therefore, there can be no constitutional
warrant to inquire about the specific impact of a defendant’s disability
on any aspect of the crime for which he has been charged.
Furthermore, the facts of the criminal offense offer no insight into
whether the individual’s measured intellectual functioning falls within
the range of intellectual disability, and no insight into whether the
disability manifested during the developmental period of his life. The
only conceivable relevance would be on the issue of adaptive behavior,
and as noted earlier, the existence of purported strengths or abilities is
not the proper focus of that inquiry.356
From a clinical perspective, the use of the facts of the criminal
offense is a thinly disguised form of stereotyping.357 Its purported logic
351. See, e.g., Hensel v. State, 604 P.2d 222, 232 (Alaska 1979) (“The inquiry in such cases is
whether the defendant’s mental capacity was so diminished that he was incapable of deliberating or
premeditating the killing, . . . or incapable of harboring malice aforethought . . . .”).
352. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1)(a) (McKinney 2006) (recognizing extreme
emotional disturbance as an affirmative defense to murder in the second degree).
353. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 26.02 at 364-69 (7th ed.
2015) (“Diminished Capacity: Mens Rea Defense”); PARRY, ABA REFERENCE MANUAL, supra
note 10, at 138-40.
354. Bonnie & Gustafson, Implementing Atkins, supra note 127, at 813; see also Richard J.
Bonnie, The American Psychiatric Association’s Resource Document on Mental Retardation and
Capital Sentencing: Implementing Atkins v. Virginia, 32 J. AM. ACADEMY PSYCHIATRY & LAW
304 (2004).
355. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
356. See supra Part VII.C.
357. See infra Part VII.E; see also Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Atkins v. Virginia:
Lessons from Substance and Procedure in the Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 57
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is essentially: “Defendant did [x], and since no one with intellectual
disability is capable of doing [x], defendant cannot be a person with
intellectual disability.”358 As indicated in the next Subpart, the problem
with that argument is that there is no list of things that “no person with
intellectual disability” is capable of doing.359 As a result, such an
assertion cannot be part of any clinically acceptable assessment.360
But just as the facts of the crime should not be used by prosecutors
to argue that a defendant lacked deficits in adaptive behavior, neither
should they be used by the defense as a substitute for evidence that the
individual has such deficits. It is sometimes suggested that the very fact
that the defendant engaged in criminal activity is sufficient evidence of

DEPAUL L. REV. 721, 727-28 (2008).
358. Despite the clear consensus among clinicians, the tendency to draw conclusions about an
individual’s diagnosis from the facts of the crime appears to be shared by many potential jurors. See
Marcus T. Boccaccini et al., Jury Pool Members’ Beliefs About the Relation Between Potential
Impairments in Functioning and Mental Retardation: Implications for Atkins-Type Cases, 34 LAW
& PSYCHOLOGY REV. 1, 19 (2010) [hereinafter Jury Pool Beliefs] (“These findings suggest that
jurors are more likely to determine that a defendant is a person with MR when there is a clear nexus
between his criminal behavior and MR, a finding that is consistent with the limited research [about
jurors] conducted in this area.”). See generally Margaret C. Reardon et al., Deciding Mental
Retardation and Mental Illness in Capital Cases: The Effects of Procedure, Evidence, and Attitudes,
13 PSYCHOLOGY CRIME & LAW 537 (2007) (discussing mock juror verdicts on whether a capital
defendant has intellectual disability).
359. See infra notes 380-85 and accompanying text.
360. Attempts to use the facts of the criminal offense with which the defendant is charged as
part of the assessment process, either by clinical testimony or by prosecutorial argument, raise the
suspicion that their true purpose is to shift attention away from the clinical issue and onto the
horrible facts of a particular crime. This can be true whether the determination about intellectual
disability is made by a different trier of fact than the criminal adjudication (as in pretrial procedures
or in post-conviction settings) or before the same judge or jury. When this arises as an evidentiary
question, since there is no clinical support for the assertion, its prejudicial effect clearly outweighs
any probative value. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence.”).
AAIDD has specifically disapproved of using facts of the crime in the diagnostic process.
AAIDD, USER’S GUIDE 2012, supra note 65, at 20 (“Do not use past criminal behavior or verbal
behavior to infer level of adaptive behavior. The diagnosis of intellectual disability is based on
meeting three criteria: significant limitations in intellectual functioning; significant limitations in
adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills; and age of onset
prior to age 18. The diagnosis of ID is not based on the person’s ‘street smarts’, behavior in jail or
prison, or ‘criminal adaptive functioning.’”).
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behavioral deficits.361 This represents a misunderstanding of the adaptive
behavior component of the definition.
It is widely recognized among clinicians that, as with criminal
behavior, “maladaptive behavior” is also not synonymous with “deficits
in adaptive behavior.”362 As AAIDD has concluded: “There is general
agreement that the presence of clinically significant levels of problem
behavior found on adaptive behavior scales does not meet the criterion
of significant limitations in adaptive functioning.”363 Therefore,
maladaptive behavior should not be taken as a substitute for evidence of
deficits in adaptive behavior.364
361. Macvaugh & Cunningham, Forensic Practice, supra note 83, at 168-69; id. at 169
(“Evaluators are discouraged from utilizing criminal behavior to ascertain the presence or absence
of deficits in adaptive functioning.”); George S. Baroff, Establishing Mental Retardation in Capital
Cases: A Potential Matter of Life and Death, 29 MENTAL RETARDATION 343, 347 (1991) (“I am
inclined to reject criminal behavior as grounds for an adaptive impairment associated with
retardation unless there are other noncriminal and intellectually-related difficulties (e.g., a poor
work history, poor money management skills, inability to maintain an independent adult
adjustment).” (emphasis omitted)); Olley & Cox, Assessment of Adult Behavior, supra note 116, at
386 (“If the crime required sophisticated thinking and behavior, the remainder of the defendant’s
life also should illustrate high levels of adaptive behavior in order to rule out mental retardation.”).
362. Maladaptive behavior, sometimes referred to as problem behavior, divides into two broad
categories: personal, such as self-injurious behavior, hyperactivity, and repetitive movements, and
social, such as aggression, resistiveness, fits of anger, destruction of property. See Keith F.
Widaman & Kevin S. McGrew, The Structure of Adaptive Behavior, in AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE IN MENTAL
RETARDATION, 97, 105 (John W. Jacobson & James A. Mulick eds., American Psychological
Association 1996).
363. AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 49. Indeed, the statistical correlation between maladaptive
behavior and deficits in adaptive behavior is generally low, particularly for individuals at the higher
end of the intellectual disability spectrum (which describes individuals who are likely to be
encountered in Atkins cases). Id.; see also Sharon A. Borthwick-Duffy, Adaptive Behavior, in
HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 279, 283 (John W. Jacobson,
James A. Mulick, & Johannes Rojahn eds. 2007) (discussing maladaptive behavior); Keith F.
Widaman & Kevin S. McGrew, The Structure of Adaptive Behavior, in AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE IN MENTAL
RETARDATION, 97, 100 (John W. Jacobson & James A. Mulick eds., American Psychological
Association 1996) (same); AAIDD, USER’S GUIDE 2012, supra note 65, at 18 (“Distinguish between
adaptive behavior and problem behavior(s). They are independent constructs and not opposite poles
of a continuum. Information regarding problem behavior does not inform the clinician regarding the
person’s adaptive behavior.”); Olley, Death Penalty and Courts, supra note 160, at 236; AAIDD,
USER’S GUIDE 2007, supra note 140, at 13 (“[P]roblem behavior that is ‘maladaptive’ is not a
characteristic or a dimension of adaptive behavior, even though it often influences the acquisition
and performance of adaptive behavior and thus may be important in the interpretation of adaptive
behavior scores . . . .”).
364. As one of the psychological experts on the AAIDD classification committee has written:
Some confusion once existed regarding problem behavior and adaptive behavior, largely
because of the misnomer “maladaptive behavior” that was once used to designate
problem behaviors such as self-injurious behavior, aggression, stereotypies, destruction
of property, etc. “Maladaptive behavior” is a separate and independent construct of
adaptive behavior. The presence or absence of “maladaptive behaviors” has little
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E. Stereotypes About People with Intellectual Disability365
An accurate and fair evaluation of an Atkins claim may be impeded
by persistent stereotyped views366 about what constitutes intellectual
disability.367 Such stereotypes contribute to negative attitudes
toward people with a variety of disabilities,368 but the history of
relationship to an individual’s adaptive functioning. . . . “Maladaptive behaviors” are not
part of the diagnostic criteria of mental retardation.
Tassé, Adaptive Behavior and Diagnosis, supra note 87, at 114-15 (citations omitted). In clinical
parlance, “stereotypies”not to be confused with “stereotypes” are repetitive movements or
utterances which are associated with some forms of disability. See James W. Bodfish et al.,
Compulsions in Adults with Mental Retardation: Prevalence, Phenomenology, and Comorbidity
with Stereotypy and Self-Injury, 100 AM. J. ON MENTAL RETARDATION 183, 183-84 (1995); James
W. Bodfish, Stereotypy, Self-Injury, and Related Abnormal Repetitive Behaviors, in HANDBOOK OF
INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 481 (John W. Jacobson, James A. Mulick, &
Johannes Rojahn eds., 2007).
Although “maladaptive behavior” is not a clinically appropriate focus for diagnosticians
under the second prong of the definition, it is widely recognized that many individuals with ID often
exhibit functional deficits related to a reduced ability to understand situations and to adopt an
appropriate response:
Many researchers have found that individuals with intellectual disability with higher IQs
are vulnerable to risks due to their sometimes inadequate response systems, interpersonal
competence, social judgment, or decision-making skills. These challenges are linked to
reduced intellectual and adaptive abilities that make it difficult to problem solve and to
be flexible in thinking; both limitations create susceptibility to dangers that is shared
among members of this group.
Snell, Characteristics, supra note 77, at 225 (citations omitted); see also id. at 227 (“[The principal
characteristic is] found not in the relative absence of especially routine skills but in the relative
inability, especially under conditions of ambiguity or stress, to figure out when and how to apply
those skills.” (citation omitted)).
365. The Supreme Court has recently noted the difficulties posed by stereotypes in the
adjudication of Atkins cases. See Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1052 (2017) (“[T]he medical
profession has endeavored to counter lay stereotypes of the intellectually disabled.”).
366. There is now a considerable body of literature on the psychological mechanisms of bias in
perceptions and decision-making. See generally, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton
Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945 (2006).
367. See PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, A BETTER PLACE: THE
CONTRIBUTION OF AMERICANS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION TO OUR NATION’S WORKFORCE: 1998
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 42 (1998) (“Discrimination continues to occur based on outdated
attitudes and stereotypes.”); Nicole Ditchman et al., Stigma and Intellectual Disability: Potential
Application of Mental Illness Research, 58 REHABILITATION PSYCHOLOGY 206, 207 (2013)
(“Although there has been notable progress and increased stigma change efforts over the past
decades, social stigma continues to result in prejudice and discrimination . . . .”).
368. Scholars have long recognized the persistence of negative attitudes toward people with
mental and physical disabilities. See generally, e.g., Hanoch Livneh, On the Origins of Negative
Attitudes Toward People with Disabilities, 43 REHABILITATION LITERATURE 338 (1982); Richard
LeMoine Wright & Julia Miele Rodas, Stereotypes, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN DISABILITY
HISTORY 865 (2009); PAUL K. LONGMORE, Screening Stereotypes: Images of Disabled People in
Television and Motion Pictures, in WHY I BURNED MY BOOK AND OTHER ESSAYS ON DISABILITY
131 (2003); CHARLES A. RILEY, II, DISABILITY AND THE MEDIA: PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CHANGE
(2005); OTTO F. WAHL, MEDIA MADNESS: PUBLIC IMAGES OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1995); FLOYD
MATSON, BLIND JUSTICE: JACOBUS TENBROEK AND THE VISION OF EQUALITY (2005) (blindness);
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such stereotypes regarding people with intellectual disability is
particularly dramatic.369
Throughout our history, stereotypes about “mental retardation”
have bedeviled the lives of individuals who have the disability.370 Such
stereotypes were central to the development and implementation of the
infamous eugenics policies in the first half of the twentieth century. 371
HARLAN LANE, THE MASK OF BENEVOLENCE: DISABLING THE DEAF COMMUNITY (1992).
These negative attitudes have produced, or at least exacerbated, a wide variety of
categories of discrimination against people with disabilities. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (2012) (“The Congress finds that . . . discrimination against
individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as employment, housing, public
accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health
services, voting, and access to public services . . . .”); RUTH COLKER, THE LAW OF DISABILITY
DISCRIMINATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 3-6 (1995); SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1-7 (2d ed. 2014) (discussing the development of disability rights law
in the United States).
369. Public attitudes toward people with intellectual disability have been the subject of
scholarly study for decades. See, e.g., Jay Gottlieb & Gary N. Siperstein, Attitudes Toward Mentally
Retarded Persons: Effects of Attitude Referent Specificity, 80 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 376
(1976). The stigmatization of individuals with intellectual disabilities and its impact on public
attitudes are phenomena found in other countries as well. See, e.g., Katrina Scior, Public Awareness,
Attitudes and Beliefs Regarding Intellectual Disability: A Systematic Review, 32 RESEARCH IN
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 2164, 2177 (2011); Shirli Werner et al., Stigma and Intellectual
Disability: A Review of Related Measures and Future Directions, 33 RESEARCH IN
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 748 (2012); D. Morin et al., Public Attitudes Towards Intellectual
Disability: A Multidimensional Perspective, 57 J. INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY RESEARCH 279
(2013).
370. See, e.g., Parnel Wickham, Idiocy and Early Modern Law: Intellectual Disability in Early
Modern Times (1500 CE to 1799 CE), in THE STORY OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: AN EVOLUTION
OF MEANING, UNDERSTANDING, AND PUBLIC PERCEPTION 63, 63-77 (Michael L. Wehmeyer ed.,
2013).
371. There is now a substantial and growing body of historical scholarship on the connection
between the fearful stereotyping of people with intellectual disability and the development of
eugenic sterilization policies. See, e.g., JAMES W. TRENT, JR., INVENTING THE FEEBLE MIND: A
HISTORY OF MENTAL RETARDATION IN THE UNITED STATES 131-224 (1994); LEILA ZENDERLAND,
MEASURING MINDS: HENRY HERBERT GODDARD AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE
TESTING 143-221 (1998); EDWIN BLACK, WAR AGAINST THE WEAK: EUGENICS AND AMERICA’S
CAMPAIGN TO CREATE A MASTER RACE (2003); PAUL A. LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO
IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE SUPREME COURT, AND BUCK V. BELL (2008); ADAM COHEN, IMBECILES:
THE SUPREME COURT, AMERICAN EUGENICS, AND THE STERILIZATION OF CARRIE BUCK (2016); J.
DAVID SMITH & MICHAEL L. WEHMEYER, GOOD BLOOD, BAD BLOOD: SCIENCE, NATURE, AND THE
MYTH OF THE KALLIKAKS (2012); HARRY BRUINIUS, BETTER FOR ALL THE WORLD: THE SECRET
HISTORY OF FORCED STERILIZATION AND AMERICA’S QUEST FOR RACIAL PURITY (2006); NICOLE
HAHN RAFTER, CREATING BORN CRIMINALS (1997); MENTAL RETARDATION IN AMERICA: A
HISTORICAL READER (Steven Noll & James W. Trent, Jr. eds., 2004); A CENTURY OF EUGENICS IN
AMERICA: FROM THE INDIANA EXPERIMENT TO THE HUMAN GENOME ERA (Paul A. Lombardo ed.,
2011); J. David Smith, Steven Noll & Michael L. Wehmeyer, Isolation, Enlargement, and
Economization: Intellectual Disability in Late Modern Times (1930 CE to 1950 CE), in THE STORY OF
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: AN EVOLUTION OF MEANING, UNDERSTANDING, AND PUBLIC
PERCEPTION 157, 157-85 (Michael L. Wehmeyer ed., 2013). See generally VICTORIA F. NOURSE, IN
RECKLESS HANDS: SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA AND THE NEAR TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN EUGENICS
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Those policies were the outgrowth of a widespread belief that people
with mental retardation were a (if not the) major source of social
problems in this country.372 Support for such policies extended into
many professions373 and to all areas of the country,374 and produced
(2008); THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF EUGENICS (Alison Bashford & Philippa
Levine eds., 2010). But, lest the reader conclude that historical mistreatment of persons with
intellectual disability invariably met with unanimous approval, see J. David Smith & Edward A.
Polloway, Before Itard: Intellectual Disability and the Enlightened Voice of Daniel Defoe, 52
INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 470 (2014).
372. See, e.g., ERNEST BRYANT HOAG & EDWARD HUNTINGTON WILLIAMS, CRIME,
ABNORMAL MINDS AND THE LAW 62 (1923) (“As long as the feeble-minded are freely permitted to
pass their taint along, they will be with us always. Poor seed yields poor fruitage; and this is just as
true of the human plant as it is of the vegetable kingdom. The sterilization of the socially unfit is
therefore not only morally permissible but socially obligatory.”). Many of the alarmists were, in
fact, leaders in the field of mental retardation at the time. For example, Lewis M. Terman, one of the
early developers of IQ testing, believed that individuals with mental retardation should be identified
for lifelong segregation:
The feeble-minded . . . are by definition a burden rather than an asset, not only
economically but still more because of their tendencies to become delinquent or
criminal. To provide them with costly instruction for a few years, and then turn them
loose upon society as soon as they are ripe for reproduction and crime, can hardly be
accepted as an ultimate solution of the problem. The only effective way to deal with the
hopelessly feeble-minded is by permanent custodial care.
LEWIS M. TERMAN, THE INTELLIGENCE OF SCHOOL CHILDREN 132-33 (1919).
Another leader, Walter Fernald (who served as President of the organization that is now
AAIDD), raised a similar alarm:
The past few years have witnessed a striking awakening of professional and popular
consciousness of the widespread prevalence of feeble-mindedness and its influence as a
source of wretchedness to the patient himself and to his family, and as a causative factor
in the production of crime, prostitution, pauperism, illegitimacy, intemperance and other
complex social diseases. . . . The feeble-minded are a parasitic, predatory class, never
capable of self-support or of managing their own affairs. The great majority ultimately
become public charges in some form. They cause unutterable sorrow at home and are a
menace and danger to the community.
W. E. Fernald, The Burden of Feeblemindedness, 17 J. PSYCHO-ASTHENICS 87, 87-90 (1912); see
also STANLEY POWELL DAVIES, SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE MENTALLY DEFICIENT 121-31 (1930)
(discussing the policy of lifelong segregation).
373. See, e.g., CHRISTINE ROSEN, PREACHING EUGENICS: RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND THE
AMERICAN EUGENICS MOVEMENT (2004); W.E.D. STOKES, THE RIGHT TO BE WELL BORN:
HORSE BREEDING IN ITS RELATION TO EUGENICS (1917) (the author was listed as President of the
Patchen Wilkes Stock Farm in Lexington, Kentucky); DAVID STARR JORDAN, THE HEREDITY OF
RICHARD ROE: A DISCUSSION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EUGENICS (1911) (the author was President
of Stanford University); see also Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (“It is better for all the
world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. . . . Three
generations of imbeciles are enough.”). A discussion of the history of the Supreme Court’s attitudes
and rhetoric about people with intellectual disability may be found at James W. Ellis, Disability
Advocacy and Atkins, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 653 (2008).
374. See, e.g., STEVEN NOLL, FEEBLE-MINDED IN OUR MIDST: INSTITUTIONS FOR THE
MENTALLY RETARDED IN THE SOUTH, 1900-1940 (1995); NANCY L. GALLAGHER, BREEDING
BETTER VERMONTERS: THE EUGENICS PROJECT IN THE GREEN MOUNTAIN STATE (1999); Molly
Ladd-Taylor, The “Sociological Advantages” of Sterilization: Fiscal Policies and Feeble-Minded
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some of the most egregious legislation in our history.375
Unfortunately, the abandonment of the harshest stereotype
people with mental retardation as a social threatwas followed by the
embrace by many of an image of people with intellectual disabilities as
“eternal children.” This stereotype, which insistently denied the
adulthood of adults with intellectual disability, was quite prevalent in the
middle of the twentieth century, and found its way into popular culture
through a number of avenues.376 Much like the social menace stereotype
that preceded it, this distorted image of individuals with
intellectual disabilities has been thoroughly rejected in the field of
intellectual disability.377
Women in Interwar Minnesota, in MENTAL RETARDATION IN AMERICA: A HISTORICAL READER
281, 282 (Steven Noll & James W. Trent, Jr. eds., 2004) (“Prior to 1946, more ‘feeble-minded’
persons were sterilized in Minnesota and Michigan than in all the southern states combined.”). By
far the largest numbers of eugenic sterilizations were performed in California. See RICHARD W.
FOX, SO FAR DISORDERED IN MIND: INSANITY IN CALIFORNIA, 1870-1930, at 27-36 (1978); PAUL
POPENOE & ROSWELL HILL JOHNSON, APPLIED EUGENICS 192 (1918) (“California applied her law
to all inmates (not voluntary) of state hospitals for the insane and the state home for the feebleminded, and all recidivists in the state prisons. The motive is partly eugenic, partly therapeutic,
partly punitive. . . . For several years California had the distinction of being the only state where
sterilization was actually being performed in accordance with the law.”). This history of the
treatment of people with intellectual disabilities has been characterized by five Justices of the
Supreme Court of the United States as “grotesque.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 454 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 461 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
375. See, e.g., 1929 Mich. Pub. Acts 689, 689-90, Act of May 22, 1929, No. 281, § 1 (“It is
hereby declared to be the policy of the state to prevent the procreation and increase in number of
feeble-minded, insane and epileptic persons, idiots, imbeciles, moral degenerates, and sexual
perverts, likely to become a menace to society or wards of the state. The provisions of this act are to
be liberally construed to accomplish this purpose.”); 1920 Miss. Laws 288, 294, Act of April 3,
1920, No. 126, § 17 (“That the chancery courts have jurisdiction in all cases of legal inquiry in
regard to feeblemindedness, including idiocy, imbecility, and the higher grades and varieties of
mental inferiority which render the subjects unfit for citizenship.” (emphasis added)); see also
DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF HUMAN HEREDITY
99-100 (1985) (noting the influence of the eugenics movement on both sterilization statutes and
laws prohibiting interracial marriage); ARTHUR H. ESTABROOK & IVAN E. MCDOUGLE, MONGREL
VIRGINIANS: THE WIN TRIBE (1926).
376. For example, there were particularly popular family memoirs by novelist Pearl Buck and
by western actress Dale Evans. See PEARL S. BUCK, THE CHILD WHO NEVER GREW (1950); DALE
EVANS ROGERS, ANGEL UNAWARE (1953); see also Michael L. Wehmeyer & Robert L. Schalock,
The Parent Movement: Late Modern Times (1950 CE to 1980 CE), in THE STORY OF INTELLECTUAL
DISABILITY: AN EVOLUTION OF MEANING, UNDERSTANDING, AND PUBLIC PERCEPTION 187, 188-92
(Michael L. Wehmeyer ed., 2013); Katherine Castles, “Nice, Average Americans”: Postwar
Parents’ Groups and the Defense of the Normal Family, in MENTAL RETARDATION IN AMERICA: A
HISTORICAL READER 351, 359-60 (Steven Noll & James W. Trent eds., 2004) (“[In the 1950s,]
parents’ groups encouraged the old idea that individuals with mental retardation were eternal
children, possessing childlike qualities of innocence, simplicity, and emotional dependence
regardless of their chronological age.”); Janice Brockley, Rearing the Child Who Never Grew, in
MENTAL RETARDATION IN AMERICA: A HISTORICAL READER, supra, at 130-64.
377. See, e.g., WOLF WOLFENSBERGER, THE PRINCIPLE OF NORMALIZATION IN HUMAN
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The central fallacy of all these stereotypes begins with their
assumption that all individuals with intellectual disability are essentially
identical. As noted earlier, this is clearly untrue.378 But the impulse to
measure actual individuals against our own, conjured vision of what
people with intellectual disability are like remains remarkably strong.379
These images are often accompanied by an invented “list” of things that
people with intellectual disability cannot do. But there is no such list in
the scholarly literature on intellectual disability, nor is there such a list in
the experience of clinicians who deal with individuals with intellectual
disability every day.380 Stereotyped expectations and preconceptions
SERVICES 23-24 (1972) (“Generally those who hold the eternal child role perception do not place
strong or even reasonable developmental and adaptational demands upon the person so perceived.”);
Brian J. Linn & Lesly A. Bowers, The Historical Fallacies Behind Legal Prohibitions of Marriages
Involving Mentally Retarded Persons—The Eternal Child Grows Up, 13 GONZAGA L. REV. 625,
654-55 (1978). An integral feature of the image of the perpetual child was an attribution of
categorical moral innocence. WOLF WOLFENSBERGER, THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF OUR
INSTITUTIONAL MODELS 14-15 (1975) (“Retarded persons, and possibly those with other handicaps
as well, have occasionally been perceived as the special children of God. As such, they are usually
seen as incapable of committing evil voluntarily . . . .”); see also HEATHER E. KEITH & KENNETH
D. KEITH, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: ETHICS, DEHUMANIZATION, AND A NEW MORAL
COMMUNITY 12-18 (2013). The “eternal child” or “holy innocent” stereotypical view of people with
intellectual disability may be particularly prejudicial in capital cases, since a juror who harbors such
an image, even unconsciously, will often find it dramatically inconsistent with the alleged or
observed behavior of the defendant, and may conclude that this dissonance disproves the clinical
evidence that the individual does, in fact, meet the diagnostic criteria of intellectual disability.
378. See supra note 318 and accompanying text; Everington & Olley, Defining and
Diagnosing, supra note 15, at 8 (“The argument is often made that if a person has certain practical
skill strengths, the person cannot have mental retardation, when, in fact, all of the major
professional definitions of mental retardation allow for intraindividual difference in adaptive
behavior.”); see also Tiffany J. McCaughey & Douglas C. Strohmer, Prototypes as an Indirect
Measure of Attitudes Toward Disability Groups, 48 REHABILITATION COUNSELING BULLETIN 89,
90 (2005) (“[E]xtensive research has demonstrated that attitudes [towards the mentally disabled]
can include beliefs that all individuals with disabilities are dependent, isolated, and emotionally
unstable.”).
379. Reschly, Documenting Origins, supra note 83, at 133 (“Multiple examples of apparently
adequate social role performance do not necessarily rule out the MMR [mild mental retardation]
diagnosis. For example, the fact that the person can drive, has a driver’s license, holds an entry-level
unskilled job, and lives in the community with the occasional help of a benefactor is not inconsistent
with MMR.”). There is evidence in the clinical literature that, at least for jurors, driving and
personal relationships may be central to the stereotyped view of people with intellectual disability.
Jury Pool Beliefs, supra note 358, at 18 (“The failure of jury pool members to recognize severe
deficits in functioning as indicators of MR was especially pronounced for the ability to form and
maintain a romantic/sexual relationship and the ability to operate a motor vehicle.”). There are
similar indications of preconceived views of jurors regarding independent living and school
performance. Id. at 15, 16; see Janis Chadsey, Adult Social Relationships, in ODOM, HANDBOOK OF
DD, supra note 92, at 449-68.
380. The clinical literature helpfully describes the daily functioning of individuals with
intellectual disability in their communities. See, e.g., Snell, Characteristics, supra note 77, at 22227; Gary N. Siperstein & Melissa A. Collins, Intellectual Disability, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 21, 26-27 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015); Roger J. Stancliffe & K.
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about people with intellectual disability often involve the subjects of
managing daily life,381 employment,382 and personal relationships.383
Charlie Lakin, Independent Living, in ODOM, HANDBOOK OF DD, supra note 92, at 429, 430
(“Seminal studies have documented the ability of many people with ID to live reasonably
successfully in the community with relatively modest formal support . . . .” (citations omitted)).
These empirically based observations stand in sharp contrast to many of the stereotypes often held
by laypeople. See, e.g., Siperstein & Collins, supra, at 27 (“[R]esearch has demonstrated their
ability to master independent living skills, such as using ATMs, cooking, and making financial
decisions. Many can use computers, the Internet, and other technologies, and navigate urban
settings, or ride public transportation.” (citations omitted)).
381. See Michael L. Wehmeyer & Susan B. Palmer, Adult Outcomes for Students with
Cognitive Disabilities Three-Years After High School: The Impact of Self-Determination, 38 EDUC.
& TRAINING IN DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 131, 139 (2003) (maintaining a bank account and
paying for the person’s own groceries); David Mank, Employment, in ODOM, HANDBOOK OF DD,
supra note 92, at 390, 392 (noting that research as early as the 1960s “focused on the skills of daily
living: doing laundry, cooking, handling money, and so forth”). Some laypeople also believe that
individuals with intellectual disability are incapable of driving or obtaining a driver’s license, but
that stereotyped generalization is also inaccurate. See Reschly, Documenting Origins, supra note 83,
at 133 (“Most are capable of driving competently and many can pass the written driver’s license
examination.”); Stephen A. Richardson et al., Patterns of Leisure Activities of Young Adults with
Mild Mental Retardation, 97 AM. J. ON MENTAL RETARDATION 431 (1993); GEORGE S. BAROFF,
MENTAL RETARDATION: NATURE, CAUSE, AND MANAGEMENT 43 (3d ed. 1999) (“Persons with
mild mental retardation function in all adult roles—they are members of families, have friends,
work, marry, and have children.”). But the stereotypes persist. See Olley, Death Penalty and Courts,
supra note 160, at 236 (“[E]vidence of isolated examples of adaptive functioning does not disprove
ID. Although the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities
manual . . . clearly stated that people with mild ID are likely to have areas of adequate functioning,
courts have mistakenly accepted examples of competent functioning to show that the defendant does
not have an ID. Examples include knowing what days of the week the defendant could have visitors,
having long-term gainful employment, being able to drive, passing the driver’s test, and even being
able to steal a television.” (citation omitted)).
382. Professionals in the field have long recognized that individuals with intellectual disability
often can and do perform many of the tasks in the workplace that may seem, to some, inconsistent
with preconceived stereotypes about them. See, e.g., ROY DEVERL WILLEY & KATHLEEN
BARNETTE WAITE, THE MENTALLY RETARDED CHILD: IDENTIFICATION, ACCEPTANCE, AND
CURRICULUM 229-31 (1964) (showing a chart of “the kinds of work in which the mentally retarded
have succeeded”); DARYL PAUL EVANS, THE LIVES OF MENTALLY RETARDED PEOPLE 215 (1983)
(discussing job categories); David Mank, Employment, in ODOM, HANDBOOK OF DD, supra note 92,
at 390, 391 (“[I]t is becoming increasingly clear that people with developmental disabilities have the
ability to be gainfully employed.”); id. at 395-96 (People with intellectual disabilities can be
“productive on work tasks,” and “work productively in integrated job settings.” They can also “be
supported in community job settings with a combination of paid supports and natural supports,”
they can “earn significant money and be fully integrated into the culture of the workplace,” and may
even “own or run income-producing businesses.”).
Nonetheless, it is commonly assumed by many laymen, and even potential employers, that
people with intellectual disability cannot hold jobs, at least outside of settings like sheltered
workshops. See Joanne Kersh, Attitudes About People with Intellectual Disabilities: Current Status
and New Directions, in 41 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH ON DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES 199, 214 (Robert M. Hodapp ed., 2011) (“Negative stereotypes about workers with
disabilities tend to elicit fear in potential employers.”).
Although unemployment is a serious problem for many (see Neeta P. Fogg, Paul E.
Harrington & Brian T. McMahon, The Impact of the Great Recession Upon the Unemployment of
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Americans with Disabilities, 33 J. VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION 193 (2010)), many others with
intellectual disability hold “trade jobs like plumbing and carpentry. Other commonly held jobs
include maintenance, food service, and retail positions.” Snell, Characteristics, supra note 77, at
223; see Gary N. Siperstein, Robin C. Parker & Max Drascher, National Snapshot of Adults with
Intellectual Disabilities in the Labor Force, 39 J. VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION 157, 161 (2013)
(the most frequent employment categories included customer service, retail, restaurant work, office
work, and manufacturing); id. (“Of the adults with ID employed in a competitive setting, over half
(62%) have been at their current job for 3 years or more.”); Robert R. Moran, Suzanne McDermott
& Stanley Butkus, Getting a Job, Sustaining a Job, and Losing a Job for Individuals with Mental
Retardation, 16 J. VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION 237, 241 (2001) (discussing job retention rates
for categories such as food preparation, janitorial/laundry/cleaning, cashier, and lawn care.); id.
(“[T]here was no difference in IQ scores in any of the job categories between those who lost jobs
and those who sustained them.”); Michael Brickey & Ken Campbell, Fast Food Employment for
Moderately and Mildly Mentally Retarded Adults: The McDonald’s Project, 19 MENTAL
RETARDATION 113, 113-116 (1981) (reporting lower attrition rate than for nondisabled employees);
Reschly, Documenting Origins, supra note 83, at 133 (“Many can secure employment and
economic self-support, typically in low-level jobs that do not require complex reasoning and
decision making.”); Rosemary Lysaght, Hélène Ouellette-Kuntz & Cheng-Jung Lin, Untapped
Potential: Perspectives on the Employment of People with Intellectual Disability, 41 WORK 409,
413 (2012) (“[M]any of these individuals [have the ability] to reliably perform a variety of routine
work tasks . . . that typically detract from the productivity of highly paid professionals . . . .”);
MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE IN MENTAL RETARDATION 18 (John W.
Jacobson & James A. Mulick eds., American Psychological Association 1996) (“This designation
implies variation in academic skills, and for a large proportion of these adults, persistent low
academic skill attainment limits their vocational opportunities. However, these people are generally
able to fulfill all expected adult roles.”); Kiyoshi Yamaki & Glenn T. Fujiura, Employment and
Income Status of Adults with Developmental Disabilities Living in the Community, 40 MENTAL
RETARDATION 132, 138 (2002) (“[W]e found a more diversified employment profile.”);
PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, A BETTER PLACE: THE CONTRIBUTION OF
AMERICANS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION TO OUR NATION’S WORKFORCE: 1998 REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT 6 (1998) (“Today, however, hundreds of thousands of individuals with mental
retardation are able to earn significant wages in integrated community settings.”); see also Deborah
Olson et al., Employers’ Perceptions of Employees with Mental Retardation, 16 J. VOCATIONAL
REHABILITATION 125 (2001).
383. It is often assumed that marriage or romantic social relationships are inconsistent with a
diagnosis of intellectual disability. Yet this stereotype is also often inaccurate. See, e.g., ROBERT
MEYERS, LIKE NORMAL PEOPLE (1978) (written by a Washington Post reporter, describing the
marriage of the author’s brother); MARTHA A. FIELD & VALERIE A. SANCHEZ, EQUAL TREATMENT
FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL RETARDATION: HAVING AND RAISING CHILDREN (1999); ALLISON C.
CAREY, ON THE MARGINS OF CITIZENSHIP: INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 172 (2009) (“Studies found that people with mental
retardation . . . placed a high value on relationships and marriage.”); Karen L. Salekin, J. Gregory
Olley & Krystal A. Hedge, Offenders with Intellectual Disability: Characteristics, Prevalence, and
Issues in Forensic Assessment, 3 J. MENTAL HEALTH RESEARCH IN INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES
97, 100 (2010) (“Once out of school, individuals with IQs at the high end of the mild ID range often
blend into the general population; they have friends, marry, have children, and only need assistance
during periods of personal or economic stress.”); see also MARGARET EDDS, AN EXPENDABLE
MAN: THE NEAR-EXECUTION OF EARL WASHINGTON JR. 208-12 (2003).
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One issue of stereotyping may arise when evaluators use outside
informants in assessing deficits in a defendant’s adaptive behavior.384
The interviewer must avoid relying on the informant’s informal (and
perhaps unarticulated) estimation of whether the individual had
intellectual disability.385 Reliance on a lay individual’s conclusory
impression has the potential of merely reflecting the informant’s
assumptions about people with “mental retardation.”386 If that
informant’s stereotype of mental retardation envisions people with the
more severe levels of impairment, or if that person thinks of another
individual of his or her acquaintance who has Down Syndrome 387 or
some other particular, identifiable mental disability, there is a risk of a

384. The problem of informant stereotypes can be compounded, of course, if the clinician
allows his or her own stereotypes to enter into his or her own professional evaluation. See CLINICAL
JUDGMENT 2014, supra note 253, at 38 (“Clinicians are not necessarily free of the historical
stereotypes that have accompanied individuals with ID. Indeed, most individuals or groups who are
perceived as different on some basis are stereotyped based on the perceiver’s mental model or
image of such persons or groups.”).
385. Olley, Death Penalty and Courts, supra note 160, at 237 (“Although the best source of
information is not always clear, sometimes the worst source is. It is inappropriate and clearly invalid
to ask a family member, friend, or other lay witness, ‘Do you think he has mental retardation?’”);
see Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1052 (2017) (criticizing overreliance on defendant’s “father’s
reactions to his academic challenges, and his sister’s perceptions of Moore’s intellectual abilities”).
386. See Tassé, Adaptive Behavior and Diagnosis, supra note 87, at 121 (“Most individuals
with mental retardation will have strengths and areas of ability. These strengths may confound a
layperson or a professional with limited clinical experience with individuals who have mild mental
retardation. These laypersons may erroneously interpret these pockets of strengths and skills as
inconsistent with mental retardation because of their misconceptions regarding what someone with
mental retardation can or cannot do.” (citation omitted)).
387. AAIDD, USER’S GUIDE 2012, supra note 65, at 25-26 (“Physical appearance can also
contribute to stereotypes as reflected in the statement that ‘if you don’t have the look (as in Down
syndrome) then you are not intellectually disabled.’ It should be noted that the vast majority of
persons with an ID have no dysmorphic feature and generally walk and talk like persons without an
ID.”); Snell, Characteristics, supra note 77, at 220 (“Most of these individuals [in the range of mild
mental retardation] are physically indistinguishable from the general population because no specific
physical features are associated with intellectual disability at higher IQs.”); Reschly, Documenting
Origins, supra note 83, at 125 (“Persons with MMR do not exhibit the physical characteristics of
many persons with MR at more severe levels, and they are not comprehensively impaired in the
sense of requiring assistance with nearly all social roles and functions.”); Karen L. Salekin, J.
Gregory Olley & Krystal A. Hedge, Offenders with Intellectual Disability: Characteristics,
Prevalence, and Issues in Forensic Assessment, 3 J. MENTAL HEALTH RESEARCH IN INTELLECTUAL
DISABILITIES 97, 110 (2010) (“In fact, we cannot ‘see’ the offender with ID any more obviously
than we can ‘see’ the offender without ID. There are no labels on their backs, and there are often no
obvious signs that they are impaired enough to warrant attention. That said, underneath what appear
to be typical offenders lie true differences in cognitive abilities that can dramatically affect their
ability to function within the criminal justice system. By contrast, see Curtis K. Deutsch, Down
Syndrome, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLIGENCE, supra note 112, at 357; Nancy F. Roizen, Down
Syndrome (Trisomy 21), in CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES, 307-18 (Mark L. Batshaw, Nancy Roizen
& Gaetano R. Lotrecchiano eds., 7th ed. 2013) (discussing the obvious facial characteristics of
people with Down Syndrome, who are usually moderately to severely impaired).
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misleading assessment.388 Interviewers should focus on specific,
concrete observations of what limitations there were in the defendant’s
functioning. Otherwise, there is a substantial risk that the assessment is
built on a stereotype about intellectual disability of which the evaluator
(and the court) may be unaware.389
Even more serious concerns arise if the court itself imposes its own
stereotypes about the abilities and behaviors that characterize people
with intellectual disability. Indulging in such stereotypes is not only
unsupported by the clinical literature, it is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court’s holdings in Atkins, Hall, and Moore.
One way in which stereotyping may infect the Atkins adjudication
process occurs when a state’s procedures provide for a jury
determination of whether the defendant has intellectual disability. Most
states provide for bench determinations of Atkins claims,390 and,
rejecting arguments from defense counsel in a number of states, courts
have been nearly unanimous in finding that there is no constitutional
requirement that the determination be made by juries.391 But where juries
are entrusted with the decision, there is a substantial risk that jurors
will—consciously or unconsciously—base their decision on their own
stereotyped views of intellectual disability392 and compare the defendant
to their predetermined image of what a person with “mental retardation”
would look like or what skills that person might possess or lack. 393
388. See Olley, Death Penalty and Courts, supra note 160, at 231 (“[T]he public generally
misunderstands mild ID and expects that such individuals are easy to identify by their physical
appearance, their speech, or other readily apparent characteristics.”).
389. See Joanne Kersh, Attitudes About People with Intellectual Disabilities: Current Status
and New Directions, in 41 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH IN DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES 199, 220 (Robert M. Hodapp ed., 2011) (“Additionally, a lack of familiarity with
people with ID may lead to a reliance on common misperceptions and stereotypes in order to make
judgments and decisions about individuals.”). Of course, the opposite may also prove to be true: if
an individual has only had contact with a person who has a more severe condition of intellectual
disability, there may be a tendency to draw conclusions about the defendant based on the fact that
his disability appears to be substantially less severe.
390. See Legislative Guide, supra note 3, at 15.
391. See, e.g., State v. Flores, 93 P.3d 1264, 1267-68 (N.M. 2004); Arbelaez v. State, 898 So.
2d 25, 43 (Fla. 2005); State v. Grell, 135 P.3d 696, 706 (Ariz. 2006) (en banc).
392. Explanations by expert witnesses of the clinical definition of intellectual disability may
encounter resistance among jurors. See Jury Pool Beliefs, supra note 358, at 4 (“However, these
criteria may not resonate with fact finders. Fact finders may not understand why certain behaviors,
such as social skills, are important for official diagnosis while others, such as behavior during a
crime, are not even considered.” (footnote omitted)).
393. See supra note 396; Jury Pool Beliefs, supra note 358, at 4; Joanne Kersh, Attitudes About
People with Intellectual Disabilities: Current Status and New Directions, in 41 INTERNATIONAL
REVIEW OF RESEARCH IN DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 199, 219 (Robert M. Hodapp ed., 2011)
(“In general, research suggests that people tend to underestimate the capabilities of persons with ID,
largely as a consequence of a lack of exposure and information.”).
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Courts can address this problem in two ways.394 First, they can use the
voir dire process to attempt to identify such stereotypes and prejudices395
before the trial or hearing begins.396 In jurisdictions where the standard
procedure of the courts is to limit the participation of counsel in
questioning individual potential jurors,397 there may be reason to relax
those rules or otherwise increase the likelihood that such prejudices can
be uncovered in a timely manner. Second, courts in such jurisdictions
have reason to be particularly vigilant that the parties not be allowed to
encourage such latent prejudices, either in the presentation of evidence
or in arguments to the jury. There is reason to be skeptical about whether
either of these approaches—or both—will be sufficient to completely
keep stereotypes about mental retardation out of the jurors’
deliberations, but every effort should certainly be made.398
It is at least equally disturbing when the courts themselves engage
in stereotyping about people with intellectual disability. This can occur,
of course, in individual adjudications involving particular defendants,
but it can also take the form of the systematic imposition of stereotyped
images of intellectual disability adopted by appellate courts. This can, of
course, have even greater impact because such stereotypes are then
imposed on all lower courts in that jurisdiction.

394. For a discussion of issues that arise when juries consider Atkins cases, see John H. Blume
et al., A Tale of Two (and Possibly Three) Atkins: Intellectual Disability and Capital Punishment
Twelve Years After the Supreme Court’s Creation of a Categorical Bar, 23 WM. & MARY BILL OF
RIGHTS J. 393, 409-12 (2014).
395. Stereotypes and prejudices can, of course, derive from popular culture, attitudes conveyed
within the family, and from a particular potential juror’s school experiences. A discussion of this
can be found in Gary N. Siperstein, Jennifer Norins & Amanda Mohler, Social Acceptance and
Attitude Change, in HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 133, 13354 (John W. Jacobson, James A. Mulick, & Johannes Rojahn eds., 2007).
396. See Andrea D. Lyon, But He Doesn’t Look Retarded: Capital Jury Selection for the
Mentally Retarded Client Not Excluded After Atkins v. Virginia, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 701, 713-17,
Appendix at 718-19 (2008) (including sample questionnaire).
397. See id. at 709-10.
398. Another potential source of stereotyping in Atkins cases may come from clinical witnesses
who insert their own scientifically-unsupported prejudices into their evaluations of a defendant. For
an example of such testimony and its legal consequences, see Caroline Everington, Challenges of
Conveying Intellectual Disabilities to Judge and Jury, 23 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 467,
476-78 (2014) (discussing testimony and publications by Dr. George Denkowski); Keith F.
Widaman & Gary N. Siperstein, Assessing Adaptive Behavior of Criminal Defendants in Capital
Cases: A Reconsideration, 27 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY, no. 2, 2009, at 5, 10-13 (same); John
H. Blume & Karen L. Salekin, Analysis of Atkins Cases, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 37, 48-49 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015) (describing sanctions
imposed against Dr. Denkowski by the Texas Board of Examiners in Psychology); Brandi Grissom,
Psychologist Who Cleared Death Row Inmates Is Reprimanded by Board, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15,
2011, at A19 (describing methods used by Dr. Denkowski in his evaluations of death row inmates
and instances where these methods were questioned by courts).
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The most notable example of such stereotyping occurred in the state
of Texas. In the case of Ex Parte Briseno,399 the state Court of Criminal
Appeals adopted a collection of such stereotypes.400 The Briseno case
was on appeal from a trial court’s rejection of a post-conviction petition
for Atkins relief on the ground that the defendant had mental
retardation.401 After expressing considerable skepticism about whether
the same definition should apply in Atkins cases that is used in other
contexts,402 the Court of Criminal Appeals announced that it was
adopting the AAMR definition of mental retardation, as it had done
previously in other cases (and as the Texas Legislature had done for
other purposes).403 The court then focused exclusively on the second
prong of the definition, observing (without any citation to the clinical
literature about adaptive behavior assessment or acknowledgement of
the existence of adaptive behavior scales404) that “[t]he adaptive
behavior criteria are exceedingly subjective, and undoubtedly experts
will be found to offer opinions on both sides of the issue in most
cases.”405 As if in response to this perceived subjectivity and anticipated
difference of opinion, the court then offered seven “other evidentiary
factors which factfinders in the criminal trial context might also focus
upon in weighing evidence as indicative of mental retardation or

399. 135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), abrogated by Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039
(2017).
400. See id. at 8-9. Although the Supreme Court has unanimously rejected the Texas courts’
use of the Briseno factors (Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1044, 1054 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)), presentation
of the underlying issues and the clinical literature addressing them may prove helpful to courts in
dealing with comparable issues involving adaptive functioning.
401. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 3.
402. Id. at 8 (“Some might question whether the same definition of mental retardation that is
used for providing psychological assistance, social services, and financial aid is appropriate for use
in criminal trials to decide whether execution of a particular person would be constitutionally
excessive punishment.”); see Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1052 (“Indeed, Texas itself does not follow
Briseno in contexts other than the death penalty.”).
403. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7-8 (citing what is now titled the Persons with an Intellectual
Disability Act, TEXAS HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 591.003 (7)(a), (13) (West 2015)).
404. For a discussion of such adaptive behavior scales, see supra Part VII.A.
405. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8.
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of a personality disorder . . . .”406 There are numerous serious problems
with these “evidentiary factors.”407
One of the primary problems that the Supreme Court identified with
the enterprise is that it was clearly designed to carve out a subset of
individuals with intellectual disability to receive Atkins protection,
leaving the remainder—who also met the clinical definition described in
the Supreme Court’s opinion408—outside the mandated Eighth
Amendment protection.409 The Texas court attempted to justify its
rationing enterprise by declaring that “[w]e, however, must define that
level and degree of mental retardation at which a consensus of Texas
citizens would agree that a person should be exempted from the death
penalty.”410 The Supreme Court disagreed, stating: “Mild levels of
406. Id. at 8. The factors that were invented by the Texas court are:
 Did those who knew the person best during the developmental stage—his family,
friends, teachers, employers, authorities—think he was mentally retarded at that
time, and, if so, act in accordance with that determination?
 Has the person formulated plans and carried them through or is his conduct
impulsive?
 Does his conduct show leadership or does it show that he is led around by others?
 Is his conduct in response to external stimuli rational and appropriate, regardless of
whether it is socially acceptable?
 Does he respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral or written questions or
do his responses wander from subject to subject?
 Can the person hide facts or lie effectively in his own or others’ interests?
 Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the capital offense, did
the commission of that offense require forethought, planning, and complex
execution of purpose?
Id. at 8-9.
407. The Briseno evidentiary factors have been severely criticized. See, e.g., Macvaugh &
Cunningham, Forensic Practice, supra note 83, at 136 (“The seven criteria of the Briseno opinion
operationalize an Atkins interpretation that only exempts a subcategory of persons with mental
retardation from execution.”); Caroline Everington, Challenges of Conveying Intellectual
Disabilities to Judge and Jury, 23 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 467, 481 (2014) (“Using these
seven factors as part of a diagnosis has the potential (if strictly interpreted) to exclude anyone
functioning in the mild ID range from the protection of Atkins.”); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M.
Steiker, Atkins v. Virginia: Lessons from Substance and Procedure in the Constitutional Regulation
of Capital Punishment, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 721, 727-28 (2008); John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn
Johnson & Christopher Seeds, Of Atkins and Men: Deviations from Clinical Definitions of Mental
Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLICY 689, 710-14 (2009); Peggy
M. Tobolowsky, A Different Path Taken: Texas Capital Offenders’ Post-Atkins Claims of Mental
Retardation, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 149-66 (2011).The Supreme Court has taken note of the
clinical criticism of Briseno. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1052 n.10 (“Given the Briseno factors’ flaws,
it is unsurprising that scholars and experts have long criticized the factors.”).
408. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S 304, 308 n.3 (2002) (setting forth the AAMR and DSMIV-TR definitions of mental retardation).
409. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051 (“By design and in operation, the Briseno factors creat[e] an
unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be executed.” (alteration in original)
(internal quotation omitted)).
410. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 6 (emphasis added). Without explaining why the scope of the
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intellectual disability, although they may fall outside Texas citizens’
consensus, nevertheless remain intellectual disabilities, and States
may not execute anyone in the entire category of [intellectually
disabled] offenders.”411
Over and above the Texas court’s apparent ambivalence about
implementing the constitutional holding of Atkins, the purported remedy
it ordered is based on blatant stereotypes about people with intellectual
disability, and is contrary to the accepted definition and the
understanding of clinicians about the nature of the disability. Its seven
“evidentiary factors” appear to be drawn from a preconceived image of
what people with mental retardation must be like.412 Some elements of
those factors are at least tangentially related to characteristics seen in
many—but not all—individuals with intellectual disabilities.413 Others
seem more clearly focused on mental illness than on intellectual
disability.414 One factor actually relies on the stereotypes about mental
retardation that were held by others.415 The final Briseno factor mandates
inquiry into the facts of the crime with which the defendant has been
charged, in the hope that they will reveal whether the individual has
intellectual disability.416
The most serious concern with the Briseno evidentiary factors is
that they are at odds with the clinical literature concerning the diagnosis
Eighth Amendment’s substantive provisions should vary from state to state, the court concludes that
the best guidance for its state courts would be found in a literary description of a single fictional
character with mental retardation: “Most Texas citizens might agree that Steinbeck’s Lennie should,
by virtue of his lack of reasoning ability and adaptive skills, be exempt.” Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 6
(citing JOHN STEINBECK, OF MICE AND MEN (1937)). Remarkably, the state court then went on to
speculate about whether “[there is] a national or Texas consensus that all of those persons whom the
mental health profession might diagnose as meeting the criteria for mental retardation are
automatically less morally culpable than those who just barely miss meeting those criteria[.]” Id.
411. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).
412. See Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8-9. This despite the fact that the court acknowledged
elsewhere that, “[t]he term ‘mental retardation’ encompasses a large and diverse population
suffering from some form of mental disability.” Id. at 5.
413. For example, impulsivity is often observed in individuals with intellectual disability. See
Ellis & Luckasson, Defendants, supra note 10, at 429.
414. For example, whether the defendant’s conduct is “rational and appropriate,” and whether
he responds to questions “coherently [and] rationally.” Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8.
415. “Did those who knew the person best during the developmental stage—his family,
friends, teachers, employers, authorities—think he was mentally retarded at that time, and, if so, act
in accordance with that determination?” Id. The answer to that question, of course, depends on what
the image of a “person with mental retardation” meant to that individual. That family member’s (or
other person’s) stereotype about mental retardation is then given great weight years or decades later
in a capital case. See supra notes 390-98 and accompanying text.
416. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8-9. The Texas court’s cautionary preface to this factor: “[p]utting
aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the capital offense,” id., seems particularly
unlikely to be effective. For a discussion of the relevance of the facts of the crime, see supra
Part VII.D.

1412

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1305

of people with intellectual disability.417 This approach rejects the
understanding of deficits in adaptive behavior that is the product of
decades of experience and scholarly study,418 and replaces it with a
stereotype of “mental retardation” grounded only in the judge’s
imagination and prejudices.419 As a result, the Briseno court effectively
subdivided the class of individuals with intellectual disability into two
groups: (1) those who match the court’s preconceived expectation of
what people with intellectual disability must be like; and (2) those who
satisfy the clinical definition but who do not conform to the court’s
stereotypes.420 Because the Briseno factors completely abandoned
clinical science in favor of stereotypes, the Supreme Court unanimously
found them to be incompatible with the Eighth Amendment.421 The
Supreme Court has made clear that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
417. AAIDD has been particularly insistent on the subject of reliance on stereotypes of people
with mental retardation. See AAIDD, USER’S GUIDE 2012, supra note 65, at 26. Regardless of their
origin, a number of incorrect stereotypes can interfere with justice. These incorrect stereotypes must
be dispelled:
– Persons with ID look and talk differently from persons from the general population
– Persons with ID are completely incompetent and dangerous
– Persons with ID cannot do complex tasks
– Persons with ID cannot get driver’s licenses, buy cars, or drive cars
– Persons with ID do not (and cannot) support their families
– Persons with ID cannot romantically love or be romantically loved
– Persons with ID cannot acquire vocational and social skills necessary for independent
living
– Persons with ID are characterized only by limitations and do not have strengths that
occur concomitantly with the limitations
These incorrect stereotypes are unsupported by both professionals in the field and
published literature.
Id. at 26; see also Reschly, Documenting Origins, supra note 83, at 133 (“MMR [mild mental
retardation] diagnoses require deep knowledge of the phenomenon of MMR and the capabilities of
persons with MMR. For example, many persons with MMR attain basic literacy skills, typically
reading at about the fourth grade level, with some reading as high as the sixth grade level. Most are
capable of driving competently and many can pass the written driver’s license examination. Many
can secure employment and economic self-support, typically in low-level jobs that do not require
complex reasoning and decision making.”).
418. See supra Part VII.A–B.
419. See supra notes 366-83 and the accompanying text for a discussion of the common
stereotypes about people with intellectual disability. And, of course, it ignores a central feature of
intellectual disability: the fact that for almost all individuals, adaptive weaknesses co-exist with
strengths. See supra Part VII.C.
420. See Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7-8.
421. Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1053 (2017) (“By rejecting the habeas court’s
application of medical guidance and clinging to the standard it laid out in Briseno, including the
wholly non-clinical Briseno factors, the CCA failed adequately to inform itself of the medical
community’s diagnostic framework.” (internal quotation omitted)); id. at 1053 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (“I agree with the Court today that those factors are an unacceptable method of
enforcing the guarantee of Atkins, and that the CCA therefore erred in using them to analyze
adaptive deficits.”).
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execution of anyone who meets the clinical definition of intellectual
disability, and that the states lack the authority to protect only a portion
of that population.422
VIII.

PROCESS OF JUDICIAL EVALUATION

Judges facing the task of evaluating a defendant’s Atkins claim,
whether at the trial level or in reviewing the work of a lower court, may
encounter several more specific questions about the clinical evaluations
of the defendant.
A. Qualifications of Evaluators
A key element to any accurate assessment of an individual’s
possible intellectual disability is, of course, the skill and qualifications of
the evaluators whose work comes before the court. As a general matter,
courts will want to place primary reliance on those experts who have the
most relevant knowledge and training.423 While that is true for
assessments in cases involving mental illness,424 it is particularly
important in the evaluation of whether an individual has
intellectual disability.425
422. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1044, 1051; Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1999 (2014) (“If the
states were to have complete autonomy to define intellectual disability as they wished, the Court’s
decision in Atkins could become a nullity, and the Eighth Amendment’s protection of human dignity
would not become a reality.”).
However, it would appear that states do have some opportunity to select the wording of
the definition that, for example, is already employed elsewhere in state law, so long as it includes all
individuals who meet the clinical definition. See supra notes 95-96 for a discussion of the
definitions states used in their statutes. But if a state were to create a more restrictive definition than
the clinically accepted standard, it would run the risk of “creating a clinical diagnosis and a forensic
diagnosis of mental retardation.” Tassé, Adaptive Behavior and Diagnosis, supra note 87, at 122.
423. See FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 702 (“A witness who is qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or
otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on
sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d)
the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.”).
424. See, e.g., GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A
HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 580 (3d ed. 2007) (“The most
fundamental reason for clarifying referral issues is to make sure that the clinician has the clinical
and forensic skills necessary to undertake the referral.”); JOHN PARRY & ERIC Y. DROGIN,
CRIMINAL LAW HANDBOOK ON PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY
26-34 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2000); ABA MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 1988, supra note 8, std. 7-1.1
(Roles of Mental Health and Mental Retardation Professionals in the Criminal Process); see also
ABA MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 2016, supra note 8, std. 7-1.3.
425. Richard J. Bonnie, The American Psychiatric Association’s Resource Document on
Mental Retardation and Capital Sentencing: Implementing Atkins v. Virginia, 32 J. AM. ACADEMY
PSYCHIATRY & LAW 304, 307 (2004) (“The expert selected or appointed to conduct mental
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On the issue of intelligence testing, it is important to recognize
that the administration and evaluation of IQ testing is a
particularly specialized and demanding skill.426 As AAIDD, the
leading professional organization in the field of intellectual disabilities,
has concluded:

retardation evaluations in capital cases should be a psychiatrist or psychologist who is qualified by
training and experience to make a diagnosis of mental retardation. The testing of intellectual
functioning and adaptive behavior should be carried out by clinicians who have the necessary skill
and experience.”). The most recent edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s diagnostic
manual states: “A comprehensive evaluation includes an assessment of intellectual capacity and
adaptive functioning; identification of genetic and nongenetic etiologies; evaluation for associated
medical conditions (e.g., cerebral palsy, seizure disorder); and evaluation for co-occurring mental,
emotional, and behavioral disorders.” APA, DSM-5, supra note 65, at 39; see also Olley,
Qualifications, supra note 268, at 136 (“Experts in Atkins cases should be familiar with the
prevalent definitions of mental retardation . . . , the applicable ethical principles of their professions,
position statements made by professional organizations, and recommendations made by recognized
authorities in the field.” (citations omitted)); ABA MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 1988, supra note
8, std. 7-3.11 (Expert witnesses: Qualifications for Testifying About A Person’s Mental Condition.);
ABA MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 2016, supra note 8, std. 7-3.10(c).
In addition to expertise concerning the definition and the clinical literature, courts should
be mindful of the importance of an evaluator’s actual experience with individuals who have
intellectual disability. Olley, Qualifications, supra note 268, at 139 (“The expert in an Atkins
proceeding must have experience with individuals with mild mental retardation, knowledge of the
research on this population, and knowledge of the applicable laws and court procedures.”); id. at
135 (“Neuropsychologists bring an understanding cognitive processes and the use of tests to assess
various strengths and weaknesses. However, a background in neuropsychology does not assure
expertise or experience with people with mental retardation . . . .”); MARC J. TASSÉ & JOHN H.
BLUME, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY 144 (2018); Gilbert S Macvaugh III,
Mark D. Cunningham, & Marc J. Tassé, Professional Issues in Atkins Assessments, in THE DEATH
PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 325, 327-29 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015). See
generally, Snell, Characteristics, supra note 77.
426. See, e.g., ANASTASI & URBINA, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING, supra note 106, at 207 (“In
common with most individual intelligence tests, the Stanford-Binet requires a highly trained
examiner.”); Bonnie & Gustafson, Implementing Atkins, supra note 127, at 827 (“Once a
standardized measure generally accepted by the field has been selected, it must be administered in
conformity with accepted professional practice.”); Macvaugh & Cunningham, Forensic Practice,
supra note 83, at 159 (“The best instrument in the wrong (poorly trained) hands is no better than a
poorly designed instrument in the hands of the best professionals.” (quoting MARY BEIRNE-SMITH,
JAMES PATTON, & RICHARD ITTENBACH, MENTAL RETARDATION 133 (4th ed. 1994))).
A particular concern arises when an older or uncommon test is found in the defendant’s
records. See supra note 176. Courts should be alert to this potential problem, and make sure that
experts interpreting scores from an older or less widely-used instrument are qualified to do so. See
AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION &
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON MEASUREMENT IN EDUCATION, STANDARDS FOR EDUCATIONAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING std. 10.15 at 167 (2d ed. 2014) (“The interpretation of test or test battery
results for diagnostic purposes should be based on . . . an understanding of the normative, empirical
and theoretical foundations, as well as the limits of, such tests and data.”); id. comment to std. 10.15
at 167 (“The interpretation of findings . . . requires appropriate education about, supervised
experience with, and knowledge of procedural, theoretical, and empirical limitations of the tests and
the evaluation procedure.”).
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The assessment of intellectual functioning is a task that requires
specialized professional training. Assessment data should be reported
by an examiner(s) experienced with people who have mental
retardation and qualified in terms of professional and state regulations
as well as meeting a publisher’s guidelines for conducting a thorough,
valid psychological evaluation of the individual’s intelligence
functioning. In some instances, this may require an interdisciplinary
evaluation.427

The American Psychological Association’s standards regarding
psychological testing and assessment also emphasize the evaluator’s
qualifications: “Those who use psychological tests should confine their
testing and related assessment activities to their areas of competence,
as demonstrated through education, training, experience, and
appropriate credentials.”428
Similarly, the administration of adaptive behavior instruments must
be performed by professionals with expertise in their use.429 Evaluators
and expert witnesses who do not meet these standards are appropriately
viewed with some skepticism.430
427. AAMR 2002, supra note 95, at 51; see also AAIDD 2010, supra note 65, at 40-41.
Seemingly small errors in implementing the test’s conditions and protocols can produce scores that
inaccurately reflect the subject’s actual level of intelligence. See ANASTASI & URBINA,
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING, supra note 106, at 207 (“Special training and experience are needed for
administration, scoring, and interpretation of results. Considerable familiarity and practice with the
scale are demanded for a smooth performance. Hesitation and fumbling may be ruinous to rapport,
especially with a young test taker. Minor, inadvertent alterations in wording may alter the difficulty
of items.”) (discussing the Stanford-Binet instrument); AIKEN, ASSESSMENT OF INTELLECTUAL
FUNCTIONING, supra note 106, at 91 (“[T]he directions for each test should be followed closely and
read rather than recited from memory.”) (discussing the Stanford-Binet).
428. AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION & NATIONAL COUNCIL ON MEASUREMENT IN EDUCATION, STANDARDS FOR
EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING, std. 10.1 at 164 (2d ed., 2014). The Commentary to
this Standard explains that:
Responsible use and interpretation of test scores require appropriate levels of experience,
sound professional judgment, and understanding of the empirical and theoretical
foundations of tests. For many assessments, competency also requires sufficient
familiarity with the population of which the test taker is a member to facilitate test
selection, test administration, and test score interpretation.
Id. comment at 164; see also Paul Andrews, Psychological Testing, in 4 WILEY ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
FORENSIC SCIENCE 2173, 2174-75 (Allan Jamieson & Andre Moenssens eds. 2009) (discussing
qualifications of psychologists to administer cognitive testing).
429. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MENTAL RETARDATION: DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR
SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS 155 (Daniel J. Reschly et al. eds., 2002) (“In order for the assessment
to be clinically and scientifically meaningful, it is important that the assessor be sufficiently trained
in using and interpreting appropriate instruments. A high level of training is necessary in order to
capture and distinguish the level, quality, and pattern of adaptive behavior displayed by a given
subject, as viewed by the eyes of the respondent (parent, teacher, or caregiver).”).
430. That is not to deny that there may be some evidentiary value, in very limited
circumstances, in evaluations that do not meet this standard. For example, an IQ test that had been
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B. Clinical Judgment
In addition to explaining the technical details of evaluating a
defendant who may have intellectual disability, clinical experts must
also be given latitude to exercise and explain the role of their
professional judgment431 in reaching their conclusions.432 An expert’s
credentials are necessary to a reliable assessment, but may not, by
themselves, be sufficient.433 Courts must also be certain that the clinician
is basing his or her conclusion on an empirical and fully documented
assessment.434 That evaluative process must include consideration of a

administered during a defendant’s childhood which indicated that he had intellectual disability may
be useful to the courts in confirming that the definition’s requirement of manifestation during the
developmental period (age of onset) is satisfied. For a discussion of the similar issue of “short form”
IQ tests, see supra Part VI.B.
431. Keith F. Widaman, Concepts of Measurement, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 55, 59 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015) (“[T]he need for clinical
judgment to combine all information to arrive at important diagnostic decisions is always a
component of this assessment task.”); CLINICAL JUDGMENT 2014, supra note 253, at 7 (“The
purpose of clinical judgment is to enhance the quality, validity, and precision of the clinician’s
decision or recommendation in situations related to diagnosis, classification, and planning
supports.”); see also AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION & NATIONAL COUNCIL ON MEASUREMENT IN EDUCATION,
STANDARDS FOR EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING, std. 10.1 comment at 164 (2d ed.,
2014) (“Test score interpretation requires professionally responsible judgment that is exercised
within the boundaries of knowledge and skill afforded by the professional’s education, training, and
supervised experience, as well as the context in which the assessment is being performed.”); APA,
DSM-5, supra note 65, at 37 (“Clinical training and judgment are required to interpret test results
and assess intellectual performance.”); Ruth Luckasson & Robert L. Schalock, Standards to Guide
the Use of Clinical Judgment in the Field of Intellectual Disability, 53 INTELLECTUAL &
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 240, 247 (2015) (“The clinical judgment standards . . . provide the
basis for valid and precise decisions and recommendations . . . .”).
432. See ROBERT L. SCHALOCK & RUTH LUCKASSON, CLINICAL JUDGMENT 6 (1st ed. 2005)
(“Clinical judgment should not be thought of as a justification for abbreviated evaluations, a vehicle
for stereotypes or prejudices, a substitute for insufficiently explored questions, an excuse for
incomplete or missing data, or a way to solve political problems.”); CLINICAL JUDGMENT 2014,
supra note 253, at 15; Tassé, Adaptive Behavior and Diagnosis, supra note 87, at 121 (“Hence,
clinical judgment should not be used as a shield when one draws conclusions that are not supported
by the assessment results, observations, and/or case records.”); Macvaugh & Cunningham, Forensic
Practice, supra note 83, at 155 ([“C]linical judgments . . . should be based on a solid foundation of
scientific knowledge and not the ‘gut instinct’ or ‘seat-of-the-pants’ impression of the examiner.”);
Everington & Olley, Defining and Diagnosing, supra note 15, at 7 (“Statements such as ‘the bright
look in his eye told me he was not retarded,’ cannot be accepted as psychological evidence in a
mental retardation hearing.”).
433. Olley, Qualifications, supra note 268, at 139 (“[T]he diagnosis of mild mental retardation
is complex and requires more than the rigid application of test scores.”).
434. This excludes, of course, impressionistic and unscientific “observations”:
Alternatively, an examiner might simply conclude that the defendant ‘does not seem
mentally retarded,’ independent of IQ score, effort testing, and structured adaptive
behavior assessment. Such idiosyncratic methods and intuitive observations have no
normative comparisons, have not been scientifically tested, have no known reliability or
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variety of sources of information that shed light on whether the
individual has intellectual disability.435 Expert witnesses, whether for the
prosecution or the defense,436 must be held to a high standard of
professionalism and thoroughness in the performance of their
evaluations and preparation of their reports for the courts.437
C. Codes and Standards of Ethics
Mental disability professionals are governed and guided by
standards established by their own professions, and adherence to these
standards should be reflected in the reports they prepare and the
testimony they offer. Psychologists, psychiatrists, and other clinicians
operate within codes of professional responsibility and ethical
guidelines, and these codes and standards are fully consistent with their
task in Atkins cases of assisting the courts honestly.
Those professionals confront different ethical issues, of course,
when they have been retained in a criminal case by the prosecution or by
defense counsel, as contrasted to that same professional’s duties when
diagnosing an individual in a treatment or educational setting. The
relevant codes and standards have addressed the particular issues
involved in forensic practice.
For example, the American Psychology-Law Society (a division of
the American Psychological Association)438 provides in its Specialty
validity, and reflect unsystematic and potentially confirmatory sampling bias. Whatever
their anecdotal appeal, such methods lack scientific rigor and are not appropriate
expressions of clinical judgment.
Macvaugh & Cunningham, Forensic Practice, supra note 83, at 155; see also AAIDD, USER’S
GUIDE 2012, supra note 65, at 21 (“[A]lthough socio-cultural factors are important to be considered
by the clinician, at no time do socio-cultural factors justify modifications to scores obtained by the
individual on a standardized assessment instrument that assesses intellectual functioning.”); Robert
M. Sanger, IQ Intelligence Tests, “Ethnic Adjustments” and Atkins, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 87, 123
(2015) (“An extensive review of the literature did not locate any peer reviewed scientific studies
that support the scientific use of ethnic adjustments for forensic purposes and, therefore, none that
support such adjustments in Atkins cases in particular.”).
435. CLINICAL JUDGMENT 2014, supra note 253, at 27 (“A thorough history is essential for a
valid and precise diagnosis of ID. Such a history should include three components: social, medical,
and educational.”).
436. See McWilliams v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 1790, 1793 (2017) (“[W]hen certain threshold
criteria are met, the State must provide an indigent defendant with access to a mental health expert
who is sufficiently available to the defense and independent from the prosecution to effectively
‘assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.’” (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470
U.S. 68, 83 (1985))).
437. See AAIDD, USER’S GUIDE 2012, supra note 65, at 21 (“Be sensitive to language
differences and culturally based behaviors and beliefs. . . . Do not, however, allow cultural or
linguistic diversity to over-shadow or minimize the disability.”).
438. The group is designated as Division 41 of the American Psychological Association. See
Join Us, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL-LAW SOCIETY: APA DIV. 41, http://ap-

1418

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1305

Guidelines for Forensic Psychology that the role of forensic examiners is
“to assist the trier of fact to understand evidence or determine a fact in
issue, and [to] provide information that is most relevant to the
psycholegal issue.”439 In performing this function for the courts,
psychologists are admonished to “ensure that the products of their
services, as well as their own public statements and professional reports
and testimony, are communicated in ways that promote understanding
and avoid deception.”440 Meeting this responsibility requires of the
clinician both integrity and candor.441
Psychiatrists are governed by similar ethical rules when they work
in forensic settings. The Ethics Guidelines of the American Academy of
Psychiatry and the Law counsel caution that the adversarial nature of the
legal process cannot be permitted to distort the witness’s obligation to
provide the court with accurate assessments and professional opinions.442
All of these professional and ethical standards reflect a common
principle: assuring that the evaluator gives the court the most accurate
and complete information available and the benefit of that professional’s
best clinical judgment.443 This is, of course, the same perspective shared

ls.wildapricot.org/page-1680571 (last visited Aug. 23, 2018). The group that specializes in issues
involving intellectual disability is Division 33. See President’s Welcome, AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION: APA DIV. 33: IDD/ASD, http://www.division33.org/presidentswelcome (last visited Aug. 23, 2018).
439. Am. Psychological Ass’n, Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychology, 68 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 7, 15 (2013) (Guideline 10.01). The American Psychological Association has also
adopted general ethical principles for all psychologists. Am. Psychological Ass’n, Ethical
Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, 57 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1060 (2002).
440. Id. at 16 (Guideline 11.01); id. (“Forensic practitioners do not, by either commission or
omission, participate in misrepresentation of their evidence, nor do they participate in partisan
attempts to avoid, deny, or subvert the presentation of evidence contrary to their own position or
opinion.”).
441. Id. at 8-9 (Guideline 1.02); id. at 9 (“When conducting forensic examinations, forensic
practitioners strive to be unbiased and impartial, and avoid partisan presentation of unrepresentative,
incomplete, or inaccurate evidence that might mislead finders of fact.”).
442. AM. ACADEMY PSYCHIATRY & THE LAW, ETHICS GUIDELINES FOR THE PRACTICE OF
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY (2005) (Guideline IV Commentary), reprinted in PHILIP J. CANDILIS ET AL.,
FORENSIC ETHICS AND THE EXPERT WITNESS 185, 187-88 (Andrew Szanton ed., 2007) (“Being
retained by one side in a civil or criminal matter exposes psychiatrists to the potential for
unintended bias and the danger of distortion of their opinion. It is the responsibility of psychiatrists
to minimize such hazards by acting in an honest manner and striving to reach an objective
opinion.”); see also Robert Weinstock et al., Ethical Guidelines, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 56 (Richard Rosner ed., 2d ed. 2003); Am. Academy of Psychiatry & the
Law, AAPL Practice Guideline for the Forensic Assessment, 43 J. AM. ACADEMY PSYCHIATRY &
LAW S3, S36, 38 (2015 Supp.) (Guideline 10.3 Assessments of Persons with Intellectual Disability,
and Guideline 10.6.3 Evaluator Bias).
443. See, e.g., SHANE S. BUSH ET AL., ETHICAL PRACTICE IN FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY: A
SYSTEMATIC MODEL FOR DECISION MAKING 11 (2006) (“To achieve this goal, the psychologist
assumes the role of seeker of truth and judicial educator.”).
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by the legal profession and by courts.444 In Atkins cases, courts need to
be mindful of these professional principles, and careful in determining
whether they are, in fact, being met by the professionals who appear
before them.445
IX.

CONCLUSION

Adjudicating cases under Atkins presents challenges for courts, but
the challenges are certainly not insurmountable. There is a remarkable
degree of consensus and clarity on almost all diagnostic issues among
clinicians and scholars who study intellectual disability, and that
consensus is reflected in the abundant scientific literature. As a result,
courts (as well as counsel and expert witnesses) have access to clear
clinical guidance in addressing the issues posed by these cases.

444. See, e.g., ABA MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 1988, supra note 8, std. 7-1.1(b) (“In
offering expert opinions and testimony concerning present scientific or clinical knowledge and in
evaluating and offering expert opinions and testimony on the mental condition of criminal
defendants, the mental health or mental retardation professional, no matter by whom retained,
should function objectively within the professional’s area of expertise. . . . In evaluating the mental
condition of a defendant or witness, the professional has an obligation to make a thorough
assessment based on sound evaluative methods and to reach an objective opinion on each specific
matter referred for evaluation.”). The Commentary to this Standard notes that “[t]he counterpart to
an attorney’s responsibility to respect an evaluator’s professional independence is, of course, the
evaluator’s obligation to perform objectively and to understand the need for objectivity.” Id.
commentary (Professionals as Evaluators); see also ABA MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 2016,
supra note 8, std. 7-1.3(b).
445. Olley, Death Penalty and Courts, supra note 160, at 231 (“Whether the expert is hired by
the prosecution or the defense, it is his or her ethical responsibility to present information
objectively. Thus, it is essential that one knows and relies upon the established research on ID.”
(citation omitted)).

